


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


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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a Committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.



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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME I.

JANUARY, 1908.

NUMBER 1.

THE CALL TO THEOLOGY

FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The time may appear to many persons inopportune for the launching of a Journal of Theology. The tide of theological interest may seem to have ebbed so low as to leave no channel for such a venture; the profession of the ministry fails to win recruits; the queen of the sciences is deposed from her throne; critics are announcing the rout of the theological schools. The machinery of the churches, it is true, revolves with energy, but it does not seem to be geared into the wheels of the working world; and the deliberations of the theologians are frankly regarded by great numbers of people with indifference, if not with contempt. A distinguished railway president, on being informed that a promising youth had undertaken the study of theology, remarked, "Why does not so gifted a man devote himself to something that is real?"

This apparent turn of the tide is illustrated by the movement of higher education in the United States. Universities and colleges, whether maintained by the State or endowed by private means, have become detached, not only from theological supervision, but even from theological instruction. Faculties of theology are the exception rather than the rule in American universities. It is felt that theology is not only a difficult and divisive subject, but that it is not essential to the complete equipment of an institution of learning. "Let those who care for theology," it is said, "establish their denominational schools where they may have the advantage of an academic environment; the univer-

sity itself needs no school of theology to complete its circle of the sciences." The same reaction from theology is to be observed even among those who have been professionally trained as theologians. Education in medicine, law, and natural science, has been within one generation fundamentally revised to meet the new expansion of knowledge, but education for the ministry has for the most part remained unadjusted to the new world of learning. The requirement of the Hebrew language, for example, as a condition of ordination—or rather the requirement of so meagre a knowledge of the Hebrew language that not one student in ten can utilize it—still extorts from many students of theology in the United States from one-fourth to one-third of their years of professional education. As a consequence of this and similar survivals in the theological curriculum, many ministers of religion have found themselves trained in subjects which they cannot use, and ignorant of much which they need to know, and as they take up their work in the world are inclined to lay down their theology. They become administrators of congregations, organizers of ecclesiastical industries, philanthropists, pastors, but not theologians. Theology has presented itself to their minds as a record of controversies which were once living fires but are now extinct volcanoes, and they turn with a sense of relief to the fertile fields of modern life. The call of the time seems to them a call away from theology. They may even acquire a habit of mind quite distinct from that which characterizes a learned calling. Practitioners of law, medicine, or the natural sciences, are primarily and continuously students, unremittingly concerned to maintain the pace of intellectual progress, open-minded to each fresh discovery of truth. Practitioners of theology, on the other hand, often reserve little time for study, and may easily become disinclined to severe or logical thinking. Thus they may become faithful custodians of the oracles of God or skilful operatives in the work of the Church, and in either function may be workmen that need not be ashamed, but their attitude toward truth tends to detach them from the spirit of the modern world. A distinguished man of science, addressing, in 1906, the graduates of a technical school, said to them, "We old fellows have hard work to keep up with the advances of this generation in scientific theory and technical

practice, and we strain every nerve to maintain our place as *learners*." Then, as though contrasting this habit of mind with another, he proceeded to remark: "Authors, clergymen, women, and charitable workers, whose ideals of duty are in some respects unquestionably higher than those of the world, are in general strangely blind to the obligations of debt and contract. . . . Bankers do not like to deal with ladies or ministers or literary men." The scientific habit of mind, that is to say, according to this scholar, has its moral effect, and ministers, being less devoted to the method of science, become correspondingly less trustworthy in the ethics of daily life. However exaggerated such an indictment may be, it is not altogether without support in the habit and disposition of some ministers. It can hardly be maintained that the traits of intellectual honesty—precision, reserve of statement, the weighing of words—are as conspicuous in ministers as in men of science or men of affairs. At a convocation lately held of students from many theological schools the problems and ideals of the ministry were set forth for three days by selected advisers, and discussed by selected young men. The programme was rich in suggestions, both for the conduct of the devout life and for the direction of practical service, but throughout the session not one word was spoken either by old or young which concerned the minister as a thinker, or the duties of theological students as students of theology. Feeling and action had crowded out of the foreground of interest the function of thought. Piety and efficiency seemed sufficient substitutes for intellectual power. The passion for service had supplanted the passion for truth. A very competent critic of preaching, addressing an assemblage of preachers in Boston, is said to have told them with characteristic candor that their work was marked by "intellectual frugality." The same indictment has been brought by a distinguished representative of the Church of England against his own communion. "The real security of the Church," said the Bishop of Birmingham, "lies in giving full scope to the scholar's gift, and the reason why many thoughtful people do not find spiritual advantage in listening to preachers is that the preaching gives them little to think about." A supply of priests, in other words, cannot make good a lack of prophets. The church as altar or workshop cannot supplant the

church as interpreter and preacher. A time when people in an unprecedented degree are thinking can be guided by those only who can think straight and can report their thought with power. At such a time the words of Phillips Brooks, which to many readers once seemed exaggerated, become words of sober warning, "In many respects an ignorant clergy, however pious it may be, is worse than none at all."

If, then, these signs of a reaction from theology are unmistakable, what is the dilemma which confronts the Christian Church? Either it must frankly retreat from the pretence of leadership under the conditions of the present age, or it must become a more efficient organ of rational and candid thought. Not less of religious fervor and not less of practical activity are demanded of the representatives of religion, but a new accession of intellectual power, the capacity to translate the message of the Timeless into the dialect of the present age. The specialization of knowledge has prescribed to the minister of religion a definite sphere, and no amount of hastily acquired information about politics or economics or social reform can atone for the abandonment of his own province. On other subjects others are better trained than he, and may listen to his counsel with compassion, if not with contempt. If he gives up thinking about religion, he gives up his place in a learned profession. He may continue to be a devoted priest, an efficient administrator, a devout soul, but the direction of the mind of the age is transferred to other hands. In 1729, William Law, the English mystic, published his *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*, a summons to piety which touched experiences as remote from each other as those of Samuel Johnson and John Wesley. The same call of the mystic to the practice of the presence of God should be heard by the present age, and in the whirlwind and fire and earthquake of the time many a heart listens for this still small voice of the spirit. Under the new conditions of the modern world, however, its resistless movement of inquiry, its universal cultivation of the scientific method, its complete abandonment of obscurantism and ambiguity, a new and not less serious call is heard to devout and holy thinking. The future of organized religion will depend, not alone on new expressions of piety and new enlistments for service, but — in an unprecedented

degree—on a revival, among those who represent religion, of intellectual authority and leadership.

There are several further considerations which reinforce this call of the time and add to its imperativeness. In the first place, it must be remembered that any one who thinks about religion theologizes, whether he will or no. Theology may appear to him a dreary record of profitless controversies, from which he turns to a self-originated, contemporary, up-to-date religion, with its material in the events of the day or the witness of personal experience. "Yourself," said Emerson, "a new-born bard of the Holy Ghost, cast behind you all conformity, and acquaint men at first-hand with Deity." It is a natural reaction in the rhythm of progress. Dogmatism begets mysticism; literalism swings over into transcendentalism. In neither case, however, is there an escape from theology. The theology of supernaturalism is simply supplanted by the theology of naturalism. "When me they fly," theology may say with Emerson, "I am the wings." Tauler, Madame Guyon, and Schleiermacher are as legitimately to be reckoned among the theologians as Cyprian and Thomas Aquinas. The only refuge from theology is to stop thinking about religion, and that is impossible except to one who stops thinking altogether. The only alternatives are those of a molluscos theology and a vertebrated theology; a theology which is all foreground, like a Chinese plate where the man is larger than the house from which he comes, and a theology which has perspective, background, and relations.

In the second place, there should be recalled the coincidence which has occurred at many points in history of a revival of theology with a revival of religion. It has indeed not infrequently happened that a wave of religious feeling has been set in motion by unlearned preachers like Bunyan or Moody; but it cannot be inferred from such stirrings of the spirit that religious zeal is naturally repressed by learning or fostered by ignorance. The epochs of Christian history which have most indelibly marked its religious life have been at the same time epochs in the history of theology. The Confessions of Augustine, the Meditations of Anselm, the Simple Method how to Pray, of Luther, the *Monologen* of Schleiermacher—these manuals of the devout life are the

by-products of theologians. None but theologians could have created these epochs in the history of piety, and none but pious souls could have created the coincident epochs in the history of theology. Protestantism, Methodism, and Tractarianism were movements of religious vitality, but they began within the precincts of universities. It is suicidal to anticipate a revival of religion which shall be dissociated from a revival of theology. The only practicable choice is between a theology which gives chains and a theology which gives wings.

The call to theology is, further, heard in more personal experiences. Many a minister of religion would gladly testify to the tonic effect upon his spiritual power of intimacy with the mind of a master; the chastening discipline of acquaintance with great teachers or great thoughts. It is not essential to this exhilaration that the teaching should be accepted; it is the intellectual friction which sustains the momentum of his own thought. Not tolerance only, but the expansion of one's own convictions, comes of ascending with a trained guide to the heights of thought where one surveys the broad horizon of truth. No preacher is safe from spiritual atrophy who does not habitually exercise himself in these intellectual athletics of his profession. I have known a Protestant rationalist whose thought and style were enriched by the study of Cardinal Newman; another who prepared himself for worship by companionship with the mediæval mystics; and still another who sharpened his mind each week on the whetstone of Calvin. One of the most impressive facts in the biography of James Martineau is his determination, at the age of forty, to withdraw from his distinguished career as preacher and, even thus tardily, betake himself to Germany, where he might establish first-hand relations with the masters of philosophical idealism. From this point a new note of authority and a new sweep of insight are at his command, and the lyric strain of his earlier teaching is steadied and broadened by new companionships. No disclosure in the biography of Phillips Brooks is more instructive than the intellectual momentum which this prophet of modern life acquired through a study of the ante-Nicene Fathers of the Church. Historical research, far from diminishing his passionate devotion to contemporary religion, broadened and clarified his

view; and his gift of sympathy with types of thought and worship remote from his own was, if not acquired, at least confirmed, by his intimacy with Tertullian and Origen.

A further aspect of the call to theology is its promotion of co-operation between the teachers and the preachers of religion. The Devil, it has been said, laughs at a divided Church. It must be not less amusing to him to see the skirmish-line of theology advancing to new attacks of inquiry while the commanders of ecclesiasticism retreat to the breastworks of the past. This alienation between the conduct of pastoral life and the teaching of theological science may be observed in all countries. New sources of knowledge, new methods of criticism, new material for investigation, have given new vitality and fascination to the study of theology; but if free inquiry is to be met by anything less than appreciation and confidence, then religion cannot expect to hold the loyalty of educated men. If professional preferment or popularity be reserved for those whose minds are closed and denied to those whose minds are open, there must follow the decadence of the ministry and the paralysis of the Church. If industry and candor are less available as passports to eminence than conformity and reticence, then the Church is doomed to obscurantism and provincialism. Nothing repels the best minds from the service of religion more sternly than this sense of a schism between its science and its art. What Samuel Adams said of the American colonies is true of the ministers of religion in their relation to the teachers of theology: if they do not hang together, they will hang separately. The only permanent cure for wrong thinking is right thinking. The only way out of bad theology is through good theology. Either the theologians must lead the Church, or the Church must cease to lead the world. Religion must either hear the call to theology: or must content itself with becoming a function of the State, or a refuge for sick souls.

Finally, as one thus reviews the signs of the times which call to theology, he observes that it is a call which in many countries and many forms is being heard and obeyed. The first impression which one receives of a prevailing indifference to theology is not a just impression. On the contrary, the signs of a new concern for

the rational interpretation of religion are so many that they appear to be the premonitions of a genuine renaissance. The Roman Catholic Church is at this moment stirred by an agitation of free inquiry whose consequences may be as momentous as those of the Protestant Reformation; and this theological movement, represented by the Abbé Loisy, Senator Fogazzaro, and Father Tyrrell, is not likely to be checked by the reproach of Modernism. A great Church, as one critic has remarked, cannot maintain itself on the principle that there is no such thing as history. Either within the Catholic Church, or—in the language of the last Encyclical—“as the synthesis of all heresies,” a revision of Catholic theology seems destined to occur. A similar call to serious thinking is heard, among the noises of ecclesiastical politics, both in France and Great Britain. The collisions of State with Church, by the very violence of their friction, are striking out new conceptions of the nature and province of religion, and giving new momentum to theological progress. The “New Theology” of the English nonconformists, even if it be neither wholly new nor wholly theological, is at least a brave and candid search for a rational basis of religious experience. The scientific temper, long alienated from theology, is returning to the perennially absorbing problems of faith, as in the suggestive catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge. In every communion of churches the younger clergy are eagerly reconsidering the foundations of belief, testing the flexibility of creeds, and extending the radius of intellectual liberty. It is a propitious time to begin a *Journal of Theology*. The period of indifference seems approaching its close, and an era of promise for theology seems to be at hand. In one of the most notable of modern German books on the beginnings of Christianity, Professor Wernle remarks, with playful exaggeration, that among other characteristics of the work of Jesus Christ he came to save men from the theologians. It is a just discrimination of his teaching from the theological method of the scribes; but it is a most inadequate definition of the purpose of Jesus. He came, in fact, not to destroy theology, but to fulfil it. He gave new scope and significance to the thought of God, to the nature of man, and to the destiny of the soul and of the world. He would have been reckoned among the world's great theologians if other endowments had not given

him a higher title. He came not to save men from the theologians, but to save the theologians themselves. It is the same today. The traditional, external, and formal theology of the scribes speaks in a language which the present age does not understand, but the theology of Jesus Christ has the perennial authority of spiritual insight and habitual communion with the Eternal. The message of the gospel is not one of salvation from the theologians, nor even one of salvation for the theologians, but a message which, in its interpretation of the nature of God and of man, must be delivered by the theologians to the mind of the modern world.

MODERN IDEAS OF GOD

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Modern ideas of God are many and various, but all of them, so far as they are not mere reproductions of traditional views handed down from the past, are dominated by one or the other of two independent tendencies, which took their rise respectively from Spinoza and from Kant. In this article it is impossible to follow the various ramifications of these tendencies. They are often found together in the same theologian in curious and even inconsistent combinations. I desire to distinguish them sharply the one from the other, and to study them separately as they appear in a few of their most notable and consistent representatives. The former tendency, as I have said, took its rise from Spinoza. Despised and neglected by the leaders of European thought for nearly a hundred years after his death, he finally came to his rights, and was speedily a dominant force in Germany, which was about to assume again the intellectual leadership of Europe held in the eighteenth century successively by England and France. The time was ripe for Spinoza's philosophy. Reaction against the extreme individualism and superficial rationalism of the period was growing rapidly, and the profound and massive monism of the great Jewish sage was fitted to appeal to the imagination of the new age. The first important utterance was Herder's little work entitled *Gott*, which appeared in 1787 and had wide influence. In this book Herder interprets Spinoza in the light of Leibnitz's dynamic conception of the universe, and so supplements his unity of substance with an all-pervasive unity of force. God he represents as the infinite force which constitutes the essence of all existence, spiritual and material, and individualizes itself in the phenomenal world both of man and of nature. We are differentiations of this one all-embracing force, and have reality as individuals in proportion as we give ourselves to

the preservation of the whole, which we feel belongs to us and to which we belong. Our individuality consists in our consciousness of oneness with the all and our devotion to it. In coming to a knowledge of God, of whom we are a part, we come to self-consciousness, and in coming to self-consciousness we come to a knowledge of God.

Thus, with a monism as thoroughgoing as Spinoza's, Herder is enabled, as he thinks, to make room for individual religious feeling and activity, and so prepares the way for the various combinations of monism and Christian theism which are among the most characteristic features of nineteenth century religious thought.¹

In line with the same general tendency, stress began to be laid toward the close of the eighteenth century, again under the influence of Leibnitz's dynamic philosophy, upon a unity of process controlling all nature and human history, or in other words upon the doctrine of evolution. Herder's elaborate *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1790 f.) is an important document in this connection. The effect of the growing theory of evolution, which rapidly made its way both in philosophy and in science, was identical with that of Herder's interpretation of Spinoza, promoting as it did the idea that all force is immanent rather than extraneous, and so tending to undermine the idea of a transcendent creator and governor of the world, and ultimately to promote the doctrine of divine immanence.

Closely related to Herder's monism, though worked out more carefully and formulated in a more philosophical way, is Schleiermacher's idea of God. He felt, as Herder did, the influence of Spinoza, but not to the same extent the influence of Leibnitz; and he was controlled much more than Herder by the growing romanticism of the age. Two things about romanticism are of particular interest in this connection, its emphasis upon the emotional side of man's nature, and its recognition of him as part of a larger whole, in oneness with which and in openness to whose influence he finds his true life. Culture consists in learning to appreciate the beauty and harmony of the universe of which one

¹ For a fuller description of Herder's book, reference may be made to my article in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1905.

is a part, in coming into more intimate sympathy with it, and in acquiring a sensitiveness to the whole world of nature and of man. The common tendency among the romanticists was to reproduce the conditions of earlier ages before the modern spirit of enlightenment had taken possession of the world, when every one believed in immediate intercourse between man and the universe about him, in apparitions and fairies and fables, and when the fancy had free play and was not yet destroyed by the ruthless hand of reason. The effect upon religion was diverse. Some of the romanticists felt the religious impulse strongly; but with their hostility to the dominance of reason, which they believed began with the Reformation, and with their distaste for the prevalent coldness and barrenness of Protestantism, they found Catholicism more to their liking. Others revolted against religion altogether, which they knew only in its rationalistic form, and regarded it as unworthy the notice of the man of genuine culture. It was for romanticists of the latter class that Schleiermacher wrote in 1799 his famous *Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*.² The most important of the discourses is the second, on the nature of religion. The general thesis is that religion has its seat, not in the intellect, nor in the will, but in the feelings, and consists in a sense of the universal or infinite. "Piety," Schleiermacher says, "must take its place alongside of science and practice as a third of equal dignity and importance." To be religious is to be immediately conscious of the universal, that is of the divine, in and through all its manifestations in the world of sense and thought. Schleiermacher's religious sense was simply a translation into other terms of the artistic sense of the romanticists. What they called openness to the universe he called openness to God. What they regarded as an apprehension of its beauty and harmony was to him an apprehension of the divine. So he claimed that the highest culture, of which the romanticists made so much, includes religion; and to be without religion is to content oneself with a partial and one-sided development. Religion raises a man above his individual limitations into converse with the infinite, and the religious man recognizes in every event a manifestation of the divine.

² English translation by John Oman, "On Religion," etc., 1893.

Everything is a miracle, a sign of the presence and activity of God. Revelation is every communication of the universe to the human spirit, every vision which the individual has of the All. Grace is merely the efficient influence of man's consciousness of the infinite upon his own living. Ego and non-ego are simply differentiations of the Absolute, or God. In the Absolute the two exist in perfect unity, in the world they are separated. But they become one again in every impression of the world upon us. The universal manifests itself only through the individual, and the individual comes to its true life only in the universal, and to be aware of this life is to be religious. In a later work, *Der Christliche Glaube*, Schleiermacher defines religion as the sense of dependence upon the infinite. But this was due to the growing sway of traditional theology, and indicates no essential change of view.

Under the influence of Kant's epistemology, Schleiermacher says that we become conscious of our oneness with the absolute, not through immediate vision of it, but only through our relation to the phenomenal universe, and as a result of the impression of the world upon us. And, equally under Kant's influence, he denies that we apprehend the absolute intellectually. All knowledge of it is impossible; it is given us only in feeling. He thus saves himself from mysticism in the historic Neoplatonic sense. But this does not affect the controlling tendency of his thought. He belongs in the group which owed its existence to Spinoza. He is a monist as truly as Herder, who was not at all in sympathy with the new critical epistemology and rejected it completely.

Closely related to both Herder and Schleiermacher is Hegel with his logical monism. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (published posthumously in 1832) he says, "God is the unity of the natural and spiritual."³ "God is the absolute substance, the only true reality. Everything else which is real is not real in itself; it has no existence in itself. The only absolute reality is God alone, and so he is the absolute substance."⁴ The absolute, to be sure, is dynamic, not static as with Spinoza. "Only God is; God, however, only through the mediation of himself

³ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, 2d ed., Berlin, 1840, I, 202.

⁴ Ibid. I, 90.

with himself. He wills the finite, he sets it before himself as another, and thereby is made another to himself, is made a finite, for he has another over against himself." "This existence of the finite must not continue, but must be put an end to. God is the movement toward finiteness, and also the removing of it in himself. In the ego, as that which exists finitely, God returns to himself, and is only God in that he thus returns. Without the world God is not God."⁵ In the dynamic character of the absolute is found the basis of Hegel's doctrine of evolution, which is one of the secrets of the influence of Hegelianism.

"Religion," Hegel says, "is knowledge of God, which, since we are but moments in the self-expression of God, may be called also God's self-knowledge." "Religion is the knowledge which the finite spirit has of the infinite, and it is the knowledge which the divine spirit has of itself through the medium of the finite, and so religion may be called God's self-consciousness."⁶

The difference between Hegel and Schleiermacher, in spite of their hostility to each other, is for our purpose not vital. It is true that Schleiermacher approaches the absolute from the side of the finite, while Hegel proceeds in the opposite direction, so that the one is experimental where the other is speculative; but God is as truly absolute being, and spirit and nature as truly differentiations of the absolute, to the one as to the other. Moreover, it is of minor consequence that the one lays the emphasis on feeling and the other on knowledge. Indeed, Hegel himself recognizes feeling as the primary organ of religion, but he puts content into it, which he thinks is lacking in Schleiermacher's view. "Feeling," he says, "may have the most various content." "Feeling is the form in which the content is entirely accidental." To put content into religious feeling is the work of philosophy, but "philosophy is distinguished from religion only in form, not in content." "Philosophy thinks what the person as such feels, . . . and so feeling is not repudiated by philosophy, but is given its true content by it."⁷

The characteristic thing about Hegel, as well as Herder and Schleiermacher, is the notion of God as the absolute, of which

⁵ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, I, 193.

⁶ Ibid. I, 202.

⁷ Ibid. I, 126.

spirit and nature are only differentiations or manifestations—a thoroughgoing monism, in which oneness is the controlling fact. God so conceived may be given a moral character; both Schleiermacher and Hegel emphasize the fact that he is love. But this is not of the essence of the matter in either case, and for our immediate purpose is not important. The one essential thing about the general type of theism I have been describing is that God is the all-embracing whole, in the consciousness of his unity with which man finds his highest life.

The tendency represented by these men makes its influence felt everywhere. It is in line with the nineteenth century spirit of collectivism; and in spite of ethical difficulties and stubborn facts of experience, it makes a tremendous appeal to thoughtful minds. Many may not go as far as the thinkers described; the tendency may not always express itself in the form of a thoroughgoing and consistent monism; but the emphasis upon divine immanence in contrast with the common eighteenth century emphasis upon divine transcendence, the insistence that God is in the universe of nature and man, and that it is essentially one with him—this is characteristic of most modern religious thought. Today God is not sought in strange and abnormal phenomena, in so-called miraculous events, as he once was, but in the common and orderly processes of nature. The whole world is permeated by the divine, and man himself is one with God. Not by shutting our eyes to the universe in which we live, and not by denying the attributes of humanity, do we form a just conception of God, as was once believed; but to be in closest touch with nature is to be in closest touch with God, and to be most human is to be most divine. The doctrine of divine immanence has been called the characteristic religious doctrine of the nineteenth century, and certainly none has had wider acceptance among men of modern sympathies. Vague and inconsistent as the belief commonly is; thoroughly monistic, or shrinking from monism in its fear of pantheism; ready to repudiate the personality of God, as Herder was, or jealously insistent upon it, as most theists are—whatever form it takes, the tendency I have been describing is widely dominant today, and it is in the philosophy of Spinoza that it has its roots.

The other general tendency to which I have referred took its rise with Kant. He was at one with the rationalists of the eighteenth century in regarding morality as the essence of religion. In his work on Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason he is very emphatic on this point. Subjectively considered, religion is the recognition of our duties as commands of God. When we do our duty, we are virtuous; when we recognize it as commanded by God, we are religious. The notion that there is anything one can do to please God except to live rightly is superstition. Moreover, to think that we can distinguish works of grace from works of nature, or that we can detect the activity of heavenly influences, is superstition. All such supernaturalism lies beyond our ken. There are three common forms of superstition, all promoted by positive religion: the belief in miracles, the belief in mysteries, and the belief in means of grace.

The genuine rationalism of all this is evident. But Kant's religious contribution does not lie here. This is simply the reproduction of the common thought of the eighteenth century. Nor does it lie, as is frequently said, in his vindication of moral freedom; for freedom was not generally denied by the rationalists of the eighteenth century, and Kant's vigorous assertion of it was made necessary only by his own critical philosophy, which seemed to destroy it altogether. His real religious contribution was a double one. In the first place, he took God out of the physical and put him into the moral sphere. In his theology as well as in his epistemology he felt the influence of Hume, but in the one as in the other he went beyond Hume's negations to a positive reconstruction of his own. We do not reach God by arguing back from the universe to a first cause, from the multiplicity of phenomena to a principle of unity, from contingent to necessary being. The iron chain of cause and effect which binds our phenomenal universe together knows no God and has no place for God. God is not a phenomenon, a being presented to us. God is an idea, a belief, which gives meaning to our ethical life and so is a postulate of our moral will.

In the second place, Kant's religious contribution lies in the fact that he interpreted God, thus transferred to the moral sphere, in terms of purpose. The necessity which leads me to postulate

God is not that I must account for the origin of my moral nature and so need a moral creator; nor that I must have a moral law-giver, or standard, or motive, as the rationalists in general said. The law of my practical reason, the categorical imperative, demands that I shall labor for the accomplishment of the highest good, shall bring my life under the control of this as a dominating purpose; and God is the purposeful being whom I assume in order to make the highest good realizable and so rational. God is thus read in terms of purpose. He exists, so far as I am concerned, simply in order to the realization—which means the rationalization—of the highest good, the Kingdom of God. We do not get God from the universe, we give him to the universe. We read meaning, worth, moral purpose, into it. We assume God, not to account for the world, but in order to realize the highest good; and we live as moral beings by the support of the meaning and worth thus attaching to the world. In his *Critique of the Practical Reason* Kant says, "Granted that the pure moral law absolutely binds everyone, not as a prudential rule but as a command, then the right-minded man may well say: I will that there be a God; that my existence in this world be also an existence outside the chain of nature, in a pure world of the understanding; finally, that my existence be endless. I insist on this, and will not permit this belief to be taken from me."⁸ In another work he says, "Out of the moral law which our own reason prescribes to us with authority, and not out of the theory of the nature of things in themselves, does the conception of God arise which the practical pure reason compels us ourselves to make."⁹ Again, "Theoretically we do not, by the strongest efforts of reason, come at all nearer to the conviction of the existence of God, the reality of the highest good, and the prospect of a future life; for we possess no insight into the nature of supersensuous objects. Practically, however, we make these objects for ourselves as we regard the idea of them helpful to our reason's ultimate aim," etc.¹⁰ God, the Kingdom of God, and immortality are "ideas made by ourselves with a practical purpose, which must not be given theoretical value, or they will turn theology into

⁸ Hartenstein's edition of Kant's Works, IV, 267.

⁹ Von einem neuerdings vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie, I, 188.

¹⁰ Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff, III, 463.

theosophy, moral teleology into mysticism, and psychology into pneumatology, and so put things, a knowledge of which we make use of in practical matters, over into a transcendent sphere where they are entirely inaccessible to our reason."¹¹

We are evidently moving here in a realm of thoroughgoing pragmatism. If one says we have no evidence for the existence of God, no proof of divine purpose in the world, we may say in the spirit of Kant: We will put purpose there; we will give the world meaning which we cannot discover in it. This is to be religious. Faith in God is an heroic deed, not simply a passive acquiescence. We make a moral purpose supreme, and we read this moral purpose into the universe, and thus we find God for ourselves. Religion is a creative act of the moral will, as knowledge, according to Kant, is a creative act of the understanding. Only as we stamp purpose on the world and give it ethical meaning can we live our highest life and be true to ourselves. This is Kant's great religious message.

The validity of the particular way in which he reaches God as a postulate of the moral will may be seriously questioned. He says of it himself that, quite independently of the presuppositions of God, freedom, and immortality, one's duty grounds itself on the moral law, and needs no support from theories touching the inner nature of things, or the secret purpose of the world order, or the reality of a world ruler.¹² His method of reaching God is familiar. We see inevitably by the law of our practical reason that virtue should lead to happiness. The combination of virtue and happiness we recognize as the highest good by the very necessity of our nature. But this leads us to postulate God, for only a supreme moral being can make virtue lead to happiness; that is, only such a being can supply the second element of the highest good. This highest good is the Kingdom of God and the supreme end of creation. The moral law requires that I shall make it the aim of all my efforts. My own happiness as a moral being is included in this Kingdom, but must not be the motive of my conduct. My only motive should be virtue. No one is moral who obeys the law for

¹¹ Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff, III, 476.

¹² Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, IV, 267.

any ulterior purpose. Religion does not supply motive for virtue, but it meets the need of our practical reason, which demands the ultimate realization of the highest good. As I have said, there may be doubt as to the validity of this method of reaching God. As a matter of fact, it has little influence today. It is not here indeed that Kant's contribution lies, but, as already shown, in the fact that he interpreted God wholly in terms of moral purpose.

Closely connected with Kant was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. With Fichte's subjective idealism I am not here concerned; but the conception of religion which appears in some of his earlier writings is important, for it represents a more complete ethicizing of Kant's theory, that is, a more consistent carrying out of Kant's own ethical principles. In his beautiful little essay entitled "Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine Göttliche Weltregierung," which appeared in the *Philosophisches Journal* for 1798, Fichte shows that we cannot argue from the world to a rational creator or to a world ruler, but can reach God only through our moral nature. I find myself free from the control of the world of sense and raised above it. As a free being, I possess a purpose to which I give myself. I cannot doubt my freedom and I cannot doubt my purpose without denying myself. The conviction that I am free and am called to accomplish a purpose is faith, and hence the element of moral certainty is faith. To set myself an object is the same as to set it before me as actually accomplished in some future time. If I will not deny myself, I must assume the possibility of its accomplishment. If I ought, I can. The ought is given immediately, and necessarily involves the can. This is a categorical imperative, and is based on nothing else. If one says he must know whether he can before he knows whether he ought, he turns the thing around and makes the moral law conditional instead of imperative, and so entirely destroys it. The world, including my existence and that of others, is the common theatre of morality. It constitutes a scene for the exercise of freedom, but itself has not the slightest influence on freedom. The free moral will is above all nature. "That the rational object shall be realized," he says, "can be brought about only through the activity of a free being. But it will surely be realized in accordance with a higher law.

Right doing is possible, and every circumstance contributes to it through that higher law." This moral order, he goes on to say, is divine. "This is the true faith; this moral order is the divine which we assume. It is built through right doing. This is the only possible confession of faith, joyfully and without restraint to do what each one ought to do, without doubting and troubling oneself about the consequences. In this way the divine becomes living and actual to us." And again, "It is therefore a misunderstanding to say that it is doubtful whether there is a God or not. It is not at all doubtful, indeed, it is the most certain thing in the world, the ground of all other certainties, the only absolute objective certainty, that there is a moral order of the world; that every rational individual has his fixed place in this order and his own work; . . . that without it not a hair falls from his head; . . . that every truly good deed succeeds, every bad deed fails infallibly; and that to those who love the good all things work for good. On the other hand, to one who thinks upon this for a moment and acknowledges frankly the result of his thought, it cannot remain doubtful that the conception of God as a special substance is impossible and contradictory."

In his *Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus*, which was published the following year and is simply an elaboration and defense of the briefer essay, he says: "Their object [that is, the object of his opponents] is always enjoyment, whether of a higher or lower sort; enjoyment in this life, and if they picture to themselves immortality, enjoyment in the life beyond the grave. They know nothing else than enjoyment. They cannot conceal from themselves that the success of their striving after enjoyment depends upon something unknown which they call fortune. This fortune they personify, and this is their God. Their God is the giver of all enjoyment, of all happiness and unhappiness to moral beings. This is his fundamental character." "The central point of the strife between me and my opponents is this, that we stand in two different worlds and talk about two different worlds, they about the world of sense, I about the supersensuous world; that they think wholly of enjoyment, whatever form they may give it, while I think wholly of mere duty."

Thus Fichte follows Kant in making God a postulate of the

practical reason. But he is more consistently ethical even than Kant in neglecting altogether the latter's conception of the highest good as the combination of virtue and happiness, and seeing it solely in virtue. To Fichte God is necessary, not, as to Kant, in order to effect the ultimate union of virtue and happiness, but in order to secure the victory of virtue. The good deed succeeds infallibly, the bad deed fails infallibly, because there is a moral order of the universe, or, in other words, because there is a God. And so we may call Fichte's religion ethical optimism. To be virtuous is to do one's duty without regard to consequences. To be religious is to have the faith that goodness will prevail, that there is a moral order of the universe which makes for the final victory of the right. One may be moral and a pessimist. One can be religious only if one is an optimist.

Closely related to the position of Kant and Fichte, and yet fundamentally at variance with it, is the theistic philosophy of Jacobi, who repudiated the monism of Spinoza,¹³ and followed Kant in his sharp distinction between the physical and moral spheres, while at the same time he felt the influence of romanticism, whose emphasis on feeling and on direct vision of things unseen by the common herd dominated his whole system.¹⁴ By the *Verstand*, or Understanding, he affirms, we cannot apprehend God or supersensible realities. We can reach only the phenomenal universe, which is under the control of mechanical law. All philosophy of the understanding, that is, all demonstrative philosophy, of which Spinozism is the most consistent example, is therefore atheistical. We can never discover God or supersensuous reality by means of it. Is there then no God, and are there no spiritual realities, and is there no way by which to reach them? Jacobi answers, Yes; but they are attainable only by another faculty, a faculty of direct vision, which in his earlier works he calls *Glaube*, or Faith, in his later *Vernunft*, or Reason, and which he distinguishes sharply from the understanding. Faith, or Reason, is a perceptive faculty. By it we perceive the supersensible as immediately as sensible objects

¹³ See his Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, 1785.

¹⁴ See especially his Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung, 1811, and the introduction to his philosophical writings prefixed to his treatise on Hume in the collected edition of his Works.

through the senses, and the former no more than the latter needs proof or admits of it. We are reminded here of the Evangelicals, who also assumed the existence of such a faculty, but confined it to the regenerate, making it a gift of the Holy Spirit instead of a natural endowment shared by the whole race. It is this higher spiritual faculty which distinguishes man from the brute, and it is by virtue of belonging to the higher world that he is possessed of freedom and so is a moral being. The immediate consciousness of freedom is fundamental. We are directly aware of our freedom, and so of belonging to a higher world than that of sense and of being able to control and dominate the latter. Jacobi agrees with Kant that a man would not be free, and so not moral, if he were only a part of the phenomenal universe; but he belongs to a higher world, and by virtue of his faith-faculty, of which Kant knows nothing, he becomes aware not only of freedom but also of God and other spiritual realities, becomes a religious as well as a moral being. It is through a knowledge of ourselves that we come to the knowledge of freedom and of God. Nature only conceals God. It is our own souls that reveal him, and we discover him only through self-consciousness. We find God because we can find ourselves only together with him. Revelation is wholly internal. God cannot reveal himself by visible signs and wonders, but only within man's soul. Jacobi thus followed Kant in taking God out of the phenomenal universe and putting him wholly into the moral sphere, but he failed to interpret God as Kant did in terms of purpose, and his notion of the possibility of the immediate vision of supersensible realities is of an altogether different type. His emphasis upon faith, or reason, as a higher faculty than the understanding, giving immediate perception of divine things, is mystical in its tendency, and this sufficiently marks the fundamental contrast between him and Kant, despite the kinship of the two men. As a matter of fact, though Jacobi was radically opposed to the idea of the immanence of God in nature which took its rise from Spinoza's monism, he promoted a modified form of immanence, involving God's presence in humanity, which became very popular in England under the influence of Coleridge, who emphasized Jacobi's distinction between the reason and the understanding, and in America under the influence of Bushnell, who made so much of the

supernatural character of personality. It is, in part at least, due to men of this stamp that the many current combinations of Spinozistic monism and Kantian ethicisim have arisen—combinations of varying degrees of clearness and consistency.

Jacobi held an intermediate position, representing exclusively neither of the two tendencies with which we are concerned. But it is unequivocally in the group to which Kant and Fichte belonged that we are to place the most influential theologian of the later nineteenth century, Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl started as a Hegelian, then broke away and joined the neo-Kantian movement; and his theory of knowledge, which is an important element in his system, is Kantian in origin. We can know only phenomena. We cannot penetrate beneath them to any supposed substratum or *Ding-an-sich*. But this does not mean that in knowing phenomena we do not know reality, for Ritschl adopts the Lotzian modification of the Kantian epistemology, and asserts that in phenomena reality is given, the distinction which Kant draws between phenomenon and noumenon being invalid. The reality of a thing lies in its activities, not in a quiescent something behind them, and when we know it in all its activities we know it through and through. This theory of knowledge Ritschl applies in the religious sphere. In that sphere, too, we can know only phenomena, and we cannot press back either by way of feeling or of knowledge to an unexpressed absolute or infinite. Thus Ritschl repudiates mysticism, for, as he claims, it always involves the assumption of an unseen something back of phenomena to which one can penetrate and into immediate relation with which one can come. That is, he interprets mysticism by its classic Neoplatonic type, in which just this transcendence of phenomena and immediacy of contact with a non-phenomenal noumenon is the essential thing. That he thus interpreted mysticism too narrowly may well be, but this need not concern us here. The point is that such mysticism he repudiated completely, as on his own principle he must.

Similarly, the application of his theory of knowledge to the religious sphere leads him to break away from traditional theology so far as it has to do with supra-phenomenal matters, the being of God, the creation of the universe, the nature of the soul, the future life. All such transcendental subjects, with which theology has so

largely concerned itself, he rules out of religion. We can know nothing about them, and if we could, they would not fall within the religious realm, for religion moves wholly in the sphere of value judgments. No theoretical judgment whatever, whether it concerns God, or the world, or the soul, can have any religious significance. And so no universal objective validity can be claimed for religious truths, and the effort to establish them by demonstration is vain.

Another important element in Ritschl's system is his theory of religion. Religion arises as a result of one's relation to the world. Man is conscious of impulses and aspirations which raise him above the world, and yet he is aware at the same time that he is a part of it, and the great problem in life is to be actually superior to it, to realize his higher ideals, to rule his environment, not be ruled by it. Out of the difficulty which he finds in thus winning the victory religion is born; for he looks without himself for some higher power that shall help him, in other words he looks for a God, that is, not a being who is himself the world, or who is the absolute lying back of it, whose manifestation the world is, or from whom it comes, but a God who stands over against it, asserting a spiritual principle higher than it, so that in oneness with that principle and under the control of the purpose which embodies it one may become superior to the world and a victor over it. Thus he says, "The religious view of the world is in all its forms based upon the fact that man distinguishes himself in some degree in value from the phenomena which surround him and the activities of nature which press upon him."¹⁵ And again: "In all religion the effort is made, with the help of the exalted spiritual power which man worships, to overcome the contradiction in which he finds himself as a part of the world of nature and as a spiritual personality which makes the claim to rule nature. For on the one hand man is a part of nature, helpless over against it, dependent upon and limited by external things. But on the other hand, as spirit, he feels himself driven to assert his independence over against such things. In this situation religion arises as the belief in exalted spiritual powers, through whose help the power which resides in the man himself is in some way supplemented, or raised to a complete whole

¹⁵ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, III, 17.

of its kind, which is sufficient to withstand the pressure of the natural world."¹⁶

This is, of course, the exact opposite of the idea of God (shared by Herder, Schleiermacher, and Hegel) as the great All, or Absolute, which expresses itself at the same time in nature and in man. It is God over against nature whom Ritschl seeks. He is in consequence often called a dualist, but the name is misleading. He does not think at all in terms of substance, and so is not a dualist in the traditional sense. Our superiority to the world consists in living for ideal aims which do not depend upon it and cannot be destroyed by it, living freely, courageously, patiently, and righteously. To the man living thus the world may become a means for the realization of his higher ends. It is not an end in itself, nor need it be a permanently hostile force which is to be destroyed—Ritschl was not an ascetic. The world is the sphere for the accomplishment of spiritual purposes, and it may be a means thereto or an insurmountable obstacle. In the former case we are victors and free men; in the latter, the world wins the victory over us. Thus in one sense Ritschl may be called a monist, since for the man who is truly a victor over the world all is brought under one control. But this kind of ethical monism is a very different thing from the monism of Spinoza, Herder, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and the rest; and to call it monism at all would give rise to misunderstanding, though perhaps it would be no more misleading than to call Ritschl a dualist. Either is an unfortunate term, for he moves in a different sphere altogether from that in which the words monist and dualist have had their place in the past.

Ritschl's sharp distinction between man and the world reminds us of Jacobi, but it is not the same thing; and the nature of the difference appears clearly in the fact that he repudiates anything like a special spiritual faculty, such as Jacobi assumed, by which we directly perceive spiritual realities. Religion involves no such faculty. It is due to the need in which we find ourselves over against the world, and is simply the assertion of our confidence that we are superior to it and of our conviction that we shall win the victory over it. It is an expression again, as in the case of Fichte, of our ethical optimism.

¹⁶ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, III, 189.

It is clear that Ritschl reproduced the twofold religious contribution of Kant, who interpreted God wholly in terms of moral purpose. In the fact that he followed Kant in this matter, and reread the entire Christian system in the light of the conception of God as moral purpose, lies his great significance as a Christian theologian. It is true that he did not reach God by the Kantian method, making him a postulate of the practical reason needed to effect the combination of virtue and happiness; he based his theistic faith upon the historic revelation of Jesus Christ. In him we see a man who actually won the victory over the world, which we are striving after, by faith in a God whom he called his Father, a faith which made him absolutely fearless, and by devotion to that Father's will, a will which required unfailing and self-forgetful service of his fellows. The victory won by such faith and devotion—a victory which we too may win—is the strongest possible guarantee of the existence of the divine purpose which we make our own when we thus live. That purpose is the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth; not a combination of virtue and happiness lying beyond our temporal existence, but the reign of righteousness and service in this world of ours. For the promotion of this it is the duty of every man to labor. We win the completest victory over the world, not by asserting ourselves against it, but by promoting the Kingdom of God within it. Devotion to that purpose raises us above the world as nothing else can. We conquer it by serving it. This is Ritschl's combination of ethics and religion, and this, he claims, is the message of Jesus Christ. God is moral purpose, and the purpose of the God whom Christ reveals is the highest we know or can conceive, and so we recognize the supremacy of the Christian God and of the Christian religion. Religion at its best means the winning of a victory over the world by fulfilling the divine purpose in serving the world, and Christianity is religion at its best.

In agreement with Schleiermacher and Hegel, with the rationalists in general, and with Kant, Ritschl interpreted God as love. In this he followed the common tendency of the modern age. But while, according to the rationalistic view, the divine love expressed itself in promoting human happiness; according to Kant in bringing about the co-ordination of virtue and happiness; according to

Schleiermacher in fostering man's consciousness of God; according to Hegel in effecting the reunion of the human and divine; according to Ritschl the fact that God is love means that he gives himself to the establishment of his kingdom interpreted as the reign of love among men—a fellowship of mutual sympathy and helpfulness. The divine love eventuates, not in anything passive, but in active social service. It is interesting to notice in this connection that the old schism between the divine justice and the divine love disappears in Ritschl's theology. The divine justice manifests itself, not in retribution, but in the persistency of God's eternal purpose of love and in the self-consistency with which He realizes that purpose. Ritschl's idea of God was, without doubt, his greatest contribution to Christian thought; and it is clear that it resulted simply from reading into Kant's conception of God as moral purpose a genuinely Christian content.

The two tendencies described in this article are often combined, and there is no reason why they should not be. But it should be noticed that they represent totally different points of view. To the theologian whose interest is solely ethical it makes no difference whether God be thought of as immanent or transcendent. To the one whose interest is metaphysical it makes all the difference in the world. Most Christian theologians have both interests, and combine the two things apparently without realizing the disparate elements involved. It could make only for theological lucidity if the diversity of the two points of view were everywhere recognized, as Ritschl so clearly recognized it, and the need of metaphysical unity were not confounded with the desire for ethical efficiency.

IS OUR PROTESTANTISM STILL PROTESTANT?

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There are two classes of people who have an interest in the question which we have proposed for discussion. It may be asked by those who believe that in historic Protestantism we have the true and final form of religion, and who therefore view with alarm any radical departure from the position of the earlier Reformers. In this case the question whether our Protestantism is still Protestant will mean the inquiry whether our modern liberal Christianity has so far departed from the fundamental principles of the Reformation that its title to the name of evangelical Christianity may rightly be called in question. On the other hand, the inquiry may be made by those who believe that historic Protestantism represents a stage of religious development which the world is destined to outgrow. In the latter case the meaning of the question will be whether the process of theological reconstruction has gone so far that the new type of religious thought and life which is expected to supersede the old can at last be clearly differentiated from its predecessor.

And as there are two senses in which the question may be asked, so also there are two ways in which it may be answered. One may be persuaded that, in spite of all changes in detail, modern Protestantism is still true to the principles of the Reformation, so that, great as is the revolution which thought has undergone during the century that has closed, it has introduced "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion." Or, one may conclude that, whatever flashes of insight the Reformers may have had, the religion which was the final outgrowth of their protest was essentially a child of the past, and is to be classed with Catholicism as a religion of authority, over against the new religion of the spirit toward which the modern world is more or less consciously striving. The former is the position taken by Har-

nack in his recent lectures on the essence of Christianity.¹ The latter is the view which Sabatier has expressed in his suggestive book entitled, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*.²

It is evident that the contrast thus indicated is of momentous importance both for thought and life. It affects our attitude toward all the important problems of scientific theology. If we give Harnack's answer, we shall distinguish, as he does, three great types of historic Christianity, the Greek, the Roman, and the Protestant; and modern Protestant Christianity, however important its differences from the older form of Protestantism may seem to us to be, will still represent "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion." If, on the other hand, we agree with Sabatier, we shall still distinguish three types of historic Christianity, but in this case the line will be drawn between the older and the newer Protestantism. We shall have two great examples of the religion of authority, the religion of the church and the religion of the book; and over against these, as a third, the religion of the spirit, which is the ideal not only of modern Protestantism but of all true men, whether Catholic or Protestant, who have felt the influences of the new age in which we live.

No less important are the practical bearings of the question. If the former view be taken, then there is a real kinship between our modern religious life and the past of which it is the outgrowth, and the effort to bring out this community of spirit and to illustrate in detail the points of agreement between our present ideals and those of our fathers becomes legitimate and necessary. If, on the other hand, we believe that we have entered upon a new stage of religious development, then the attempt to gloss over by smooth words the differences which obtain is dangerous and misleading, and the true duty of the religious teacher is to emphasize the contrast by every means at his command.

Such, then, are some of the issues involved in the question proposed for our discussion. We shall endeavor to determine

¹ *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Leipzig, 1900 (English translation, *What is Christianity?* London, 1901, p. 299).

² *Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit*, Paris, 1904 (English translation, New York, 1904).

whether Harnack or Sabatier is in the right, or whether some third position is possible, from which the truth for which both alike contend may find due recognition.

On the face of it there is much to be said on either side. In support of Harnack's contention it may be urged that the Reformation began as a protest against ecclesiastical authority. It was the assertion of the right of the individual to think his own thoughts, realize his own life, and find his way to God in his own manner. Liberty of conscience has ever been a fundamental tenet of Protestantism, and the equality of all believers in rights and duties is its article of the standing or falling church. Judged by this test, modern Protestantism stands for no new ideal. It is only the clearer expression and more consistent use of principles already accepted. It is the application to traditional Protestantism itself of a method, the right of which the Reformers clearly recognized, but which the conditions of their time did not permit them adequately to employ.

Yet, on the other hand, there is much also to be said for Sabatier's position. Judged historically, and not simply in its ideal, Protestantism has too often deserved the French theologian's description. To be sure, it has substituted the Bible for the Church as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, but the attributes which it has assigned to the book have not differed in kind from those which Catholicism has ascribed to the church. To Protestant, as to Catholic, unquestioning obedience to an infallible authority once for all given has been the one sure test of true religion. No doubt, in pressing back of the Church to the Bible, Protestantism was a means of reforming many flagrant abuses and so preparing the way for the better insight which we now possess. But it may be argued with no little plausibility that the means by which this reformation was brought about is the clearest proof of the gulf which separates the older from the newer faith. For, in turning back to the Bible and finding in a historic revelation, given once for all, the sole norm and final test of truth, historic Protestantism contradicts the fundamental assumption of modern life, which is that God is a God of progress, and therefore that his final word to man is to be sought in the present and in the future rather than in the past.

It is clear that before we can rightly determine the issues thus raised we must face the prior question as to the nature of Protestantism. In order to tell whether modern Protestantism is Protestant, we must first understand what it means to be Protestant, and especially what is the distinctive mark by which Protestantism is separated from the type of religion we call Catholic. We shall be helped in this discrimination by a brief review of some answers which on closer inspection prove to be inadequate.³

One of the most familiar of these is that which makes the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism synonymous with that between experimental and traditional religion. According to this view Protestantism is the religion of freedom and immediacy. It passes over all that is external and secondary in its effort to gain direct access to God in the personal religious experience. It needs no mediator between God and man, because it has learned to know God at first hand. Its faith is not grounded on the testimony of any man or church, but upon the witness of God himself speaking directly through his spirit to the heart of each believer. This fresh and vital aspect of Protestantism has been strikingly emphasized by Mr. Santayana in his recent book, *Reason in Religion*. Protestantism, he tells us, is "the religion of pure spontaneity, of emotional freedom."⁴ It is instinctively trustful and self-assertive, "more primitive than reason, and even than man."⁵ In contrast with this young and virile faith,

³ Under Protestantism, in the sense in which the term is used in the present discussion, we include all the different phases of religious life and thought which were the outcome of the general movement we call the Reformation. Professor Troeltsch, in his recent suggestive essay entitled *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt* (1906), uses the term in a narrower sense, to describe the type of thought represented by the more conservative Reformers, Zwingli, Luther and Calvin, as distinct from that of the more extreme independents, who carried their individualism to greater lengths. Such a restriction of the term, however useful for the purposes of scientific discussion, I believe to be unjustified by historic usage, and to lead to an undue minimizing of the novel elements inherent in the new faith. The genius of a new type is best disclosed by a study of its more advanced representatives, and the nature of Protestantism cannot be justly estimated till we have given full weight to the evidence afforded by the history of the Baptist and other early independent movements, whose break with the older Christian tradition was more radical than that of the Lutheran and Calvinistic bodies.

⁴ Page 115.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 122.

Catholicism represents a later and less confident form of religion. It is religion grown cautious through the experience of repeated failures, timorous, self-distrustful, content to take God at second-hand because it has lost faith in its ability to find God for itself.

No doubt there is truth in this contrast. It is true that the Catholicism of the sixteenth century had become largely traditional, and that Protestantism represented a genuine revival of vital religion; but as an expression of the fundamental difference between the two types this distinction is clearly inadequate. The contrast between vital and traditional religion is not confined to any age or any type of faith. Protestantism has had its full share of traditionalists, and Catholicism, in its finer expressions, is not without acquaintance with the freedom and spontaneity of the Christian life. The Westminster doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*⁶ may be paralleled in almost so many words in the language of the Vatican Council.⁷ Nor is the similarity in doctrine alone. The great saints of the Catholic Church, men like Bernard and women like St. Theresa, were conscious of no less direct communion with God than Luther and Wesley among the Protestants. And surely if a spirit of virility and of youth trusting in its own instincts and gladly reaching out into the unknown world in simple trust that it would answer to the claim of the spirit within be sufficient to stamp a man a Protestant as distinct from a Catholic, then the gentle saint of Assisi from

⁶ Confession of Faith, i, 5: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts."

⁷ Chapter iii, quoted by Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, II, 243: "And the Catholic Church teaches that this faith, which is the beginning of man's salvation, is a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which he has revealed are true; not because of the intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself, who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive."

whom the Franciscans claim their descent must hold the foremost place among the heroes of Protestantism.

Nor is the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism synonymous with the difference between an individualistic and a social religion. This too has often been affirmed. Catholicism, we are told, stands for the principle of churchly mediation, which Protestantism rejects. So great a name as Schleiermacher may be quoted as authority for this method of stating the contrast. In his *Glaubenslehre*⁸ he tells us that the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism may be expressed by saying that in Catholicism the relation of the believer to Christ is made dependent upon his relation to the Church, whereas in Protestantism the believer's relation to the Church is made dependent upon his relation to Christ.

Here too, no doubt, there is a truth which needs to find expression in our definition. Protestantism began as a protest against the abuse of ecclesiastical authority, and ever since it has stood for the liberty of the individual. It has been the religion of free men, willing, if necessary, to break with existing forms of social life when constrained to do so by their conscience. Yet we may easily be tempted to carry the contrast too far. It was not against the Church as such that Protestantism protested, but against a church which had grown unchristlike and corrupt. The last thing that was in the mind of Luther and the other Reformers was the substitution of an individualistic for a social religion. What they wished to do was to replace a false church by a church that was true. The Bible is not to be understood as the substitute for the churchly principle, but as its clearer definition. It is the book which shows us what kind of a church God requires and what kind of mediation really leads to him. This is not the mediation of priests, who prescribe works of penance through which a store of merit may be heaped up to the credit of the performer, but of living men, who through the communion of their own souls with God have learned his message of redemption and peace, and pass on the good news to their brother men that they too may find salvation. The typical individualist is not the Protestant who goes out among his fellows to preach the

⁸ § 24.

good news of salvation through Christ and establish his Kingdom among men, but the mystic who in his concern for his own soul's salvation withdraws into a hermitage or a monastery that he may commune with God in peace. Protestantism has had its hermits, its men of narrow and self-centred life. But it has been Catholicism rather than Protestantism which has been the home of the individualistic ideal as such.

What then is the real difference between Protestantism and Catholicism? We have already anticipated it in what has just been said. It is in the nature of the mediation which is admitted. The Protestant affirms that this mediation must be rational,⁹ while the Catholic denies that this must necessarily be the case. What distinguishes the Protestant from the Catholic is not that the one is more earnest and devout in his religious life than the other, nor that the one accepts while the other rejects an external standard, but that the standard which the Protestant accepts wins assent because of its own inherent nature, whereas in Catholicism it is received on grounds which are independent of its content.

This does not mean, of course, that Catholic theologians deny that reason has its use in religion, or regard with disfavor the attempt to give a rational proof of Christian doctrine. Nowhere has speculation been carried to bolder heights than in the Church which produced an Anselm and an Aquinas. But it is meant that the rational insight for which the Catholic longs is a consequence rather than a condition of his faith. *Credo ut intelligam* is the Catholic formula; and faith for the ordinary Christian does not necessarily involve an inner assent to the content of the message, but only reverent submission to the authority which promulgates it. When the Vatican Council would add rational evidence of the authority of the Scripture to the inner witness of the

⁹ The word "rational" is not used here in the narrow sense in which it is sometimes employed in philosophical discussion to denote the processes of the logical understanding as distinct from the emotions and the will (e.g. by our modern pragmatists in their attack upon intellectualism), but as a comprehensive term to include all the processes by which man, as a reasonable being, reacts upon his moral and intellectual environment. From the point of view of our present discussion the questions in dispute between the pragmatists and the intellectualists have to do with the interpretations of the word "rational," and the contrast here made would retain its validity, whichever of the rival interpretations should ultimately prevail.

Holy Spirit, upon which, in common with the Westminster divines, it makes saving faith depend, it is not upon the inherent evidence of the majesty and beauty of its content so graphically set forth in the Confession that it relies, but upon the miracle and prophecy by which the divine commission of its authors was attested and sealed.¹⁰ The change is significant. In the one case the assent, when it comes, is to the content of the message; in the other it is to the authority of the messenger.

We see now why mysticism has found so congenial a home in the Catholic Church. For mysticism is that type of religion in which thought is transcended, and man communes with the Eternal in the immediacy of feeling. It is the religion of mystery, of awe, of ecstasy, touching the intangible, hearing the inaudible, seeing the invisible, possessing the incommunicable. For the God of the mystic no rational proof can be given, since he cannot be described in words. It was such a God as this that Newman found, when, after his years of wandering, he sought refuge at last in the bosom of Mother Church. The joy which sings in the closing chapter of his *Apologia* is not the satisfaction which comes from insight into truth, but the peace which follows the relinquishment of a hopeless quest.

We perceive, also, why the sacraments should hold so prominent a place among the means of grace of Catholicism. For by the sacrament a way is found through which divine influence may be communicated without the necessity of the conscious participation of the recipient. When the priest sprinkles the water and repeats the trinitarian formula over the dying child, regeneration follows, whether the child or his parents have any understanding of the meaning of what has been done or not. When the priest himself is set apart by ordination to the sacerdotal office, he receives the power to transmit the divine grace to others, however unworthy he may prove to be himself. In each case the sacrament

¹⁰ Chapter iii, quoted by Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, III, 243: "Nevertheless, in order that the obedience of our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation; to wit, divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain proofs of his divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men."

works *ex opere operato*, that is, by virtue of the mere fact that it has been performed. Faith may be a result of its performance; it is not a condition of its effect.

The separation between the means used and the effect produced appears most clearly in the Catholic view of doctrine. To the Catholic, doctrine is dogma, that is to say, truth promulgated by authority and having the force of law. If it commend itself to the reason, so much the better; but it is not upon this fact that its claim to be received is based. That depends solely upon the endorsement of the properly constituted ecclesiastical authorities. Like the Trinity in Newman's famous example,¹¹ it may lie in a realm where neither logic nor experience can follow it, and contain propositions which to the unaided human reason seem to involve a contradiction. None the less, if the Church declares it to be true, it is the duty of the Catholic to believe it. For the soul's salvation, an implicit faith is just as effective as one which is intelligent and reasonable.

To the Protestant, on the other hand, such a conception of faith seems destructive of all that is most precious in religion. The faith for which Luther contended is not mere belief. Still less is it willingness to receive upon testimony matters incapable of experimental verification. It is the response of the whole man to an object inherently worthy. It is the assent of the will to an ideal presented to the mind by a person deserving of confidence. As such, it is at once ethical and rational, involving both trust and obedience. It requires, on the one hand, insight into the character and the purpose of the person claiming allegiance, and, on the other, willingness to follow that insight wherever it may lead.

Such being the conception of faith, it is easy to see why it should hold the central place in the theology of Protestantism. Where faith is understood in the Catholic sense as belief upon testimony, it is manifestly inadequate unless supplemented by works. Indeed, it is itself of the nature of a work; since it is one among other conditions that the Church prescribes, upon the fulfilment of which a man's salvation depends. But if faith means trust in a person worthy to be trusted, carrying with it the inner response

¹¹ *Apologia*, chap. v, p. 240 (London, 1890).

of the whole being to the ideals and purposes which he reveals, then it is clear that it must be the all-comprehending Christian virtue, including within itself all else, and of itself alone sufficient for salvation.

This explains the central place which the Word holds among the means of grace of Protestantism. The word stands for the rational element in religion. Through the word the Gospel is presented to the mind and the conscience of men in such a form that each is able to apprehend its truth for himself and put it to the test of his own experience. When Luther translated the Bible into the language of the common people, that the printing press might scatter it broadcast through all the homes of Germany, he put an end, once and for all, so far as Protestantism is concerned, to the old notion of an implicit faith, and substituted for the magical salvation of the older sacramentarianism a salvation that was at once ethical and rational.

No doubt it is true that the full consequences of this principle were not at first drawn. The Reformers did not always distinguish clearly between the Gospel and the book in which it was enshrined. The old Catholic ideal of an unchanging dogma still lived on in the new environment. The very clearness and intensity of the new conviction made it difficult for those who held it to recognize the possibility of any difference of interpretation. The authority of the Scripture was insensibly extended from the plain and self-evidencing truths which admit of experimental verification to the more recondite matters which seemed to follow therefrom "by good and necessary consequence."¹² So, in due time, there grew up in Protestantism a religion of tradition, dealing with matters inaccessible to human reason, and received, like the dogmas of the Catholic Church, on grounds extrinsic to their content. Looking at the scholastic Protestantism of the seventeenth century, with its elaborate doctrinal systems and its *jure divino* ecclesiasticism, it is easy to see in it, with Sabatier, only a new form of Catholicism, without the venerable antiquity or the æsthetic charm which give dignity to the old.

And yet such an identification would be mistaken. For all

¹² Confession of Faith, i, 6.

its outward points of similarity with Catholicism, historic Protestantism, even in its most scholastic form, is separated from the older religion by a difference so significant as to constitute it a distinct type. This difference is found, as we have seen, in its view of the nature and grounds of faith. To Protestantism in all its forms faith is a personal act involving the whole man—reason, as well as feeling and will. To Catholicism this need not be the case. In Catholicism rational insight into truth, if attained, is the result of a previous act of blind submission. In Protestantism the duty of accepting mysteries (in the Catholic sense) is inferred—illegitimately, as we now see—from their connection with truths already verified in experience. In Catholicism we have a rational system erected upon a foundation which is non-rational. In Protestantism credence is asked for dogmas surpassing reason in the name of a rational faith.

As between Harnack and Sabatier, then, we must hold with the former. If our analysis of historic Protestantism is correct, our modern religion is still true to its essential spirit, and the question with which our discussion began must be answered in the affirmative.

But because we refuse to deny our kinship with the older Protestantism and overlook the differences which separate it from Catholicism, it does not follow that the changes which have been introduced by modern thought are few or unimportant. Modern Protestantism may be Protestant, but it is modern also. It remains to consider what is meant by this ambiguous word, and what is its bearing upon the problems which now engage us. We may find, before we are through, that Harnack passes too easily over the difficulties which Sabatier raises, and feel obliged to question the accuracy of his statement that since the Reformation "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion has appeared."

What then is the distinguishing characteristic of the thought which we call modern? Stated in a single phrase, may we not say that it is the extent to which it recognizes, and the consistency with which it attempts to apply, the principle of development? Where earlier thinkers regarded reality as something fixed and unchanging, and found in immutability the surest test of truth, we see all things in a state of flux, and classify objects in an ascend-

ing series according to their capacity for progress.¹³ Where the old theology placed God outside the world in some distant heaven, finding his revelation in those exceptional events in which alone it was believed that the infinite and absolute could enter our world of the finite and the relative, we find God everywhere at work in his world, and see in all life the revelation of a spiritual personality which is its immanent ground. Finally, where our fathers looked back upon the past as the golden age, and regarded that institution or doctrine as most pure which could be proved to have altered least from the time of its origin or its promulgation, we look forward to the future for the clearest manifestation of truth, and put our absolute at the end of the world-process rather than at the beginning.

It is difficult to exaggerate the greatness of this change. It affects every department of our thought and life. It has reconstituted our science, rewritten our history, and is transforming our social, our economic, and our political ideals. It would be strange indeed if it did not leave its traces on our theology. Comparing the view of even so advanced a man as Luther, who held that Christian doctrine had existed unchanged from the beginning of the world, and that the Trinity and the Incarnation were the subjects of discussion for our first parents in Paradise, with that of our modern scientific theology, which believes in the gradual ascent of man from a primitive state of savagery and barbarism, and conceives of Christ as limited both in knowledge and in power by the conditions of his environment, it is hard, in spite of Harnack's great authority, to resist the conviction that the change through which theological thought is passing in our day is so momentous that the historian of the future, if not of the present, will feel constrained to date from it "a new phase in the history of Christianity."

If, then, we object to Sabatier's classification, it is not because

¹³ No doubt it is true that the belief in progress, like every other characteristic idea of modern life, has its antecedents in the past. The notion of development plays an important rôle in the philosophy of Aristotle, and it recurs now and again in later Christian thought. What it is here intended to assert is simply that the systematic employment of the idea of development for the definition of reality and the explanation of life is of comparatively recent date, and constitutes the distinguishing mark of the type of thought which we call modern.

it exaggerates the contrast between the older and the newer Protestantism, but because it fails to show clearly wherein the true nature of their difference is to be found. This does not consist in the introduction of a new principle, but in the application of an old principle to a new environment. In the last analysis there are but two attitudes in which one may approach the ultimate problems of life. One may believe that the reason is the most trustworthy guide of life, and that the satisfaction of one's longings and the impulse to one's activities must be sought in objects and ideals which commend themselves to the mind and approve themselves to the conscience as inherently worthy. Or one may be persuaded that the ultimate reality is beyond the reach of reason (whether *infra-* or *supra-*rational, as the case may be), and be content to find in external authority a substitute for rational faith. The former we have called the Protestant, the latter the Catholic attitude. What differentiates modern Protestantism from its predecessor is not the fact that it has abandoned the earlier faith in a rational revelation of universal authority, in order to take refuge in some vague religion of the spirit without definite content, but that, whereas the older Protestantism found that revelation in an unchanging system once for all communicated, modern Protestantism finds it in living principles, incarnated in a personal, and therefore a free and expanding, life, and progressively applied and verified in the course of an enlarging experience.

This insistence on the progressive apprehension of truth does not mean that modern Protestantism undervalues, still less that it can dispense with, the revelation of the past. No generation has turned back more eagerly to the sources of the Christian religion than the present, or done more to bring to clear recognition the abiding contribution of Jesus to the religious life of mankind and the unique place held by the book which tells of him among the literatures of the world. But it is meant that the principles which are brought to the interpretation of the book are those which have proved themselves fruitful in the investigations of modern life, and that the proof of the supremacy of the Christ is found in the fact that the ideals which he reveals still maintain their authority in the life of today. It is charac-

teristic of a rational faith that it owns the truth wherever found, and binds together past and present in a unity not otherwise to be attained. Such a unifying world-view the recognition of progress makes possible.

It will help us to understand the true significance of this change in the point of view if we realize that it is not confined to Protestantism. The influences which have forced the recognition of progress in Protestantism have not been without their effect upon the Catholic Church as well. Catholicism also has two varieties, one of which turns its face to the past, and makes the measure of Catholic doctrine and practice the fidelity with which it holds fast an unchanging tradition, and another which faces the future, and founds its claim for the authority of the Church upon the ease with which it can deal with new questions and adapt itself to new conditions. The former of these is illustrated by the Greek, the latter by the modern Roman Church. Greek Catholicism is the Catholicism of the past, priding itself upon its unchangeableness, and measuring its orthodoxy by its inertia. Roman Catholicism is the Catholicism of the present and of the future, alert, adaptable, fertile in resources, quick to learn, ready to apply what it has learned. Greek Catholicism is the religion of Russia and of the East; Roman Catholicism is at home in London and in Berlin, and is nowhere more active and vigorous than in America, the country of freedom and of change. If anything were needed to make us question whether the principle of development were really the exclusive possession of the newer Protestantism, it would be the spectacle of modern Catholic theologians like Loisy¹⁴ invoking this principle against Protestants like Harnack in support of the claims of the Catholic Church. Yet this is what we are seeing today.

One reason why the significance of this change of position is so seldom recognized is the tenacity with which in theory modern Catholicism holds fast to the principle of tradition. The Roman Church today still professes to be what it was in the beginning, and carries back its latest developments both in doctrine and practice to the days of the Apostles. But here, as so often, words

¹⁴ *L'évangile et l'église*, Paris, 1902, p. xxiii. See also Newman's well-known essay on the development of Christian doctrine.

are misleading. The identity of the name covers a radical change in the thing signified. Under the guise of the power to interpret dogma, the Roman church has asserted her power to change it; and, in the act of defining, has dethroned the tradition she professes to venerate. The final authority of modern Catholicism is not the tradition of the past, but the living Church speaking through its living representatives to the issues and the needs of the present, and in this fact lies its strength.

This is the real significance of the dogma of Papal infallibility. It is the public declaration of the emancipation of the Church from the tyranny of the past. It is the affirmation of the right and the power of the Church to deal with the new questions which the new age has brought, without being fettered by the decisions of the ages that are gone. It is the consummation of the process, long ago begun, by which the seat of religious authority has been shifted from Augustine and Aquinas and the fathers of Trent to Leo and Pius and the bishops and cardinals who are their present advisers. The fact that this power may be used, as we see it being used today, in the interest of a reactionary policy, does not lessen the significance of the change which its presence implies. The policy which the present pontiff has inaugurated may be reversed by his successor; and it is upon this possibility that modern liberal Catholics base their hope of the ultimate triumph of their ideals.

The radical difference in point of view thus described has already found theoretical recognition in our text-books in the distinction of two types of Catholicism, the Greek and the Roman. What is needed is a like discrimination between the different types of Protestantism; between the Protestantism which turns its face to the past, and finds God's revelation in an unchanging system contained in an infallible book, and the Protestantism which looks towards the future, finding God's revelation in living principles, incarnated in a person, and hence needing ever new application to the changing conditions of a changing world.

We propose, then, to distinguish four main types of historic Christianity, the Greek, the Roman, the earlier, and the later Protestant; the two former being differentiated from the two latter as Catholic from Protestant by their different conception

of authority, the first and third from the second and fourth as ancient from modern by their attitude to the idea of development.

Such a fourfold division avoids the difficulties to which those of Harnack and Sabatier are alike exposed, while at the same time conserving the truth for which each contends. It has at least three practical advantages over the older classifications. In the first place, it leads to a more adequate appreciation of the causes which give modern Roman Catholicism its strength. Secondly, it gives a truer insight into the actual relation between modern Protestantism and its antecedents. Thirdly, it discriminates more justly between what is distinctive of Christianity as a historical religion and the changing forms in which this distinctive principle has found expression. A word in conclusion as to each of these.

First, as to the true significance of modern Catholicism. The charges which the older Protestant polemic brought against Rome were, first, that it introduced the Church as a mediator between God and the individual, and hence robbed him of his freedom; secondly, that it added to the original message of God in the Scripture the tradition of later ages, and hence obscured the simplicity of the Gospel; thirdly, that in this addition it not only confused but corrupted the truth of God by substituting new, man-made, and often immoral teaching for the original divine revelation. The Rome against which the Reformers fought was a Rome which put between the individual and God an institution tied to a complex, and in part unchristian, tradition, and required of him, on peril of his salvation, a blind submission to her authority. The remedy they proposed was the rejection of the mediatorial function of the Church and a return from the changing tradition of man to the unchanging truth of God in the Scripture.

No doubt it is true that against the more corrupt forms of Roman Catholicism this answer is still effective; but against the Catholicism of our modern age in its best representatives, the Catholicism of a Newman or a Loisy, it is inadequate. The strength of Catholicism lies in the fact that through its living organs it brings God close to the individual, speaking directly to his present need by the lips of living men. Granting that there have been corruptions and mistakes in the past, modern Catholic

theologians tell us that the living Spirit who abides in the Church is able to lift the faithful above them by an interpretation adapted to the present, and so to make the errors of the past serve as guides to larger achievement in the future. And not a few among the more earnest and devout spirits of our day have been found to listen to their appeal. In other words, the strength of modern Catholicism lies precisely in the two points in which the older Protestant polemic found its weakness; first, in its exaltation of the Church, and, secondly, in its power to adapt itself to a changing environment. The weakness of the older Protestantism, on the other hand, lay in its inadequate recognition of the function of the living church and in its attempt to guard against the abuses of change by denying the possibility of progress. In both these points modern Protestantism is learning lessons from the failures of its own past, and in its new social spirit and its larger recognition of progress it is making place in its own way for the truth which gives Rome its strength.

It is only when these admissions have been made and we have heartily made place for the truth for which the Catholic contends that we are in a position to see clearly what is the real difference which separates modern Protestantism from Catholicism in all its forms. This is the fundamental difference in the conception of religious authority. Not in the fact of churchly mediation (for, as we have seen, from one point of view, the Bible itself is but a form of the churchly principle), but in the nature of the church which mediates; not in the recognition of a revelation which requires constant re-interpretation, but in the nature of the revelation accepted, lies the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. The revelation which the Protestant accepts commends itself as inherently true through its adaptation to man's permanent needs, and hence is one to which, when presented, the individual may be safely trusted to make his own response. The revelation on which the Catholic relies, on the other hand, is designed to supplant the incapacity of human nature, and consequently requires for its guarantee some sponsor from without. Rome offers the Church as a substitute because the individual may not be trusted; Protestantism requires the Church as a helper because he may. Rome adds to the original

revelation new interpretations because its meaning is not clear; Protestantism is constantly revising earlier utterances because it is. This fact once clearly seen, the issue is joined at the right place, and the danger which comes from bringing in irrelevancies is avoided.

In the second place, this classification gives us a truer insight into the real relation of modern Protestantism to its antecedents, and hence makes possible a more intelligent and less artificial treatment of its present problems. What unites the earlier Protestantism with the later is its clear recognition of this fundamental antithesis—its insistence upon the direct relationship between the Father God and the individual soul; upon the capacity of man's spirit to apprehend and to respond to divine truth, and hence its substitution for the external constraint of Rome of a more spiritual conception of religious authority. In all this, modern Protestantism is a true child of the Reformation, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. What differentiates modern Protestant theologians from even the greatest of their predecessors is the failure of the latter consistently to apply to the object of their faith the same principles which characterized their view of its ground. We have an example of this failure in Melanchthon's acceptance¹⁵ of two kinds of doctrines, the former characterized by their immediate adaptation to experience and to be tested thereby, the latter consisting of mysteries to be received on authority because found in the Bible, though incapable of experimental verification. It is further illustrated in the uncertainties of the Westminster doctrine of Scripture, which recognizes the sufficiency of the religious (i.e. experimental) standard for the plain man, while at the same time it insists upon the necessity of an appeal to the original texts for the theologian. It appears most clearly in the prominence of the legal conception in the theology of Protestantism, in spite of its insistence upon the fundamental importance of justification by faith. In all these cases we see the new religious insight struggling in vain with an evil philosophical tradition; the old notion, I mean, of an inaccessible God, which was the worst inheritance of Christianity from Greece. For a time it seemed as if Luther might succeed in breaking away from the hampering

¹⁵ In the second edition of his *Loci Communes*.

tradition, but it was not to be. The old inheritance was too strong, and traditional Protestantism became the bundle of inconsistencies it is to-day, enshrining in its heart a great principle, hampered in its expression by the swaddling clothes of the past. These swaddling clothes modern Protestantism is throwing off. To try to shut our eyes to the fact is to introduce into our modern religious life an element of unreality. To carry our protest so far as to be blind to our own paternity is to be equally untrue.

Finally, this classification opens the way for a juster discrimination between what is distinctive of Christianity as a historic religion and the many changing forms in which this distinctive principle has from time to time found expression. The divisions which we have sought to distinguish are, we repeat again, not arbitrary, but the expression within Christianity of permanent types of the religious life, found to a greater or less extent in all religions, and grounded in deep-seated differences in human nature. All religions have their Catholics and their Protestants, their scribes and their prophets, their traditionalists and their men of independent insight, their mystics and their men of rational faith. Each is the scene of the unending strife of the forces of stagnation and of progress, the static and dynamic of the religious life. In all, these different influences combine in various ways and present us with types analogous to those we have distinguished. They are in Christianity because they are in life; but Christianity itself is something different from these. It is the new impulse imparted to the life of humanity by the life of Jesus of Nazareth, the new insight he brought, the new stream of tendency which, beginning from him, has entered into the strife of human forces, playing upon and being played upon by them all. This impulse, this insight, this influence, are not confined to any one of the four types of historic Christianity; they are found in greater or less degree in them all. Christianity is greater than Protestantism even at its best, and no treatment of the historic Christian types is adequate which does not make this clear.

But because Christ may be found in all the historic forms, it does not follow that he is found in all with equal clearness and adequacy. Without falling into the Hegelian error of identifying the order of logic with the order of history, it is possible to believe

that each of the great types of historic Christianity which has appeared in the course of the historic development represents a step in advance. The Roman religion of progress is truer than the Greek religion of stagnation, and the Protestantism which insists upon bringing all so-called progress to the test of reason represents a step beyond both. We should belie our spiritual ancestry if we did not recognize the great contribution of the Reformation to human progress and jealously guard the truth which the Reformers won; but there is a work still to do, and that is to present the Christ whom all Christians own as Lord, and whom the earlier Protestants recognized as their individual Saviour by his direct appeal to each man's heart and conscience—to present this living, spiritual Christ in his larger social relations as the inspiration and the goal of progress. This is the task of the theology of the future.

A TURNING POINT IN SYNOPTIC CRITICISM

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Christianity as not only a world-religion, but pre-eminently *the* world-religion, can be rationally appreciated only in the light of its origins. The nineteenth century, therefore, to which nothing was understood that had not been understood genetically, devoted its newly won methods of historical criticism to a comparison of the contemporary documents, the Pauline Epistles, with Acts, the earliest embodiment of the tradition, that it might learn the facts of the great evolution of the Church from the Synagogue. But inquiry into the story of the second founder of our faith was, from the nature of the case, a mere preliminary to the deeper inquiry into the story of its first Founder.

Here also the elements of the problem were providentially presented in the same two categories of subjective and objective. Acts and Epistles had as their counterparts, blended together in the Synoptic Gospels, a traditional story of Jesus' career and a report of his sayings. For the latter had been so reverently guarded as almost to take the place of a contemporary document beside the tradition of his career.

Critical comparison was as imperative in the case of Jesus as in that of Paul. But if in the remoter problem the prize was loftier, the obstacles were also greater and the path more intricate.

Textual criticism having given the Synoptic Evangelists' work in the nearest attainable approach to its authentic form, it became the primary task of the higher criticism to extricate the ultimate sources, freeing them, as far as possible, from reciprocal, as well as from external, admixture. With the completion of this task would begin the final process of historical criticism, in the intrinsic valuation of these ultimate sources and the reconstruction from them of a history as complete, self-consistent, and rationally conceivable as the available data would permit. Such, in general

tendency, though not always with clear prescience of the issue, has been the course of criticism for a hundred years past. The source-criticism of the first third of the nineteenth century was chiefly a war of independence from the domination of churchly tradition, desultory, and largely negative in its results. It issued in the great attempt of Baur and Strauss to strike their trial balance in a critical history of Christian origins. The verdict was recom-mittal of the problem. Another half-century of patient, toilsome analysis of the documents intervened. The turning point, so far as the criticism of the Synoptic Gospels is concerned, almost exactly coincides with the beginning of the twentieth century. The year 1899 witnessed the appearance in Germany of Wernle's *Synoptisches Problem*, in England of Hawkins's *Horae Synopticae*, concentrating in purely scientific, classified form the phenomena of these, the fundamental documents of evangelic tradition. The year 1901 begins, on the other hand, a series of brilliant attempts at critical valuation and interpretation of these sources. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis* is recognized as marking "the epoch of 1901" by critics as diverse in point of view as Schweitzer¹ and Jülicher;² while the entrance into the field of such authorities in Old Testament criticism as Wellhausen³ and such Church historians as Harnack⁴ indicates that it is "white already to the harvest."

Meantime a practical consensus has been reached on the authenticity of the greater Pauline Epistles, and on the date and the relatively unhistorical character of the Fourth Gospel. No wonder the pendulum of criticism begins to swing again from the analytical to the constructive side. The Synoptic problem, many tell us, has been solved, at least to the extent that it admits of solution. It is time to scrutinize results and to draw the ultimate inferences. Schweitzer is ready for the task, and to trace the

¹ Von Reimarus zu Wrede. Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, Tübingen, 1906.

² Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Ueberlieferung, Giessen, 1906.

³ Das Evangelium Marci, 1903; Matthaei, 1904; Lucae, 1904; Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, 1905.

⁴ Lukas der Arzt, der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte, 1906; Sprüche und Reden Jesu: die zweite Quelle des Matthäus und Lukas, 1907.

history of the study of the life of Jesus from Reimarus to Wrede, finding that it issues, through the "consistent scepticism" of Wrede, in his own "consistent eschatological theory." Scholars of a less impressionist type, with somewhat larger claim to speak as representatives of the half-century of patient analysis, H. J. Holtzmann, whose *Synoptische Evangelien* (1863) laid the foundation of the now-accepted two-document theory, and Jülicher, whose *Introduction to the New Testament*⁵ ranks next to Holtzmann's as the representative liberal survey of the results of documentary criticism, have given us a very emphatically different answer.⁶

It seems thus to be possible, from practically identical results in the field of documentary criticism, to draw inferences varying all the way from the portraiture of Jesus as an obscure messianistic agitator, of whom we know practically nothing save that he preached a fanatical apocalyptic eschatology with himself as central figure, and was disappointed by the disastrous event, to a conception of him as the real, though not altogether conscious, founder of the new world-religion, a historical figure whose teaching may be definitely known in its substance, and, in outline, even his career and personality. Under such circumstances, the framing of an independent view of the real outcome of this common basis of admitted results in the analysis of the Synoptic sources, and the drawing of independent inferences as to their significance, are for every man of intelligence matters of necessity rather than of mere inclination.

The veteran Holtzmann may well be pardoned if he views with some satisfaction the present attitude of leading scholars toward the two propositions in behalf of which he entered the lists nearly a half-century ago. Weisse⁷ and Wilke⁸ had then but

⁵ English translation, from the second German edition, 1904.

⁶ See H. J. Holtzmann, "Die Marcus-Kontroverse in ihrer heutigen Gestalt," in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X (1907), pp. 18-40 and 161-200; further, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Leben-Jesu-Forschung," in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, XXVII (1906), col. 2357-2364, 2413-2422, 2477-2483, 2541-2546.

⁷ *Die evangelische Geschichte, kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, 1838.

⁸ *Der Urevangelist, oder exegetisch-kritische Untersuchung über das Verwandtschaftsverhältniss der drei ersten Evangelien*, 1838.

recently broken from the prevailing Tübingen theory of Mark as a conciliatory combination of Matthew and Luke, asserting the dependence of these two upon Mark. Weisse applied the contention of Lachmann regarding the Marcan order to Matthew, showing it to be a combination of the narrative of Mark with a mass of discourse material which he identified with the *Logia* attributed by Papias to the Apostle. Wilke declared that a systematic, scholarly, and dispassionate application of recognized principles of literary criticism, in place of the premature and undisciplined theorizing indulged in by the Tübingen school on the one side and by Ewald on the other, could establish the facts by documentary proof. In coincidence with Weisse, he predicted as the outcome a recognition of Mark as the true *Grund-schrift* of Synoptic tradition. Holtzmann's championship of the theory was of the type that Wilke would have chosen; not by eloquence or imagination, but by systematic application of rigidly scientific method. Thus he formulated in definite terms the second proposition which, together with the Mark-theory of Lachmann, constitutes the basis of the now dominant two-document theory: the coincident material of Matthew and Luke not derived from Mark, which is principally of the nature of discourse, can be accounted for neither by a relation of direct dependence between the two nor by independent use of oral tradition, but is drawn from "a second source common to Matthew and Luke, but employed by the two in completely different ways."⁹

A half-century of controversy, of aberration, of experiment with every form of hypothesis, of relentless insistence upon every feature of the problem wherein the two-document theory admittedly falls short of a complete explanation of the facts, ends with the declaration from Wellhausen¹⁰ in Germany, re-echoed by Burkitt¹¹ in England, that the one decisive, unalterable certainty achieved in the long conflict is "that Mark furnished the framework for Matthew and Luke"; and that to Lachmann, in 1835, belongs the credit of the essential element in the demonstration, namely, the invariable failure of either Evangelist to

⁹ Die synoptischen Evangelien, p. 126.

¹⁰ Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, p. 43.

¹¹ The Gospel History and its Transmission, 1906, p. 37.

support the other in any divergence from the order of Mark. Holtzmann himself, surveying in 1907 the whole field of scholarly opinion, is able to descry but two remaining irreconcilables. Hilgenfeld, of Jena, still defended a remnant of the old Tübingen theory in his doctrine of the priority of Matthew,¹² though even this is not our Matthew, but a precanonical form of that gospel; and Merx, the learned critic of the Sinaitic Syriac text, finds evidence in some peculiar readings of that ancient, but not uniformly trustworthy, version for a similar conclusion. With these exceptions, the world of New Testament scholars is unanimous¹³ in acceptance of the first great result of the two-document theory, namely, that Mark is the *Grundschrift* of the Synoptic tradition. The fact is not merely that this Gospel contains the narrative content of the evangelic material, but that this particular composition in something very near its present Greek form, with its present disposition and order of material, has been made the basis, and practically the only narrative basis, by each of the other Synoptists for his Gospel. Mere inspection of the general contents of the Synoptic Gospels shows that there was but one such narrative used in common by these writers. The proof in detail that this common story was the story of our Gospel of Mark is of immense significance, once the character and history of this writing are understood.

Since the still lingering opposition to the Mark-theory all centres upon Matthew, or at least a proto-Matthew, there is a special timeliness in the recent systematic analysis of W. C. Allen,¹⁴

¹² See his *Markus-Evangelium*, 1850; his *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 1875; and a continuous series of articles and reviews in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, especially against Holtzmann (1902, pp. 144-146); M. Schultze and Wrede (1903, pp. 4-19); Wellhausen (1904, pp. 182-228, 289-332, 462-524); and R. A. Hoffmann (1905, pp. 309-311).

¹³ Zalm, "the prince of conservative scholars," in his commentary, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*, 1903, refers the reader to his *Einleitung*, II, § 57, for the question of the relation of Matthew to Mark." His answer is, Mark is not dependent on our Matthew, but on the Aramaic original Matthew, which in content and order was identical with ours. Badham's *St. Mark's Indebtedness to St. Matthew*, 1897, is mentioned by Holtzmann, but not as having independent significance.

¹⁴ *Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew* (International Critical Commentary), 1907.

where the statistics of Hawkins and Wernle are applied to the specific question of Mark as the principal source of Matthew with a cumulative force that is irresistible. As a result, the proto-Matthew which might have been the basis of Mark appears in its real intangibility; a ghost flitting from the light toward the limbo of the "inerrant original text."

But as regards the complementary pillar of the two-document theory, Allen himself is one of the unconverted. Other theories than that of a single principal common source seem to him to be required to account for the non-Marcian element of discourse material common to Matthew and Luke, if not for their numerous minute coincident variations in their Marcan material. He will not "force the oral tradition theory to cover all the facts presented by the agreement of Matthew and Luke, because there is reason to think that both writers used written sources." How can he, when their agreement in this material is to a notable degree closer than in the material borrowed from Mark? Oral tradition, when carried to this degree of stereotyped invariability, becomes indistinguishable in practical application from a document. Allen inclines rather to "a view at present very much out of favor among critical writers," the theory that "S. Luke was acquainted with the first Gospel." Holtzmann himself, in earlier days,¹⁵ was not unwilling to concede to E. Simons¹⁶ reminiscences of Matthew, to account for minor elements of the coincident non-Marcian material. But the great reciprocal omissions and unreconciled contradictions, which must be admitted to exist on any theory of real literary dependence, compelled its limitation to the vague form of a mental echo; the third Evangelist might have heard the reading of Matthew at the Lord's day service and carried away impressions which unconsciously reproduced themselves in his own composition.

There has been progress since 1892. We owe much to Wernle and Hawkins for their strict application of scientific method to the identification of the synoptic *Grundschrift*; with what decisive results we have already seen. But Wernle has rendered a greater service still in the laying of this second ghost of a literary relation

¹⁵ Einleitung, 3 ed., 1892, p. 356 f.

¹⁶ Hat der dritte Evangelist den kanonischen Matthäus benutzt? 1880.

between Matthew and Luke. The systematic working through of pages 40-80 of Wernle's *Synoptische Frage*, as every student of the Synoptic problem should work it through, is not the task of a few spare half-hours; but the result will fully explain why the view that Luke was acquainted with Matthew is "at present very much out of favor among critical writers." Wernle expresses it thus: "Comparison of Luke with Matthew in regard to content, sequence, and text (verbal form), gives as result that Matthew cannot be among the sources of Luke. Luke has no acquaintance with a part of the Matthæan narratives; he never follows their sequence; and nowhere in his text (verbal form), whether in the Marcan narrative or the discourses, has he been affected by Matthew. The discourses which he has in common with Matthew he did not take from Matthew, but, coincidentally with him, from a collection of discourses lost to us. Although not strictly demonstrable, it is nevertheless probable that Matthew was entirely unknown to Luke."

The theory of a partial and reminiscent employment of Matthew by Luke is indeed difficult to reconcile with the systematic method professed by the latter (Luke 1 1-4). How is it conceivable that a writer of this type should be aware of the existence of this recent and most comprehensive, if not already most popular and most authoritative, of all works in the line of his own labors, and should remain so indifferent to its contributions?

Subordinating the still unsettled questions of detail, such as the numerous minute coincident variations of Matthew and Luke from Mark in their Marcan material, and the failure of repeated attempts to reconstruct a self-consistent composition from the non-Markan remainder, we may set it down as a second result of the last half-century of documentary criticism, a result whose general acceptance lingers but slightly behind that of the Mark-theory, that it has confirmed and definitely established the twin pillar of the Holtzmann-Weisse two-document theory in the certainty that our "Matthew was not among the sources of Luke," nor conversely. The inference is unavoidable and conclusive that "the discourses which he has in common with Matthew . . . are taken coincidentally with him from a collection of discourses lost to us."

It is imperative that these great and definitely established results of pure documentary analysis be differentiated from, and considered in proper perspective with, that remainder of subordinate phenomena whose significance is still in debate. This remainder may require us to qualify our description of either or both the two main factors of Synoptic tradition. We may be compelled to recognize modifications in the form of Mark extending beyond even such notable textual phenomena as the suppression of its original ending. The concession may conceivably reach a point justifying in some degree the once popular theory of a proto-Mark. Further research must be carried on. Ewald's theory of diegeses may be defunct, but its demise has not done away with the fact that such groups of anecdotes were actually known to Luke (Luke 11), nor with the sure evidences still apparent in the text of Mark of the use of such pre-existing agglutinated material, some of it certainly related to that of the other source. All this will not annul the first great achievement: Mark is the narrative basis of our Gospels.

No less important are the modifications sure to come in the theory of the "teaching" source. The indications are very strong that we shall be compelled to recede from the tempting identification of it with the reported Logia of the Apostle Matthew. This identification was indeed a sally beyond the domain of strict source-analysis. We must substitute the more strictly algebraic symbol Q (*Quelle*)¹⁷ of Wellhausen and Harnack for the question-begging Δ (*Δόγια*) of Holtzmann's *Synoptische Evangelien* and the older school. In our attempts at reconstruction, the simple formula of Wendt,¹⁸ namely, superimpose Matthew and Luke and subtract Mark, will no longer serve. Resch¹⁹ did not improve the condition of the "heap of interesting ruins," which, as he rightly said, had been left by his predecessor, by sifting the soil of the second and third century for possible traces of Logian

¹⁷ In the German the symbol is not strictly algebraic; it assumes a single document. In English it may be used to designate the strictly definable entity, the non-Marcian common element of Matthew and Luke whencesoever derived. See Salmon, *Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 24.

¹⁸ *Die Lehre Jesu*, I, 1886. This analytical portion of the work was omitted from the English translation.

¹⁹ *Die Logia Jesu*, 1898.

gold. The value of his results is negative. They show how little else but *Q* there was. Harnack paves the way for really systematic reconstruction;²⁰ but his main result is to show how completely, in its substance, the work confined itself to the teaching of Jesus, not even relating the story of his passion and resurrection. His effort to explain how such a work could begin with a formal introduction of the *dramatis personae*, recounting the Baptist's preaching of repentance and the baptism of Jesus, and including the significant story of the centurion's faith, is conspicuously unsuccessful. How could the principal actor be brought thus formally to the centre of the stage, and then simply left standing there? Even to Wernle the difficulty was not new. Holtzmann²¹ had sought to meet the scruples of Weisse on this score by connecting the preaching of John with the discourse of Jesus on the Baptist, as forming together an opening sermon on the beginning of the gospel. Wernle²² went further, and frankly distinguished the narrative introduction and the story of the centurion of Capernaum as the additions of a later hand. But few will consider that a solution of the problem has yet been reached. We have still to determine the nature and order of the grouping of material in *Q*, the leading ideas of its compiler, his purpose, standpoint, and method; and until this is done the vital question of its relation to Mark can hardly be answered. On the one side there doubtless lurks a fallacy of method in the process of eliminating from consideration as possible elements of *Q* all material also found in Mark. Take for example the story of the barren fig-tree. Matthew has preferred to give it to us in the narrative version of Mark; must we then conclude that Luke drew his parable version of it from some other source than that which he elsewhere shares with Matthew? Or, take an instance where the primary dependence of both Matthew and Luke is on Mark. Both thus relate the transfiguration, though with some striking coincident variations. But in Mark itself 9 2-10 is a doublet, as regards doctrinal content, of 8 27-9 1 11-13, and it has close intrinsic affinities in both thought and language

²⁰ *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, 1907.

²¹ *Synoptische Evangelien*, p. 142.

²² *Synoptische Frage*, p. 226.

with the story of Jesus' baptism and temptation. Must we disregard these because the Marcan form was more acceptable to Matthew and Luke? The contention of the elder²³ and younger²⁴ Weiss for a larger narrative content of Q, and a dependence of all three Evangelists on it, is not so easily met, when this weak point of method and the unsolved problem of the coincident variations of Matthew and Luke are fairly considered. Moreover, Wellhausen has introduced an almost startling novelty into the field of debate by his emphatic declaration in favor of the priority of Mark to Q; and Wernle already concedes that we must distinguish between Sayings (*Sprüche*) and Discourses (*Reden*),²⁵ and that the agglutinated discourses of Q give just as much evidence of their secondary and artificial composition as the artificially connected narratives of Mark.

The third Gospel, with its second treatise, Acts, is also brought again into the field. Harnack's *Luke the Physician*²⁶ renews the argument of Hobart's *Medical Language of St. Luke* to prove linguistically the traditional authorship, though, as an ally of Ramsay,²⁷ he will hardly be welcome for his valuation of Luke as a historian.

Thus the problems that still remain to be solved by the patient, dispassionate methods of literary analysis are as full of interest and as burning as ever. But from these it is possible—and not only possible but imperative—to distinguish the achieved results,²⁸ and to bring them into comparison with the ancient tradition of gospel origins.

²³ B. Weiss, *Das Markusevangelium*, 1872; *Die Evangelien des Markus und Lukas*, 9 ed., 1901; *Die Geschichtlichkeit des Markusevangeliums*, 1905.

²⁴ J. Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, 1903; *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I, 2 ed., 1907.

²⁵ *Quellen des Lebens Jesu*, 1906, p. 71.

²⁶ English translation by Wilkinson, 1907.

²⁷ *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, 1895.

²⁸ Wernle, *Quellen des Lebens Jesu*, 1906, p. 35, formulates these results as follows:

1. The short Gospel is the source of the two longer.
2. Besides it, the two long Gospels are based in common on a Greek discourse-source.
3. Finally, Matthew and Luke have each their share of peculiar tradition.

The most striking result of such comparison is the correspondence of the two in broad outline. It is true that the Gospel of Mark does not seem to us to be so lacking in order as the other Gospels, for it alone supplies what outline still remains of historical perspective in the story of Jesus; a beginning, in the great Sabbath of preaching and mighty works at Capernaum after the imprisonment of John, where Peter's house is headquarters; a middle, in the declaration of the messianic programme at Cæsarea Philippi, where Peter's confession is the nucleus; an end, in the tragedy in Jerusalem, where Peter's denial and restoration form the pivot—or would, if the original ending of the Gospel had not been suppressed. And yet it becomes more and more conspicuously clear, even to such conservative critics as the elder Weiss,²⁹ that the ancient description of Mark's order as not a historical or chronological sequence, but a sequence adapted to the requirements of practical edification, is justified to the letter. Even the great pivotal points are not appreciated as such by the Evangelist. The "beginning of miracles" at Capernaum, with the following vigil of prayer by Jesus, has scarcely to him its historical significance. The confession of Peter is to him anything but epoch-making. The story of the women at the tomb has (at least in subsequent development) eclipsed the all-important "turning again" of Peter. Notoriously, his subordinate groups are topical and not chronological, the geography inconceivable,³⁰ and the relation of events almost regardless of before and after.³¹ All that is certain is that somewhere, very far behind this agglomeration of anecdotes, there looms up dimly the figure of the Galilean fisherman as ultimate narrator, and that Mark, like Paul, reverts to "what Peter could relate"³² when the evangelic story is in question. And documentary criticism adds the abundant, decisive evidence that in the days even of Matthew and Luke there was already practically nothing else but Mark to represent the story of Jesus. For some remarkable reason all else had been eclipsed.

It is also true that Q is very far from meeting Papias's descrip-

²⁹ B. Weiss, *Geschichtlichkeit des Markusevangeliums*, 1905.

³⁰ Mark 5 1 14 20 6 45 53 7 31, etc.

³¹ Mark 3 6 22 7 1 8 34 9 14.

³² ἀνῆλθον ἱστορήσαι Κηφᾶν, Gal. 1 18; cf. 1 Cor. 15 1-5, ὥφθη Κηφᾶ.

tion of the Matthæan Logia. It was not Semitic in language, but Greek. Even if apostolic in origin, it certainly was not primitive; and even if its text be often more authentically reflected in Matthew than in Luke, it is not Matthew, the Palestinian gospel which from its origin, circulation, and authorship should be expected to correspond most nearly with the Logia, that actually stands nearest in order, arrangement, and spirit to Q. No; our first evangelist shows decided preference for the Marcan disposition, contents, and language, wherever choice was open. It is our third gospel, traditionally of Antiochian derivation,³³ which reverses this preference, and shows closer spiritual affinity with Q, although always freer than Matthew in verbal transcription. Again, there is little *prima facie* agreement between the tradition and the results of criticism. But deep down there is much. Q, as we know it, is a Greek composition, more Pauline in theology than Petrine, closer in affinity to Luke than to Matthew, secondary in its elaboration of the sayings into discourses. But there remain embedded in it some few decisive evidences of translation from a Semitic original;³⁴ its conception of the evangelic message is, in distinction from Paul's, the teaching rather than the personality and career of Jesus; and, finally and most significantly, it includes practically all. Matthew's few parables not shared by Luke are not enough to alter the force of this far-reaching general phenomenon. His antitheses of the higher righteousness (Matt. 5 21-42) and other material bearing on the special issue with Mosaism can hardly be counted as derived from some other source, because Luke's systematic omission of kindred material in Mark (for example, Mark 7 1-23 10 1-10 12 28-34) makes it practically certain that he would have omitted this from Q.

The second fact revealed to us by documentary analysis, namely,

³³ The tradition of the Antiochian parentage of Luke, reported by Eusebius (HE. iii, 4, 7), finds strong support, if applied not to the man, but to the writings, in the phenomena of Acts, some of which are lightly touched upon by Harnack (Lukas der Arzt, p. 15; cf. Bacon, "Acts versus Galatians," in American Journal of Theology, July, 1907), and in the singular choice of this gospel by Marcion, disciple of Cerdo of Antioch.

³⁴ E.g. Matt. 24 51 = Luke 12 46; cf. Isa. 53 12, "divide him his portion with the great."

that there was, when our first and third Gospels were compiled, practically but one great source besides Mark; that this source comprised the teaching of Jesus in the form of elaborated discourses—and probably very little else—with strong indications of a remoter period when the sayings circulated unagglutinated into discourses and in a Semitic tongue, is a phenomenon to be placed alongside that of the Petrine narrative in our attempt to interpret the ancient tradition in the light of critical results. Why does all the available material fall into these two groups, Roman narrative and Syrian teaching? Why does the comparison of our two later gospels of the things which Jesus “began both to do and to teach” with their two sources, Mark and Q, give a result so analogous to that obtained by comparison of the extra-canonical with the canonical, a sense of the relative poverty and worthlessness of all they were able to add? Only the explanation which applies to the extra-canonical gospels will meet the case: Mark and Q had exhausted the field. In their respective regions, Rome, headquarters of the Gentile mission field, Pauline in its whole constitution and by the very necessity of the case, however it might cling to the name of Peter, and Syria, with its two great seats of Christianity, Jerusalem and Antioch, had between them taken up the whole available substance of evangelic tradition. Jerusalem gloried in the apostolic tradition of the teaching “compiled by Matthew in the Hebrew tongue.” Antioch (if we may be allowed an inference from Gal. 2 11-13) combined, as Rome did, the names of Peter and Paul, though reversing the proportionate influence of each on real doctrinal attitude. Here something more of Petrine narrative was added to Matthæan teaching before the combination with Mark; while even Jerusalem, in substituting Greek for Aramaic, was content to adopt also the more literary Antiochian (?) recast of its Logia.

The lesson of the comparison between tradition and sources is that both have a long history behind them. Neither Mark nor Q is a primitive composition, but the distinction in their type is primitive. It is not only witnessed to by the ancient tradition, with its echoes of rivalry between the home-made apostolic and the Roman gospel, but it reflects the most vital distinction between the gospel of Paul and that of those who were apostles

before him. To "the apostles and elders in Jerusalem" the teaching was its essence. To Paul, the story, the drama of the self-humiliated, divinely exalted Son of God, had been, since he himself first learned it from the lips of Peter, the objective background of his message of the Christ manifested in him as the Son of God by the resurrection.

"The elder" of Papias is our witness how long the teaching of Jesus was preserved independently of the story of his life, death, and resurrection. Only at a comparatively late period in the history of evangelic composition did it become the practice to combine "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach."³⁵ Tradition tells first of a body of "sound words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ,"³⁶ as the norm of doctrine. Later we hear of a compilation of "the oracles of the Lord" by the Apostle Matthew "in the Hebrew tongue." True, our informant, Papias, as well as his contemporary Polycarp, who uses the same term, "oracles of the Lord," as his standard,³⁷ may employ it in the comprehensive sense in which his contemporaries apply it to the general teaching of the Old Testament;³⁸ or, indeed, the term may be simply a Greek rendering of the title *Dibre Yeshua*, which might mean either "Sayings of Jesus" or "Matters Concerning Jesus." So far, then, as this part of the tradition reported by Papias is concerned, there is little to indicate the nature of the apostolic document referred to. We can only say that Papias himself, who gave to his own work the title, "Expositions of the Lord's Oracles," was in search of "the commandments delivered by the Lord to the faith," and that this represents the need which would be first felt in the Aramaic-speaking churches. But besides the anonymous tradition which Papias reports concerning Matthew, he gives another regarding Mark, this latter explicitly from "the elder," and the two seem to stand in an antithetic relation. Matthew's commandments of the Lord³⁹ is the admitted standard by comparison with which Mark is judged and defended. The description of Mark as containing "both the things said and the things done"⁴⁰ by the Lord, may therefore fairly be brought into

³⁵ Acts 1 1. ³⁶ 1 Tim. 6 3. ³⁷ Ep. Polyc. 7 1. ³⁸ E.g. 1 Clem. 62 3.

³⁹ Cf. Matt. 28 20 with Papias, ἐντολὰς . . . παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου τῇ πίστει δεδομένας.

⁴⁰ ἡ λεχθέντα ἡ πραχθέντα.

comparison with the simpler phrase regarding Matthew. The significant point of agreement between source-analysis and ancient tradition is that both lead us back to that remote past when the Church knew but two fundamental types of gospel composition. To the one of these might be applied the terms "teaching," "commandments," "sound words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ," "oracles of the Lord"; to the other, "sayings and doings," "doings and teachings." Or it might be more fully described as the "report concerning Jesus of Nazareth, how that God anointed him with the Holy Ghost and with power: who went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed of the devil . . . whom also they slew, hanging him on a tree, but God raised him up the third day."⁴¹ For the missionary of the Pauline school, making converts among the Gentiles, the latter diegesis would be the outline of the gospel. To judge from the Pauline epistles, it would require but very slight supplementation from the commandments of the Lord. The Pauline object was a committal of the life to Jesus as the living heavenly Lord, in order to become animated by his spirit of filial devotion to the divine will. For this purpose, knowledge of Jesus' teaching as a scribe of the kingdom in the interpretation of that will in detail was wholly subordinate. Hearers or readers must be convinced of his real Lordship as glorified Redeemer, and made acquainted from the story of his career with the quality of "the mind which was in Christ Jesus." By way of commandment, the law of love, superseding all others, would suffice.⁴² For the representative of the Aramaic-speaking church the vital element of the tradition lay necessarily elsewhere. To him Christianity was simply the flower of Judaism; Jesus was the second Moses,⁴³ the prophet raised up from among his brethren to give the ideal and authoritative interpretation of the law, who after securing the obedience of a repentant people to this higher law would reappear from heaven as the Christ.⁴⁴ In the churches of Syria, accordingly, or at least of Palestine, the all-important element was the teaching. The condition of entrance into life was to keep the commandments. Were the question asked, Which?

⁴¹ Acts 10 37-40. ⁴² Rom. 13 8-10; Gal. 5 14 6 15; Mark 12 28-34.

⁴³ So uniformly in the Ebionite Clementine writings. ⁴⁴ Acts 3 18-26.

the answer was, Those of the decalogue, as supplemented and interpreted by Jesus' law of love.⁴⁵

The deepest cleavage of the evangelic tradition, both in the character of the documents as they come down to us and in the most ancient testimony of the Church, is precisely along this line of the subjective and objective view. The second and fourth Gospels are fundamentally Pauline, because the starting point in their line of development is to convey the knowledge of Christ as the ascended Lord, and the fellowship of his sufferings and the power of his resurrection. Mark's is the Paulinism of a layman, stripped of the theological element; John's, the Paulinism of the theologian, interested in Paul's christology rather than in the practical issues. Both centre upon the doctrine of the spirit of adoption, incarnate and victorious in Jesus. They are written that men "may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and by believing may have life in his name."⁴⁶ That which the other two Gospels add to this has a different character and a different motive. The contrast is obscured by the later tendency to combine, harmonize, assimilate; but the common remainder obtained after the subtraction of Mark appears in the Lucan, and still more strongly in the Matthæan, form as the product of the Jewish Christian rather than the Gentile or Pauline conception of the essence of the gospel. It centres upon the doctrine of the heavenly reward. It seems almost to presuppose faith in Christ, rather than aim to produce it; and this faith is of value only as it prepares the soul to accept and do the commandment. The essential content of the evangelic tradition is conceived as "the Way," "the Teaching"; and its content corresponds.

In sketching the great results of documentary criticism we have to some extent unavoidably anticipated those of that historical criticism whose advent seems to be impending. As a first attempt to sum up results, Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* is a great and epoch-marking book. "Consistent scepticism" is his inference from the establishment of the Mark-theory. Weisse, its founder, was far from sharing the complacent optimism

⁴⁵ Matt. 19 17-19; contrast the parallel in Mark.

⁴⁶ John 20 31; cf. Mark 1 1 11 9 7 15 39.

of a school of followers who accommodate it to traditional views by the easy logic, "first, therefore primitive and authentic." Contrariwise, Bruno Bauer⁴⁷ represents the logical outcome. The wholly secondary, unhistorical character of the Fourth Gospel once admitted, and Mark recognized as the basis of Matthew and Luke if not of Q as well, internal analysis of Mark leads inevitably, in his judgment, to a verdict differing only in degree from that pronounced against John. Brandt⁴⁸ and Wrede⁴⁹ mark the logical steps along this road, negatively establishing through the inconsistencies of the narrator the untrustworthiness of his story, and positively accounting for its distinctive features by coincidences of adaptation to a later-constructed ecclesiastical theory of the origin of the doctrine of the messiahship. To Schweitzer the determination of the other factor of evangelic tradition, the teaching of Jesus, as a parallel phenomenon, brings only the confirmation of the eschatological theory of Johannes Weiss,⁵⁰ and makes it, in spite of Paul, the supreme interest of Jesus to proclaim himself the Son of Man in the crudely apocalyptic sense.

It is to be regretted that a volume so truly great in its knowledge and appreciation of the bearing of the work of critics should show so little first-hand acquaintance with the ultimate sources which by common acknowledgment must now be recognized as the documentary basis for the critical history of Jesus. Schweitzer⁵¹ thinks Matt. 19 12 good enough evidence to disprove von Soden's characterization of the teaching of Jesus as wholesome, just as if the admitted distinction between Q and the redactional additions to Matthew had never been drawn. Over and over he reverts to the inappropriate conclusion of the instructions to the apostles, Matt. 10 16-42, just as if there were no reasons but the arbitrary choice of the critics for distinguishing the Marcan

⁴⁷ *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841-1842; Kritik der Evangelien, 1850-1852.*

⁴⁸ *Die evangelische Geschichte und der Ursprung des Christenthums, 1893.*

⁴⁹ *Das Messiasgeheimnis, 1901.*

⁵⁰ *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, 2 ed., 1900.* See also *Das älteste Evangelium, 1903.*

⁵¹ *Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 306, n. 1.*

nucleus forming the substance of 10 1-15 from the Matthæan agglutinated supplement in verses 16-42. Schweitzer has no more apprehension of the history, substance, and significance of Q, in distinction from later amplifications, than he thinks his opponents have of the fact that the canonical Gospels are the products of their age. Equally so as respects Mark. Over and over Mark 4 11-12 must serve to fasten upon Jesus himself, or at least our ultimate knowledge of him, the artificial, *ex post facto* theory that the preaching in parables was an intentional hiding of the light. He not only can see no contrast between these two interjected verses and the adjoining material which they so badly misinterpret, but is afflicted with the blindness of those who will not see toward the connection of this Marcan theory with the Pauline apologetic of Rom. 9-11. No wonder it strikes Holtzmann as little less than cool effrontery when Schweitzer replies to this explanation of Mark 4 10 ff., "It really is about time to point out these Pauline influences on Mark, instead of constantly asserting them. How would Mark look if it had got into the hands of a Paulinist?"⁵² Schweitzer's work marks an epoch, because it issues so well the summons to another trial balance on the work of the documentary critics, and itself responds to it so badly.

In its results, particularly in the field of Synoptic criticism, the old trial balance of the Tübingen school has been rejected once for all. The essence of Baur's method, however, remains established with equal permanence and definiteness: First, the Gospels are ecclesiastical formulations of the tradition, and must be interpreted as the products of their time. Second, the issues of that time must be defined by independent scrutiny of the great Pauline Epistles. Comparison of the results of documentary analysis with the ancient account of gospel origins yields, indeed, some negative results, which simply go to show that the tradition is more ancient than the canonical Gospels to which Papias and later investigators vainly seek to apply it; but these are outweighed by the great positive result that we are carried back to a period which knows but two streams of evangelic tradition, attaching respectively to the names of Matthew and Peter. For in the

⁵² *Op. cit.* p. 303; cf. Holtzmann, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X, 37-40.

ultimate comparison, geographical distribution, internal characteristics, and ancient tradition will be found at one in connecting this Syrian-Roman division of the evangelic tradition with the transition of the gospel from Semitic to Aryan soil; from particularism to universalism; from a centre of gravity with James and "the apostles and elders" at Jerusalem⁵³ to a centre of gravity at Rome with an idealized Peter and Paul.

The school of criticism that has already struck out the true lines of valuation for the evangelic tradition, unknown to Schweitzer, we may designate the aetiological,⁵⁴ from its recognition that the starting point is the existing belief or practice of the Church, which is to be explained or justified by means of the tradition of its origin. In Mark we have a stringing together of groups of anecdotes from the story of Jesus, illustrative of (1) baptism and the gifts of the Spirit. So Jesus was baptized and endowed. (2) The ministry in its two functions of teaching and healing. So the apostles received "the mystery of the kingdom," and witnessed the wonder-working of faith. (3) The *agapé*, and its symbolism of the bread of life. So Jesus fed the multitudes and predicted his death for the world. (4) The institution of the Church. So Jesus and the Twelve went forth leaving all. (5) The eucharist, with its lesson of death and resurrection. The general arrangement is dominated by a conspicuously Pauline motive. Of course we do not expect to find in Mark the Pauline mysticism. That was reserved for the Fourth Gospel. Our Evangelist is a Paulinist of the type of those who in Corinth appealed to the Apostle for advice which should confirm their own radicalism, and got instead a rebuke of their disposition to rate the gifts of miracles above the inward gifts of the Spirit; of their inconsiderate use of the principle "all things are lawful," without regard for the weak brother; of their war-cry, "I am of Paul," against the equal intolerance of those who claimed special authority for Peter. To

⁵³ Acts 21 18; Gal. 2 1-10.

⁵⁴ The term is applied by Menzies, *The Earliest Gospel*, 1901, p. 15, with rather inadequate application of the principle. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis*, 1901, in its positive contributions, which greatly outweigh the negative, marks the new development in this direction. Note the citations from Jülicher, Wernle, Pfleiderer, B. and J. Weiss, Harnack, Bousset, Frommel, and Zimmermann, made by Holtzmann, l. c., pp. 26-28, as typical of the aetiological tendency.

the Roman evangelist, Peter is a witness, as he had been to Paul (Gal. 1 18; 1 Cor. 15 1-5); with James and John he has the reward of the "witness" faithful unto death (Mark 10 28-31 35-45). But that reward is not to "exercise authority over" the Church (10 42-44). For the rest, Mark knows scarcely more of Peter than the sharp rebukes he received (8 33 9 5-6), his conspicuous disloyalty (14 29-31 66-72), and the self-seeking (10 28) and incapacity to receive the truth which he had shared with all "the disciples" (6 52 7 18 9 28 32). Of James and John he has just one anecdote besides that of their request for the places of honor (10 35-45). It is Jesus' rebuke of their narrow intolerance (9 38-41).⁵⁵ Of the brethren of the Lord he has also one, "They went out to lay hold on him, for they said, He is beside himself." Of Peter's share in the "turning again" and "stablishing his brethren," to which the Apostle owed his best title to the name of Rock-Foundation of the Church, as Mark related the story, we can only judge by the fact that that portion of the Gospel in which it appeared has been suppressed by the Church, while the allusion to this rallying of the scattered flock in 14 28 makes Jesus personally, and not Peter, the agent.

There is a Petrine element in Mark, but it lies very far back indeed, and shows itself in spite of the Evangelist rather than by his intention. It is not the Petrinism of Luke, whose solution of the whole problem of "distinctions of meats" and "the pollutions of idols" is the mediating position of Peter so sharply rebuked by Paul in Galatians 2 11-16,⁵⁶ and who makes Peter the Apostle to the Gentiles (Acts 15 7). Mark 7 1-23 solves this whole question by a radical repudiation of Judaism as a "vain worship," "commandments of men" (cf. Col. 2 22), invoking the principle, "there is nothing which goeth into a man that can defile him," as "making all meats clean" (7 19). On the subject of the law, he supersedes Mosaism by clear enunciation of the principle of the higher law of God in creation (10 1-9). Goodness is not

⁵⁵ The omission of this passage by Matthew should be studied in the light of Matt. 7 21-23, which inverts the sub-Pauline principle that acknowledgment of Jesus as Lord and exercise of the gifts of the Spirit is proof of discipleship.

⁵⁶ See Bacon, "Acts versus Galatians: the Crux of Apostolic History," in *American Journal of Theology*, XI (1907), pp. 454-474.

won by keeping the commandments, but by the utter self-renunciation of Jesus (10 17-22). Its law is not that of "whole burnt-offering and sacrifice," but the love of God and man (12 28-34).⁵⁷ But we are not endeavoring to prove the Paulinism of Mark, which is amply sustained by the critics to whom Holtzmann directs Schweitzer's attention;⁵⁸ we are merely pointing to the beginnings of a historico-critical school which finds the key to the formulation of gospel material in the aetiological motive. And the first result of its application is to find that the great epistles to the Galatians, Romans, and Corinthians lay bare to us the institutions, the problems, the live issues which the groups of anecdotes in Mark are adapted to explain, determine, and justify. The issues of Mark are the real and practical problems of Gentile church life between 70 and 90 A.D.

Historico-critical interpretation and valuation of Q is, from the nature of the case, far less advanced; but the work of reconstruction, as it appears, e.g., in Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, permits already a similar application of the aetiological method. Here, too, we have agglutination of the sayings into discourses, whose principle of aggregation is again practical ecclesiastical use, but with the Jewish Christian conception of the Gospel as a "royal law," a glorified *Torah*, as the motive. What was the interaction of the two factors in the accumulation and transmission of the evangelic tradition; whether Q was known to Mark or conversely, or whether only factors of each were reciprocally known—these are questions still in the hands of the documentary critics.⁵⁹ The established fact is the process, which went on in the Aramaic-speaking church, from the time of the Apostle Matthew to that of our own Greek Gospel of Matthew, under the same dominant idea of "teaching to observe all things whatsoever Jesus had commanded." The principle was, "If thou wouldest enter into life, keep the commandments," viz.,

⁵⁷ In all cases the parallels in Matthew and Luke must be compared. In nearly every case of Pauline radicalism in Mark it will be found that Luke omits the passage, while Matthew inverts its sense by verbal changes.

⁵⁸ See the authorities cited in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X, pp. 38-40.

⁵⁹ On the influence of Q or some factor of it on Mark 1 1-13, see Bacon, "The Prologue of Mark," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXVI (1907), pp. 84-106.

those of Moses as interpreted and supplemented by Jesus.⁶⁰ The true exponent was the "scribe of the kingdom," who, with the Twelve, had learned to "bring forth from his treasure the new and the old"; the false exponent, he who propagated "lawlessness" under cover of confession of the Lordship and exercise of the charismata.⁶¹ How long the process continued before the ultimate combination of the Palestinian type with the Roman appears not merely from such internal evidence as Matt. 7 22 13 41 16 18-19 22 6-7 28 19, and similar references, but from the completeness with which the Roman gospel had monopolized the field of narrative, even in Syria, when our Matthew began his harmonistic work. Moreover, it is not Jerusalem, but Antioch, which supplied him the form and principal contents of even the Oriental factor. Even this now survives not as an Aramaic, but a Greek teaching of Jesus; not as an anti-Pauline, but a catholic form of the tradition; not as a Gospel according to the Hebrews, with James as the dominant figure, but in the group of apostolic "scribes of the kingdom of heaven" (13 51-52), the chief scribe, entrusted with the keys and the authority to bind and loose, is Peter. Our first and third Gospels present a parallel phenomenon at a period which their mutual independence compels us to regard as almost the same. It is the phenomenon of the adjustment of the apostolic gospel of the teaching to the Pauline gospel of the personality. Antioch is the centre; and the name to conjure with is that of Peter, with the Apostles and Matthew in the dim background.

The vista of research which opens before the twentieth century gives a long perspective, whether in the field of documentary analysis or historical interpretation. But the elements of the problem, and the method, are more surely in hand than ever; and the results are far from indicating the negative conclusions Schweitzer would have us believe. We can bring into relation the documents and the ancient tradition, interpreting both in the light of the great Pauline Epistles. Ultimately we shall make the teaching of Jesus and the story about him interpret each other.

⁶⁰ Matt. 28 30 19 17-19.

⁶¹ Matt. 5 17-20 7 22-23 13 39-41 24 11-12.

RECENT EXCAVATIONS IN PALESTINE

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While recent discovery in Palestine has added much to our knowledge of the peoples who lived there, it must be admitted that the results are, in comparison with those obtained in Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia, disappointingly meagre. Some of the reasons for this are clear. Palestine was not, like the countries named, the seat of a great empire, with splendid palaces temples and tombs, with boundless wealth and luxury built on the tribute of the nations, with flourishing centres of art and literature. Much of the best that was produced in Palestine has been destroyed by the wars which have so often devastated the country. Still further, the sites where most might be expected, at least for the Hebrew period, yet await investigation—Jerusalem and Samaria. The former, being almost entirely built over, is likely to remain a sealed book. The latter, owing to its great size, would be an expensive undertaking, but not otherwise difficult. The whole mound might be explored, save the eastern end with its village and cemetery.

But though Jerusalem and Samaria, the centres of ancient Hebrew life, still keep their secrets, other sites have given much information, especially about the times before the Hebrew occupation of the land. We are, indeed, not a little surprised to find that where a Canaanite site was later occupied by the Hebrews, it is the earlier people who have left the ampler evidence of themselves. The fine specimens of pottery and bronze, revealing a taste for objects of artistic value, and the many articles of Babylonian, Egyptian, and Cypriote origin, showing active intercourse with foreign peoples, give a new idea of the state of culture attained by the early inhabitants of Canaan. Many a narrative or intimation in the Old Testament finds its confirmation or illustration in these discoveries.

The chief excavations have been carried on by Professor W. M.

Flinders Petrie and Doctor Frederick J. Bliss and his associates between 1890 and 1901, and by Mr. R. A. Stewart Macalister, Professor Ernst Sellin, and Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, subsequently to the latter date.¹ The results of the earlier series have been set forth in book form, while those of the later series are to be found mainly in technical journals, not so easily accessible. One must also add, not so easily intelligible, owing in some cases to lack of plan or illustration, in others to the fact that the reports made during the progress of the work are liable to correction by subsequent reports. It is with the later series, therefore, that this paper chiefly deals. But the former, owing to their importance, call for a brief survey, because the principles deduced by the earlier explorers have guided the work of their successors.

A word of explanation is necessary regarding 'tells' and the methods of exploring them. *Tell*, 'hillock,' is the name applied by the natives to the mounds which mark the sites of ancient settlements. The mounds represent the accumulated débris and rubbish, which varies in depth from a few feet to sixty or more, according to the nature of the building material, the length of occupation, and the change of inhabitants. Such tells, of varying dimensions, abound in all parts of the country, but especially in the plains and on the edges of the plains. Underneath them is usually a slight elevation, at times the native rock. Their rounded shape and evenness of outline distinguish them from natural hills, and slight experience is sufficient to recognize them. The deposits of débris are arranged in strata, corresponding to the number of rebuildings and new occupations of the site. These strata, when undisturbed by later digging, are easily distinguishable. The successive strata contain the remains of the period to which they belong, objects in stone, metal, pottery, bone, or glass.

For a variety of reasons the exploration of such a tell by what might appear the natural method, the removal of an entire stratum before proceeding to the next lower, is not feasible. In view of the practical difficulties of doing this, the best method is to cut away the tell by sections down to the rock or virgin soil. Neither method

¹The work of Doctor Bliss and Mr. Archibald Dickie, 1894-1897, outside the walls of Jerusalem (described in their *Excavations at Jerusalem*, London, 1898), is mainly a local topographical study, and is not included in this review.

has been applied to a whole tell, though Doctor Bliss applied the first to one-third of Tell el-Hesy. Mr. Macalister, while working at Gezer by sections, has not been able to follow the consecutive order. Elsewhere, explorers have had to content themselves with the very unsatisfactory method of trenches and shafts, enlarging these as indications might suggest.

A new era in Palestinian exploration was opened by the work of Professor Petrie at Tell el-Hesy in 1890.² Prepared by long experience in Egypt, Petrie's achievement was the discovery of the various strata at Lachish, the recognition of the successive types of pottery, and the assignment of relative dates to both. The mound had been so eaten away by the stream at its base and the wash of the rains that not much actual digging was necessary for the studies made by Petrie.

Tell el-Hesy lies on the edge of the Philistine plain about thirty miles southwest of Jerusalem. Its height of 120 feet, over half of which is artificial accumulation, makes it a conspicuous object from afar. The plateau is of irregular shape, with an average length of about 200 feet each way, and the slope on the steepest side, next the stream, is about forty-five degrees.

The latest objects found on the tell were fragments of Greek pottery of the fifth century B.C., whence Petrie concludes that the history of the tell closed in that century, say about 450 B.C. How many centuries are represented by the 60 feet of débris? No Egyptian objects being found to give a fixed point, recourse is had to the so-called "Phœnician" pottery, which occurs in the ruin from 20 to 45 feet below the top. The middle of this "Phœnician" ware is thus $32\frac{1}{2}$ feet below the top. In Egypt the same ware occurs from 1400 to 800 B.C., the middle of the period being thus 1100. Assuming the same range of dates for Palestine, the upper $32\frac{1}{2}$ feet of the mound will have grown between 1100 and 450 B.C., that is, in six centuries and a half. The rate is thus five feet to the century. If the rate for the whole tell were uniform, we should have twelve centuries for the accumulation, or 1650 B.C. for the first occupation. These results are, of course, given as approxi-

²W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Tell el-Hesy (Lachish)*, London, 1891.

mations only, working hypotheses awaiting correction or confirmation.

Does the tell contain other historical clues? Petrie sees such a clue in an extensive bed of ashes five feet thick, spread by the wind, beneath which is a stratum of rough building stones, indicating a time when huts were made of the rudest materials. These are at the level which ought to correspond to about 1200 B.C., and are believed by Petrie to represent the rude houses of the Hebrews in the time of the Judges. Below this stratum are massive city walls, designated by him "Amorite."

The earliest wall, of unburnt bricks resting on the native sand, would be of the seventeenth century B.C. It has been raised in height at several different times. On both sides of this wall were fragments of the earliest "Amorite" pottery. Above the stratum of rude stones likewise, at various depths, are stone walls, assigned by Petrie to the several rebuildings of Lachish which Hebrew kings are reported to have made.

The pottery as he describes it is as follows: At the lowest depths "Amorite" pottery, characterized by marks on the surface as if made by a comb ("comb facing"), spouts of peculiar shape, ledge handles, mouths made by a simple hole in the side of the vessel, bowls with thick brims, and polished facing. Above the "Amorite" level comes the "Phœnician" ware, distinguished by thin black-faced pottery, by *bilbils* (thin black vases with long necks), by soft, light drab pottery, by thin bowls, and by pottery painted on the outside with bistre. Then comes Jewish pottery, "styles which are neither Amorite nor Phœnician, but which consist of a mixture of characters. They are mostly red-brown with rough surface." Greek pottery begins to appear in the tell about 800 or 700 B.C. Of Seleucidan or Roman pottery there is none.

It will be seen that Petrie recognizes at Tell el-Hesi four types of pottery, which he calls Amorite, Phœnician, Jewish, and Greek. All his successors make the same distinctions, but with great differences as to the names which they employ. Having thus determined approximately the age of the tell, and noted the great divisions of Palestinian pottery, Petrie returned to his Egyptian explorations, leaving the details of the subject to be wrought out by other hands.

The identification of Tell el-Hesi with the important Canaanite and Jewish city Lachish, first proposed by C. R. Conder, while not strictly proved, is in a high degree probable. Petrie's reasons, in brief, for the identification are its commanding position, with the best water supply in the region; its approximate agreement with the distance of Lachish from Eleutheropolis (the modern Beit Jibrin) as stated in the Onomasticon; and the possibility of interpreting the successive cities in the light of the Biblical references to Lachish. There is no other tell in the vicinity whose appearance suggests such importance as we know that Lachish enjoyed. The cuneiform tablet found by Bliss in the third city adds to the probability of the identification. It mentions Zimrida, which was the name of a governor of Lachish in the el-Amarna correspondence, as we know from other tablets; but the tablet is very fragmentary, and the Zimrida referred to is not necessarily the governor.

In 1891-1892 Doctor Bliss cut away the northeast third of Tell el-Hesi down to the virgin soil at a depth of 65 feet.³ In doing this he removed the remains of one city before proceeding to the next lower city. With larger material at hand he was able to distinguish more sharply than Petrie had done the several cities and the successive types of pottery, but did not fundamentally differ from Petrie's conclusions. He found evidence of eight occupations, three of which seem to represent two periods each. The depth of the foundations of these various settlements below the surface is 65, 53, 45, 37, 22, 18, 8, and 5 feet respectively. Between the third and fourth cities most of the surface is covered by the thick bed of ashes noted on the margin of the tell by Petrie. The part cut away by Bliss measured 100 by 120 feet at the top and 160 by 125 at the bottom. The first three or four settlements at Tell el-Hesi covered a much larger area than that of the tell, the accumulation over this larger space varying from a few feet to seventeen in depth. Later settlements were confined to the tell.

The most prominent object of the first city was the great city wall on the north, ten feet thick, and still about as high. The stream had cut away the eastern wall. House walls were so badly

³F. J. Bliss, *A Mound of Many Cities*, London, 1898.

preserved that it was hardly possible to recover the plans. The pottery shows the ledge handles, comb marking, peculiar spout, and other characteristics noted by Petrie. Bronze objects were wanting, but the year before at the same level in another part of the tell was found a chamber containing a battle-ax, spear heads, and adzes of this metal. In the second city were found two groups of chambers, and the lower portion of a circular blast furnace, seven feet in diameter, made of mud. The wall of the third city was partly worn away; what remained was 17 feet thick. From a rubbish heap beside some chambers came lance tips and fragments of pottery. In the same heap was found, on May 14, 1892, the cuneiform tablet already mentioned. The phraseology and the character of the script seem almost certainly to fix its date as that of the el-Amarna correspondence, in the fourteenth century. None of the objects associated with this tablet seem later than the time of the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty. It certainly antedates the great bed of ashes lying above the third city. The bad condition of the tablet makes it uncertain who was the sender and who the receiver, but the indications are that the tablet was sent from some other town to the Egyptian governor stationed at Lachish. The bronze objects from the second and third cities include a spear head, chisels, a borer set in a bone handle, and a variety of pins and needles. The pottery shows a marked change from that of the first city. It represents the transition to the "Phœnician" style, which became prevalent in the fourth city. A few painted fragments from the second city resemble the finest Egyptian ware of the el-Amarna period.

The ash bed between the third and fourth cities varies in thickness from three to seven feet. That the period represented by it was not a long one appears from the fact that the same styles of pottery are found in the two cities. In the fourth city was found a well-built house, 56 feet square, with a symmetrical plan. Underneath the walls was a layer of yellow sand half an inch deep. The outer walls were $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick, the largest chamber 15 by 30 feet. At the same level, but in another part of the mound, 5 feet above the ash bed, Petrie came upon a building with decorative pilasters, the only ornamental stone work found in the tell. Among the remains of this city, in which two periods were recognized, were found

scarabs and seals, many objects in bronze, likewise stone objects such as dishes, pestles, and corn-grinders. This is the time when the "Phœnician" pottery is at its best, including pointed juglets, rough lamps and bowls, smooth bowls with peculiar handles, painted in bistre. Some of the bowls have strainer spouts. Bowls filled with sand and a lamp and covered by another bowl were found so often near foundations as to suggest some rite associated with house-building. Some of the best pottery of this date came from a spot outside the city limits. Bliss calls the spot a cemetery, though he found no human bones. There were many whole jars and vases filled with fine sand; a large jar frequently containing another of smaller size. The period yielded also a few specimens of rough painted ware, red and brown, and a fragment of a plate inscribed with three Phœnician letters. Iron objects occur for the first time at the top of the fourth city.

Around the fifth city there seems to be no wall. There is a series of extensive, complicated buildings, but whether barracks, bazaars, or something else does not appear. The sixth city had a massive northern wall. Both this and the house walls are ruined to the base. Bliss found a rude lamp-stand with seven Greek letters scratched across its base. Petrie found outside the wall a jar fragment with four Phœnician letters. Many bronze objects came from the fifth and sixth cities. The iron objects, beginning in the fourth city, included knives, chisels, spear and lance points. The seventh city was destroyed by fire, the marks of which are everywhere visible. Many granaries were found in the form of round pits in the earth, still common in Palestine. There were two houses in fairly good condition. One of the rooms contained a layer of burnt barley, five to eight inches deep. In another were many jars, mostly broken, containing seeds. The remains of the eighth city were almost entirely destroyed by moisture from the surface. "The characteristic pottery of cities V to VIII was the Jewish, i.e. coarse copies of the older Phœnician types." In cities VI to VIII types of Greek pottery were also found.

Reviewing the evidence of the inscribed materials, figured objects, metal tools and weapons, and pottery, Bliss reaches the following results as to the dates of the successive cities: Sub I, before 1700 B.C.; I, ca. 1600; Sub II, ca. 1550; II, ca. 1500; III, ca.

1450; Sub IV, ca. 1400; IV, ca. 1300; V, ca. 1000; VI, ca. 800; VII, ca. 500; VIII, ca. 400. These are of course meant for approximations only. Of the date 1450 for city III one may feel a good deal of confidence on account of the cuneiform tablet, when one recalls that from the following century we have many such tablets, sent to the Pharaohs by Egyptian officials stationed in Palestine, including several from the city of Lachish,⁴ and others which make mention of the place.⁵

In the years 1898-1900 Doctor Bliss and Mr. Macalister excavated in four tells lying in the Shephelah a few miles to the northeast of Tell el-Hesi.⁶ These tells are Zakariya, es-Safi, ej-Judeideh, and Sandahannah. This work put to the test the results obtained at Tell el-Hesi. Tell Zakariya, which rises 350 feet above a wady of the same name, is at the top about 1000 feet long, and half as wide at its widest point. The excavation consisted of trenches and pits at various points on the tell. The accumulation is of two kinds: an older, resting on the rock, from 2 to 10 feet thick, characterized by late pre-Israelite pottery; and an upper, from 4 to 9 feet thick, containing Jewish and Seleucidan ware. The main building was a large fortress belonging to the upper of the two strata. About it the débris varies from 13 to 24 feet thick. The fortress seems to be of Jewish origin.

Tell es-Safi, commonly identified with Gath, rises 300 feet above a wady lying near its foot. On it are a village, two cemeteries, and dense cactus hedges, which greatly limit the area of possible exploration. At its highest point, on the southern end, are the foundations of a Crusaders' castle built in 1144. The cliffs of the tell near this point rise precipitously from 100 to 150 feet. Along the slope at various points are seen portions of a ruin, perhaps the ancient city wall, enclosing a tract of irregular shape, about 400 by 200 yards. Pits dug at several points reached the rock at a depth of 41, 30, and 24½ feet respectively. The first 5 feet held Arab remains; the next 5, Jewish; thence to the rock, pre-Israelite, in an

⁴ Hugo Winckler, *The Tell el-Amarna Letters*, New York, 1896, Nos. 217, 218.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 181.

⁶ Excavations in Palestine during the years 1898-1900, by F. J. Bliss and R. A. S. Macalister, London, 1902.

earlier and a later stratum. The pottery testifies to a continuous history from about 1700 B.C. down to Seleucid times. The city wall noted above seems to be from Jewish times, and may be the work of Rehoboam, who is said to have fortified Gath.⁷ On the northeast plateau, at a depth ranging from 18 to 20 feet below the surface, and enclosed by walls, were found three upright monoliths, varying in height from 5 feet 10 inches to 7 feet 1 inch. These seem to have belonged to an ancient high place, of which a fine example was found later by Macalister at Gezer.

At Tell ej-Judeideh the excavation revealed traces of a city wall pierced by four gates flanked by towers. Near the middle of the enclosure was a Roman villa. The pottery and other data suggest that the site "was occupied in very early times, deserted before the Hebrew conquest, reoccupied by the Jews during the later days of the monarchy, and finally fortified at a comparatively late period, perhaps in Roman times." Tell Sandahannah was the site of a Seleucid town about seven acres in area, surrounded by a double wall. The tops of the house walls were found as a rule less than a foot below the surface of the ground. The town is roughly divided into streets, several of which are paved. The houses are complex in plan, with small chambers lighted from the street and from central courts. The date of this Seleucid town seems to be the third and the second century B.C. Many fragmentary Greek inscriptions were found. The clearing of a small section down to the rock passed through strata with Jewish pottery, showing that a Jewish settlement preceded the Seleucid.

The pottery found in the four Shephelah towns was of types similar to those from Tell el-Hesy, and in the same order. The enlarged study made possible by them confirmed the conclusions reached by Bliss at Tell el-Hesy. The names applied by him to the four great periods of the pottery are early pre-Israelite, late pre-Israelite, Jewish, and Seleucid. The first ends about 1500 B.C., the second extends into the period of the Hebrew monarchy, the third extends till about 300 B.C., the last beginning then and ending in the Roman period. The elaborate discussion of this subject, accompanied by a large number of plates, makes the *Excavations in Palestine* a valuable thesaurus of Palestinian pottery.

The results given in this book and those reached by Petrie and Bliss at Tell el-Hesi have formed the starting-point for subsequent excavations in the tells of Palestine.

The work of Mr. Macalister at Gezer is distinguished from that of other explorers in Palestine by the attempt to make a complete excavation of the site. This work extended from June 14, 1902, to August 30, 1905, and was taken up afresh in March, 1907. Regular reports of the progress of the work are given in the Quarterly Statements of the Palestine Exploration Fund. In *Bible Side-Lights from the Mound of Gezer*, 1906, Mr. Macalister has presented some of the results in popular form.

The way in which Gezer is spoken of in the el-Amarna correspondence shows that it was a place of importance. According to Joshua it successfully resisted the Hebrew invaders (Josh. 16 10). It was apparently Philistine territory in the time of David. Though acquired by Solomon and rebuilt by him (1 Kings 9 16-17), it seems never to have been important as a Jewish town. It was fortified against the Maccabees by Bacchides (1 Macc. 9 52), but a few years later Simon the Maccabee captured it and built therein a palace (1 Macc. 13 43-48). During the Crusades it was known as Mont Gisart.

The identification of Gezer with the present Tell ej-Jezari, made by Clermont-Ganneau in 1873, is beyond dispute.⁸ The tell is about midway between Jerusalem and Jaffa, a little south of the wagon road connecting the two cities, beside the modern village Abu Shusheh. It lies east and west, is about 1700 feet long, and 300 broad in its narrowest part. It consists of two hillocks, an eastern and a western, with a depression between. On the western is a Moslem cemetery and the weli, or shrine of the local saint, beneath which one cannot excavate.

The first digging was on the eastern hill, and brought to light a burial cave cut in the rock underneath the débris, a circle of stones which showed marks of fire and seem to have been connected with a sanctuary, and many small objects of primitive type. There is pottery with ledge handles, comb facing and burnishing, as at Lachish; also scarab seals and fragments of Ægean ware.

⁸ Clermont-Ganneau, *Archæological Researches in Palestine*, II, 224-275.

Two city walls were found; an outer, 14 feet wide by 12 high, strengthened by buttresses, and an inner, evidently earlier, of about the same size.

The burial cave showed two modes of burial, the earlier by cremation, the later by inhumation. The bed of ashes from burnt bodies covered about half the floor, being a foot thick at its deepest point. The general coherence of the bones, and a blackened hole, or flue, at one end of the cave showed that the cremation had taken place on the spot. The pottery resembled that from the lower levels at Lachish and elsewhere. Such study of the skulls and bones as their fragmentary condition allowed, led Professor Alexander Macalister, of Cambridge, to the conclusion that the cremated bodies were those of a pre-Semitic people. The bodies of the later burials were placed on stone platforms along the sides of the cave, or on the floor, and overlay in part the bed of ashes. Professor Macalister finds them of a taller, stronger, larger-boned race than the others, and apparently of Semitic stock, perhaps from the first wave of Semitic immigration. The large amount of pottery throughout the cave was almost perfectly preserved; that associated with the burnt bodies being distinctly older and coarser in quality.

A trench on the western hill revealed seven strata of débris, the seventh and topmost being Seleucidan. The sixth stratum yielded jar handles with Hebrew stamps, and is the upper limit of the bowl and lamp deposits beneath foundations, which begin in the fifth. In the latter stratum, also, iron first appears, though bronze is the prevailing metal. The pottery is transitional from pre-Israelite to Jewish types. In the fourth and third layers occur scarabs of the Egyptian Middle Empire, and bronze is the only metal. The second stratum yielded rude pottery, but no metal was found; while the lowest stratum is represented by certain troglodyte dwellings, with rude implements of flint and bone, and very rough porous pottery. It is possible that what has been designated the second stratum was contemporaneous with these. Mr. Macalister's provisional dating is as follows: I and II, 3000-2000 B.C.; III-IV, 2000-1400; V, 1400-1000; VI, 1000-600; VII, 600-1.

A large cistern cut in the rock in the second period was used as a burial cave in the third. In it were fourteen male skeletons and

the upper half of a female, along with fine bronze weapons, spear heads, knives, and the like. A group of caves, entered by rock-cut steps, represents troglodyte dwellings. The pottery, in ware, form, and ornament resembles the earliest found elsewhere in Palestine. Objects of domestic use are of flint and stone. Two skeletons were found, an adult and an infant. One of the caves, communicating with another by a narrow curved passage, is thought by Mr. Macalister to have been used as an oracle chamber in connection with the sanctuary above it.

The most notable feature of this sanctuary, or high place, is a series of eight large monoliths, standing in a row north and south, and the stumps of two others. Two of these stones projected above the surface before the digging began. They stand on a platform of stone which has an average height of three feet above the native rock. Prostrate beneath this platform was a ninth column. There is much variety in the size of the stones. The tallest, 10 feet 9 inches high, is also the thickest (2 feet 3 inches); the broadest is 5 feet wide; the shortest and smallest is 5 feet 5 inches high. The intervals between the stones vary from 3 feet 2 inches to 17 feet 6 inches; but in the latter case a stone has been lost from the space. The resemblance to a phallus which Mr. Macalister sees in one of the stones cannot be called obtrusive. He notes on its western face a couple of shallow "cup marks and grooves." This stone is of a kind not occurring in the immediate vicinity of Gezer. The line of the stones varies but slightly from a straight line. About the middle of the row and close beside it on the west is a large rectangular block of stone with a rectangular hole cut in its upper surface. The hole is 2 feet 10 inches by 1 foot 11 inches, and 1 foot 4 inches deep. There is no sign of fire. Mr. Macalister thinks it may have been a socket to support an Asherah, or more probably a basin to contain water for ablutions.

The temple area, including these columns and the "oracle" cave, covered a space of uncertain extent. Its floor level was probably that of the stone platform about the columns. In the stratum below this level were many large jars with pointed bottoms containing what remained of the skeletons of infants. The jars were full of earth, and within or beside them were usually two or

three smaller vessels, especially a bowl and a jug. Mr. Macalister thinks that none of the infants can have been more than a week old. Two of them had been burnt, and he feels sure that all of them were sacrificed, probably as the first-born. He explains in the same way similar burials found at Ta'anach and at Lachish. The jars at the latter place were filled with fine white sand. In the rock surface below the floor were several cup holes. All the strata above it, except the topmost, contained "an enormous quantity of objects emblematic of nature worship." These are made of stone, brick, pottery, bone, horn, and marble. In all the strata were terra-cotta plaques with figures in low relief representing the "mother goddess." It would seem therefore that this spot remained sacred through successive occupations of the tell. Further discoveries in the temple precincts include the figure of a serpent in bronze, and two child burials with clear traces of fire. The children were about six years old. In a trench south of the temple, in the Jewish strata, were found bones of children under house walls or built into them, suggesting foundation sacrifices. An enormous pool, doubtless a reservoir for water, of Maccabæan date, cut over 50 feet deep into the rock, was cleared of its stones, débris, and silt. Of several caves one is noteworthy for a large number of cup holes in its floor, some 10 inches deep and 18 inches across. Outside the tell, on the slope of a hill to the south, some rock-cut Seleucidan graves were examined, one of which was closed by a rolling stone.

Summing up the results of the work of the first two years, Mr. Macalister finds that the earliest inhabitants were troglodytes, who practiced cremation, knew the sheep, cow, pig, and goat, made pottery by hand, and at times ornamented it. The first Semitic invasion he would place at about 2500 B.C. These Semites, he thinks, had relations with Egypt as early as the twelfth dynasty. They made, or began, the great megalithic high place; practised sacrifice of the first born and foundation sacrifice; had many varieties of grain for food; made pottery of the so-called early pre-Israelite type; were strongly influenced by Egypt, but much less by Babylon. The late Semitic period comes with the settlement of the Hebrews in Canaan, but these seem never to have held undisputed possession of Gezer.

A new cut across the western hill is $38\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep, and reveals eight strata of buildings. In this section was found a cuneiform tablet, and later a second near the same place. They are records of business transactions from the years 647 and 649 B.C., at a time when Judah was tributary to Assyria. The discovery suggests the presence of an Assyrian garrison or colony at Gezer. Although Gezer figures prominently in the el-Amarna correspondence, no tablets of that era have yet been found on the site.

Of the city walls there were really three; remains of a small earth wall built perhaps by the original inhabitants, and the two massive stone walls already mentioned. The relative age of these is shown by the fact that the inner wall crosses the earth wall at one point, and is in turn partly overlaid by the outer. The outer, it thus appears, is the later, built to replace the inner and give a larger surface to the city. Three strata of buildings overlie the inner wall. Within a chamber in the lowest of these was found a scarab of Amenhotep III and his queen. At another point was found a great gateway through this inner wall, flanked with brick towers. The houses above these towers yielded a large number of objects, scarabs, beads, pottery, among which "every datable object was contemporary with Amenhotep III," while "several of them bore his name." These facts seem to show that the inner wall was in ruins in the el-Amarna period. The outer wall was traced entirely around the tell, and is about 4500 feet long. Thirty of its buttress towers were examined. They are later additions to the wall, only two of them being bonded with it; and it is suggested that they may have been added at the time of Solomon's restoration of the city. Six of these towers are in turn strengthened by bastion-like additions, which may be a part of the work of rebuilding by Bacchides.

Outside the city on the northwest three shaft tombs were found, two circular, and one rectangular; all having a burial chamber on one side at the bottom of the shaft. They were empty of bones, but contained scarabs and early forms of pottery and bronze. So many of the objects in one of the tombs were Egyptian in character as to suggest that the grave may have belonged to an Egyptian. The scarabs seem to date from the twelfth or thirteenth dynasty. Many Maccabæan and Christian tombs were examined on the

northern and eastern slopes of the tell and on the slope of the hill south of the tell. All the unrifled Maccabæan tombs contained ossuaries. Along the line of the outer wall on the south lies a very large building of many chambers, completely looted, which seems to be Maccabæan. After this opinion had been formed on the basis of other evidence, a fragment of a building stone was found in the structure with a Greek inscription which may be translated: (says) "Pampras, may fire follow up the palace of Simon." The structure may therefore be the palace built at Gezer by Simon the Maccabee, and the imprecation may have been concealed in the wall by some enemy of his.

On the western hill was found a complicated series of connecting caves, believed to have been a troglodyte dwelling subsequently used for burial. There are ten chambers, one of which has its floor covered by circular cup marks, forty-six in number, with vertical sides and flat bottoms. Another chamber has beneath its floor a bell-shaped cistern, which seems to have been itself originally a lower chamber reached by a stairway. This chamber was deepened into a cistern, and the steps built over and concealed by masonry in order to make the mouth of the cistern circular. Two of the chambers in this series of caves had not been looted by robbers, being hidden by fallen rock. One of them contained several groups of pottery, one or two pieces of which were of unusual form. The other was rich in pottery and alabaster, and contained a number of gold-mounted scarabs, a fine bronze-gilt kohl-pencil, beads, etc. The scarabs from these various chambers of this series are all from the Egyptian Middle Empire.

In the eastern hill were unearthed two tombs of masonry, the first of this kind found in the tell, covered with great blocks of stone. The first is that of a man, and contained fine alabaster vessels, a glass vase, a scaraboid with engraving of Assyrian type, and a four-handled vessel of black pottery. The second is that of a woman, and contained beautiful vessels in silver and bronze, a bronze hand-mirror, an armlet, anklets, scarabs, and fragments of alabaster vessels. In each tomb was also an iron knife. Two similar graves were found later. One of these contained rare deposits in pottery, bronze, and silver. The object of greatest beauty was a cylindrical bar of polished jasper about an inch

and a half long. Around it are three ornamental gold bands, with a loop on one side, and a small disc of gold hanging from the opposite side of the band. For a variety of reasons Mr. Macalister believes these burials to be Philistine, an opinion with which J. L. Myres is disposed to agree.⁹

The report in the *Quarterly Statement* for October, 1907, records the discovery of cave sepulchres of the second Semitic period, with a new type of pottery; an unbaked clay tablet with seal impression, some of the figures on which suggest the signs of the zodiac; a fine seal in the Babylonian style; another row of columns similar to the great row already described; and, about a mile distant from the tell, the remains of a large Roman bath.

The work of Professor Sellin, in 1902-1905, at Ta'anach, on the southern edge of the Great Plain, may be more briefly described.¹⁰ The history of Ta'anach antedates the Hebrew conquest. The place was captured by Thothmes III; seems to be mentioned in a fragmentary tablet of the el-Amarna correspondence; resisted the Hebrew invaders (Josh. 12 21), and was the scene of the battle celebrated in Deborah's Song (Judges 5 19). It seems not to have become really Israelite before the time of Solomon (1 Kings 4 12); but has little importance in later Hebrew history.

The tell lies north and south, and is triangular with rounded angles. The plateau at the top has an average length of 1100 feet, with an average breadth of 520, and rises between 130 and 160 feet above the plain. Except a central plateau, 490 by 360 feet in area, the tell is cultivated. On the north and northwest the slope descends by large terraces to the plain. Sellin's method was to sink pits at various points, and to run trenches from the edge of the tell toward the middle, widening these where indications demanded it. About one-sixth or one-seventh of the area was thus dug over. As at Lachish and Gezer, the débris at Ta'anach is deposited in strata. Sellin recognizes four periods, each of which is divisible into an earlier and a later half. The pottery of the first period is characterized by red ware with comb facing,

⁹ *Quarterly Statement*, 1907, pp. 240-243.

¹⁰ Ernst Sellin, *Tell Ta'anek*, Vienna, 1904; *Eine Nachlese auf dem Tell Ta'anek in Palästina*, Vienna, 1905.

and the vessels are mostly flat-bottomed; that of the second, by grayish or olive-colored ware with the brown ladder-pattern decoration, and by the pointed jug; the third period is that of Greek influence. There are no Seleucidan or Roman remains; the fourth period is Arabic.

Fifteen cisterns were found, and Sellin estimates that the tell contains a hundred. Basalt utensils came from all the periods. Flint knives and arrow heads were numerous. In the third period they were rare, iron having taken the place of flint. Bronze was confined mostly to the first two periods, and included knives, spear heads, arrow heads, chisels, and objects of personal use or adornment; among the latter were the gold bracelets and other jewelry of a Canaanite woman. Six houses of considerable size were found. The most important is a castle on the west side of the mound, belonging to the upper half of the first period. From the same stratum, but a little earlier, is a building in the north, where were found twelve cuneiform tablets and fragments of the el-Amarna period. Of a city wall only a small part was uncovered, apparently from the first period. The main city wall is no doubt to be sought on the slope of the tell as at Tell Mutesellim. There were several caves, cut in the rock, which may have been used as houses, or cisterns, or graves. Many earthen jars were found in which young children had been buried; Sellin thinks that in some cases, at least, the children had been offered in sacrifice.

The two discoveries of greatest significance are the cuneiform tablets and an altar of incense; the latter from one of the random pits dug in the southern half of the tell. Its discovery suggests what surprises may still be concealed at Ta'anach. The tablets had probably been preserved in the pottery chest beside which some of them were found. As late as Jeremiah's time important writings were kept in earthenware vessels (Jer. 32 14). Those tablets on which the receiver's name is preserved are addressed to one Ishtar-washur, and probably all were so directed. The house in which they were found may have been his residence; and it is conjectured that he was the local governor, subject to Egypt.

Guli-Addi, one of the writers, after greeting Ishtar-washur, offers to send him silver; and among other things calls on him to

give his daughter, when old enough, to the king (namely, of Egypt). Another correspondent, Ahi-yami, invokes on Ishtar-washur the blessing of "the lord of the gods," refers to some weapons which he had received, inquires whether certain cities have been recovered, and proposes to send a messenger to Ishtar-washur. Both these writers, judging from their names, are Canaanites, but no doubt vassals of Egypt.¹¹ A third writer, Aman-hashir by name, is more probably an Egyptian; perhaps a general or a commissioner. In one of his despatches he instructs Ishtar-washur to send to Megiddo, on the next day, his brothers with their chariots, a horse as tribute, presents, and all prisoners then in his hands. In a second letter Aman-hashir writes from Gaza, reproving Ishtar-washur for not coming to him and not sending him troops. Three other tablets, in a fragmentary condition, are lists of men, it may be subjects of Ishtar-washur. The remaining fragments are too small to tell any story at all.

From the el-Amarna correspondence found in Egypt in 1887 we learned that native princes in Palestine, in the fourteenth century B.C., regularly employed the Babylonian language and script in their communications with the Egyptian court; and it is natural to suppose that replies came back in the same language. What is new in these Ta'anach letters is that within Palestine itself Babylonian is the medium of epistolary intercourse. This, taken in connection with other evidence of Babylonian relations with the Mediterranean coast, would seem to imply long possession of the land by Babylon, during which the language gained such a hold that for communication by writing it continued in use after the country passed from Babylonian control.

The altar of incense, made of hard terra-cotta, comes from the lower stratum of the third period, and seems to date from between 800 and 500 B.C. The reliefs upon it suggest the period of the later Assyrian kings. It was found in thirty-six pieces, which when put together formed an almost complete hollow altar nearly 3 feet high; the sides of the base being about 18 inches long, and the walls from 1 to 2 inches thick. The upper part contracted

¹¹ Dr. Friedrich Hrozný, the translator of these tablets, suggests (Tell Ta'anek, p. 116) that the name Ahi-yami is the same as the Hebrew Ahijah (Ahi-Yahu, Ahi-Yahweh), but Sellin justly remarks that this is only a possibility (*ibid.* p. 109).

gradually in size, and on the top was a shallow depression, 12 inches in diameter. In this, it is supposed, incense was put, and heated by a fire kindled beneath. The altar had no bottom; several holes in the walls may have been designed to admit air to the fire, in a manner well known in Palestine today. The rim of the dish is decorated with rings or eyes. Below the dish on the right side is a handle in the form of a decorative ram's horn. A corresponding handle on the left side had been broken off and could not be found. The side walls are decorated with figures in relief. On the right are three composite creatures, sphinxes or cherubim, with wings, the bodies of quadrupeds, and beardless human heads looking toward the front. The noses are sharp; the head-covering a three-cornered cap with decorated edges and with tassels. Above two of these figures are lions whose fore paws rest on the human heads. On the left side is a series of five similar monsters, and besides these a man strangling a serpent with his left hand, and apparently piercing it with a dagger held in the right hand. On the front wall near the bottom is a conventional sacred tree, on either side of which is a rampant ibex of a type familiar on Babylonian seals, Egyptian scarabs, and elsewhere. This altar, with its decorative motives derived from Egyptian and Assyrian or Babylonian art, was in all probability Israelite. From the story of the visit of Ahaz to Damascus (2 Kings 16) we know that there was in his time a fondness for imitation of foreign altars. Fragments of figures which had formed part of a second altar were also found five or six rods from the first; in neither place was there any evidence of the existence of a temple.

The earliest settlements on the tell may have been about 2000 B.C.; at least it was long before the date of the cuneiform tablets (fourteenth century). The earliest occupants do not seem to have been cave-dwellers, as they were at Gezer. The absence of Seleucid pottery indicates that Ta'anach had ceased to be inhabited before the Hellenistic period; Sellin surmises that it was destroyed in the time of Josiah by the Egyptians or the Scythians.

During three weeks in April, 1907, Sellin dug several trial pits in the tell of ancient Jericho.¹² The walls of several buildings

¹²Mittheilungen und Nachrichten des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins, 1907, pp. 65 ff.

were brought to light; also much pottery, all of which seems to antedate Hebrew times, and to show that there never was a Hebrew settlement on this mound. The work of exploration here is to be continued. The tell measures about 1200 feet by 585, with an average height of 33 feet above the plain. A Canaanite fortress of unburnt bricks on the northwest is the best preserved building of the kind yet discovered in Palestine. Among the potsherds in this building were some of great excellence, decorated with figures of animals in relief recalling Babylonian representations. Two bronze axes were found, and also twenty-two small clay tablets, just like those used for cuneiform writing, but uninscribed. A section of a wall about 10 feet thick and 10 high was uncovered, which is thought to be the city wall. In the ruins of private houses was found pottery covering a long period, from the most primitive to the most beautiful types. Oil and wine jars buried in the floors of the oldest city attest their high age by the coarse clay of which they are made, the flat bottoms, and the wavy ledge handles.

The important work done at Tell Mutesellim by Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher in 1903-1905 has been only briefly reported.¹³ The tell lies about an hour northwest of Tell Ta'anek, and is part of the ancient Megiddo, now represented by the extensive ruins called Lejjün. Its fine water supply, and its position at the point where the main road from the south crosses the mountains and enters the Great Plain, gave importance to Megiddo in early times. The place was captured by Thothmes III about 1500 B.C., and the rich booty there taken gives an idea of the wealth of the city.¹⁴ It figures in the el-Amarna correspondence, and in the Old Testament is usually mentioned in connection with Ta'anach. It was fortified by Solomon, was the place where Ahaziah died, and where Josiah lost his life.¹⁵ The tell rises about 120 feet above the plain by a slope of about thirty degrees. Its top is a plateau about 1020 feet by 750 in area, cultivated in grain, as are also the slopes. The surface pottery is at the latest as early as the fifth century B.C.

¹³In the *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins*, 1903-1906.

¹⁴J. H. Breasted, *History of Egypt*, p. 292.

¹⁵1 Kings 9 15, 2 Kings 9 27 23 29.

This shows that there was no Seleucidan nor Roman occupation of this mound, though the lower fields of Lejjūn have yielded many Roman remains, including tiles with the stamp of the Sixth Legion. The method of exploring the tell was by trenches and pits, as at Ta'anach, and perhaps not more than a sixth of the area was turned over. The deposit seems much thicker than at Ta'anach; at one spot a pit sixty-five feet deep did not reach the rock.

Of the great mass of details in the reports only a few items can be given here. The types of pottery and bronze were much the same as at Gezer and Ta'anach. A shaft at the northern foot of the tell struck a cistern, and near it a large chamber with an airhole in the middle of the roof, beneath which was a mass of human bones. The pottery in the chamber was chiefly of the oldest types, but there were also some later forms. A massive city wall was found at various points by running trenches down the slopes. This wall is everywhere 16 to 20 feet below the present plateau. On the east the thickness of the wall was about 28 feet, much stronger, therefore, than the walls of Gezer. On the southern edge of the tell were uncovered the ruins of a city gate measuring 57 by 36 feet, estimated to date from the seventeenth or sixteenth century B.C.

Three great buildings were found. The first, in the southern part of the tell, at a depth of about 11 feet, was of the best masonry in the tell, and is believed by Schumacher to be of Solomonic origin. Above this building, only 40 inches below the surface, was found a jasper seal stone bearing a Hebrew inscription, which is considered the most important discovery thus far made on the tell. The stone is oval and polished. Its face is 3.7 by 2.7 centimetres, and is finely engraved with a figure of a lion in the Assyrian style. Below the lion, in a script closely resembling that of the Moabite stone, is an inscription in two lines reading, (belonging) "To Shema, servant of Jeroboam." Professor Emil Kautzsch, at the close of a long discussion of the seal,¹⁶ concludes that the Jeroboam is one of the two Hebrew kings who bore that name, more likely the second. Another seal, with the name Asaph, was found near the same spot, but about five feet lower down.

At a depth of about 15 feet from the surface (lower, therefore,

¹⁶ *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten*, 1904, pp. 1 ff.

than the "Solomonic" building) were found bronze objects, seemingly of a sacrificial character. Three or four rods resting on a ring of bronze converge to a point at the upper end, and support a column on which rests the sacrificial dish. There are other indications of the sacredness of the site, especially twelve stones, which, the explorer thinks, are from a high place intentionally overthrown.

A second building, near the middle of the tell, is of Canaanite origin. A large part of this was traced and cleared. A pit was dug therein, 28 feet deep, through seven strata of building, to the rock, of which 28 square yards were cleared. The rock was worn smooth, and its surface contained cup holes, large and small. It was covered with a mud floor without filling in the cup holes. In the two lowest strata (numbered respectively six and seven) were found fragments of pottery of primitive character, utensils of basalt and bronze, and part of a rhinoceros tooth. Some of the graves of the fifth stratum had at the eastern end a sharp stone marked by a hole cut in one side. Underneath the foundations of the Canaanite building were walls of the same construction as those of the Egyptian building to be next described, also a layer of ashes, suggesting that the Egyptian city was burnt before the Canaanite building was erected.

South of the Canaanite building, but one stratum deeper, was another large building, called by Schumacher the Egyptian building, because of the large number of Egyptian objects found therein. Very noteworthy were three chambers in masonry, two of which are certainly tombs; the other a tomb or a store chamber. One of these contained forty-two vessels of most varied form; and one of the five skeletons held in his hand four scarabs encased in gold. This chamber was entered by a narrow passage communicating with a circular walled shaft. This Egyptian building contains many chambers, mostly small, as well as store rooms with amphoras, round pits, oil cisterns, and numerous graves. One shaft was sunk to a depth of forty-two feet below the surface without reaching the rock. Of the numerous smaller objects from this building may be mentioned utensils made of flint, eighteenth dynasty beads, bright red pottery, and other pottery of primitive types. Between the Canaanite and Egyptian buildings was found what seems to have

been a place of worship, of which the main feature was three stones, once perpendicular, covered by a fourth stone, all now fallen down. These were in a shallow pit with plastered sides. There was also a large pointed stone and a basalt vessel in the pit. A yard or more distant was a second pit, containing ashes, coals, and burnt bones of animals. The pits were enclosed by a stone wall.

The excavation of a fine synagogue of the Roman period at Tell Hum (Capernaum?) in April and May, 1905, by the German Orient-Gesellschaft has been briefly reported.¹⁷ At Tell Hum are extensive ruins but no considerable mound. The synagogue was covered by only a small accumulation of earth, and its site is about 250 feet from the northern end of the Sea of Galilee. In size the building is 58 by 80 feet. On the sides of the nave and at the rear end was a colonnade, which supported a loft or gallery. At the south end was a large central door and two side doors, and the roof was gable-shaped. About the doors, above the columns, and elsewhere, was much carving of fine execution, representing animals, eagles, garlands, fruits, flowers, and geometrical designs. In many cases this has been intentionally mutilated. The material of the building is nearly all on the site, making possible, when the digging is finished, a complete restoration of the plans. If this be the synagogue built for the nation by the centurion, the place where Jesus worshipped and taught, unusual interest attaches to the building.

In the winter of 1906-1907, two important Canaanite cemeteries at Samieh were extensively robbed by the fellahin. The site is about six hours north of Jerusalem by horse, and two hours east of the wagon road running north from that city. It is a fertile basin, irrigated by a fine spring, and surrounded by lofty mountains. The cemeteries are on the gentle slopes along the edge of the cultivated tract. There are three forms of graves; shallow sunken tombs with burial spaces hewn out on either side, and in some cases at one end; rectangular chambers cut in the face of the rock, with small receptacles, the so-called *kokim*, radiating from the chamber walls; and shaft tombs. The last named, of which more than a hundred were plundered, are circular wells,

¹⁷ Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin, December, 1905, pp. 14 ff.

communicating at the bottom with one or more chambers hewn in the rock. These chambers are circular or oval, with roofs roughly dome-shaped, and are in some cases fifteen feet or more in diameter. They are of Canaanite origin, and only two such have hitherto been reported (at Gezer). The same plan is found in one of the Mutesellim tombs, but this is of masonry. A large mass of pottery and bronze objects has come from these tombs at Samieh, much of it of excellent quality. Comparison of it with similar material from the lower levels of the excavated tells leaves no doubt as to its Canaanite origin.

What, now, has been our gain from the very considerable amount of digging which has here been reviewed? The great direct gain, it must be confessed, pertains to the earlier history of the country, to communities and the culture in general, rather than to individuals or to specific historical events. Of the earlier populations we now know their massive city walls and the materials and plans of their houses, their weapons and household utensils, the foods which they ate and the animals which served them, their methods of burial, and something of their religious beliefs and practices, the stage of their advance in art, and their intercourse with the outside nations—Egypt, Babylon, and the islands of the Mediterranean. This must be considered a welcome enlargement of our knowledge.

Whether the early populations of Palestine were accustomed to make and preserve written records we cannot say positively, but the indications are that they were not, at least not in their native tongue. The only writings found are Egyptian and Babylonian. It is not unnatural to suppose that the latter tongue, which was used for official intercourse with Egypt and in Palestine itself, was also employed for local records, but this can at present be considered only a conjecture.

The direct gain for the Hebrew period is not nearly so great as for the earlier times. Some reasons were suggested at the beginning of this paper. Another, of perhaps greater importance, is that the Hebrew civilization in its material elements was not very different from that of the Canaanites. The Hebrews made their contribution to culture in less tangible form, in literature,

morals, and religion. In other particulars they fell below their predecessors, adding little that was either distinctive or that indicated an advance. The Hebrew immigration, as Mr. Macalister has recently remarked, "did not affect the progress of culture to the extent supposed," and it had, he thinks, no "obvious influence on the development of civilization in Gezer."¹⁸ In the fusion of elements to which the Book of Judges bears witness we may be sure that the new-comers received more than they gave. But though the positive gain for the Hebrew period is relatively small, the indirect gain is great. For the more we know of conditions in Palestine before the Hebrew invasion, the better we shall understand how deeply the Hebrews were influenced by those conditions. The phase of the subject of which we hear most in the Old Testament is in regard to the Canaanite religion, whose attractions the Hebrews could not resist. What do the excavations tell us on this point?

The accounts of excavations often speak of high places, altars, standing columns, cup holes, sanctuaries, and sacrifice. In no direction have the explorers been more alert than in their search for objects of religious interest. It is therefore but natural that some of their identifications should awaken skepticism. Many of the standing stones thought to be *masseboth* (pillars connected with the cultus) seem to be only the lower parts of columns for supporting the roof. Phallic worship, the practice of which has been deduced from standing columns and from small objects found scattered through the strata, seems to require evidence of a more positive character. Many of the burials interpreted as human sacrifices need not be sacrifices at all. Particularly is this true of the infant burials. Other reasons besides sacrifice might be suggested for the burial of infants near a high place, as at Gezer. Even the marks of fire on the bones of two infants hardly constitute proof. That the Canaanites practised child sacrifice is not unlikely, when we recall the stories of Abraham and Isaac, of Jephthah's daughter, and of the practice of the later Hebrew kings. To argue from the tender age of the supposed victims that they represented sacrifices of the first born is, of course, still less convincing. The conclusion must be that the

¹⁸ Quarterly Statement for July, 1907, p. 203.

theory of child sacrifice to account for the death of these young children is not made out.

The case for foundation sacrifices seems to rest on stronger evidence. In a house at Gezer was found the skeleton of an old woman "built into a space left vacant at the corner"; "the position of the skeleton relative to the walls left no doubt that they were placed there at the same time."¹⁹ Both at Gezer and at Megiddo skeletons have so often been found immediately beneath house walls as to make the theory of foundation sacrifice seem not improbable. It is thought that the story of the rebuilding of Jericho by Hiel with the death of his first-born and his youngest son (1 Kings 16 34) may refer to this custom.²⁰

Our knowledge of cup holes has been increased in two directions. First, we now know that their use begins in very early times, since they are found cut in the rock underneath the débris of the oldest occupations at some of the sites excavated. Secondly, that they had at times religious significance is made more probable by their occurrence and peculiar arrangement in the floors of some of the early caves at Gezer. The practice of cutting these holes must have continued for a very long time. One who travels through the country today comes across them constantly. Their great frequency in one of the cemeteries at Samieh seems to imply some connection with burial customs. At other places they doubtless served different ends. Other uses suggested by Doctor Schumacher are to support pointed jars and sacrificial columns, and to receive libations of water.²¹

Of the notable object ornamented with figures in relief found by Sellin at Ta'anach no interpretation seems so probable as that it is an altar for incense. Some of the bronze dishes on the top of rods rising from feet resting on rings may well have the same use. The great religious discovery of which we need feel no doubt is the high place at Gezer with its standing megaliths, the most imposing object found in any of the tells. Taken in connection with the similar but smaller series at Tell es-Safi and

¹⁹ Macalister, *Bible Side-Lights*, p. 169.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 166; cf. Joshua 6 26.

²¹ *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten*, 1906, p. 12. Schumacher compares the pouring out of water before Jehovah, 1 Samuel 7 6, 2 Samuel 23 16.

with some of the standing columns at Ta'anach and Megiddo, the Gezer stones aid us greatly in picturing to ourselves the *masseboth* which were so prominent a feature in Hebrew worship till a late period in the national life. In a pit near it was found a large quantity of bones, which were possibly the remains of sacrificial victims. A pit with bones was also found near what seems to have been an altar at Megiddo. Such pits, we may suppose, were found at Hebrew shrines as well. The bones in the Gezer pit were human as well as animal, a circumstance which ends additional weight to the theory of human sacrifice.

But I must repeat that thus far the value of the excavations for the Hebrew period has been indirect rather than direct. To some readers this paper may seem not to attach sufficient importance to interpretations offered by the explorers. But it is better to understate than to overstate the results. Those who wish to see a fuller treatment of the subject, may find it in the admirable book of Professor Hugues Vincent of the Dominican School at Jerusalem.²² It is hoped that the permit to excavate Samaria just granted by the Turkish government to Harvard University may lead to discoveries of more direct bearing on Hebrew history and religion.

²² Canaan d'après l'exploration récente, Paris, 1907.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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Whatever else it may mean in art or morals, there is no doubt whatever that in economics the word value means power in exchange and nothing more. It is the power which an article possesses of commanding other desirable things in peaceful and voluntary exchange. Why a thing has this power is the first problem in economic value.

Whether it be universally agreed to or not, it is none the less true that utility and scarcity, and these alone, are necessary to give value to a thing which is capable of being transferred. If it is *both* useful and scarce it will have value, and it will have value under no other conditions. By utility is meant the power to satisfy a want. Whether that want be fundamental or trivial, wholesome or pernicious, does not matter so far as value, or power in exchange, is concerned. The proposition that utility, or the power to satisfy a want, is essential to value becomes sufficiently obvious when it is translated into the proposition that nothing has value unless somebody wants it. By scarcity is meant insufficiency to satisfy wants. However abundant a thing may be, speaking absolutely, if there is not as much as is wanted in any time and place, it is scarce in that time and place; and however rare it may be, speaking absolutely, if there is as much as is wanted, or more, it is not scarce. The proposition that scarcity is essential to value becomes sufficiently obvious when it, in turn, is translated into the proposition that a thing has no value when everybody has as much as, or more than, he wants of it, as in the case of air. To sum up, whenever and wherever people want a thing, and want more of it than they have got, they will be willing to give something in exchange for it, and it will therefore possess value, or power in exchange, and it will possess value only under these conditions. So much by way of definition.

The question, Why do things have the power to satisfy wants? would lead us back through physiology and psychology quite to the borders of the unknowable. The question, Why are they scarce? would lead us also toward the unknowable, but by a somewhat different route. Into this philosophical hinterland of his science the economist has generally refrained from bursting lest he should be found poaching upon the preserves of the philosopher; but there are some things in this region which, when seen through the eyes of the economist, may come to have a new significance.

Of course the first and most obvious reason for the scarcity of goods is that nature has not provided them in sufficient abundance to satisfy all the people who want them. Of some things, it is true, she is bounteous in her supply; but of others she is niggardly. Things which are so bountifully supplied as to satisfy all who want them do not figure as wealth, or economic goods, because we do not need to economize in their use. But things which are scantily supplied must be meted out and made to go as far as possible. That is what it means to economize. Because we must practise economy with respect to them they are called economic goods or wealth. Toward other things our habitual attitude is a non-economic one, but toward this class of things it is distinctly economic. In fact the whole economic system of society, the whole system of production, of valuation, of exchange, of distribution, and of consumption, is concerned with this class of goods—toward increasing their supply and making the existing supply go as far as possible in the satisfaction of wants.

The fact that there are human wants for whose satisfaction nature does not provide in sufficient abundance—in other words, the fact of scarcity—signifies that man is, to that extent at least, out of harmony with nature. The desire for fuel, clothing, and shelter, grows out of the fact that the climate is more severe than our bodies are fitted to endure, and this alone argues a very considerable lack of harmony. The lack is only emphasized by the fact that it is necessary for us to labor and endure fatigue in order to provide ourselves with these means of protecting our bodies against the rigors of nature. That labor also which is expended in the production of food means nothing if not that there are more mouths to be fed, in certain regions at least, than

nature has herself provided for. She must therefore be subjugated, and compelled to yield larger returns than she is willing to do of her own accord. And that expanding multitude of desires, appetites, and passions which drive us as with whips; which send us to the ends of the earth after gewgaws with which to bedeck our bodies, and after new means of tickling the five senses; which make us strive to outshine our neighbors, or at least not to be outshone by them—these even more than our normal wants show how widely we have fallen out of any natural harmony which may supposedly have existed in the past.

That there is a deeper harmony lying hidden somewhere beneath these glaring disharmonies is quite possible. Certainly no one can positively assert that it is not so. It may be true, as some profoundly believe, that these natural discomforts, with the necessity for work which accompanies them, furnish a discipline which is necessary for our highest good. Being thus driven by a *vis a tergo* toward our own highest good, we may be in harmony with our surroundings in ways which do not appear to our immediate sense of self-interest. But this whole question lies within the field of philosophical conjecture, and nothing positive can be affirmed on either side.

Our leaning toward a theory of a deep-lying harmony is easy enough so long as we contemplate only the civilized races of the temperate zones. They are obviously better off than the tropical races, which are *apparently* less out of harmony with their environment. But our faith is likely to receive a shock when we contemplate the hyperboreans. They, if any, are under the chastening hand of nature; they, if any, are driven by hard necessity; if discipline is what men need, they have it; and yet they do not progress according to any standard which we can understand. Even the comparison of the races of the temperate zone with those of the tropics lends doubtful support to the theory, because it is by no means certain that there is any less conflict between man and nature in the tropics than elsewhere. The climate is milder, it is true, and nature is more profuse in her supply of food; but she is also more profuse in the supply of living enemies of man, and living enemies, especially the invisible ones, are quite as dangerous and as difficult to guard against

as inhospitable weather. Saying nothing of beasts of prey and venomous creatures, the hook worm, the mosquito, and the divers sorts of harmful bacteria all imperil the lives of the dwellers in the tropics quite as much as the east winds do the lives of our New Englanders. While these tropical enemies are as dangerous, they are even more difficult to guard against than those with which we have to contend. The amount of intelligence which is required to see the necessity of clothing and shelter in our climate is small as compared with that which was required to see the necessity of exterminating the mosquito, to take a single illustration, in the fever-haunted tropics. On the whole, therefore, it would be quite as easy to maintain the thesis that the civilized races are less out of harmony with their natural environment than the uncivilized races—in other words, that the most civilized races occupy those parts of the globe where the necessity for work is least—as it would be to maintain the opposite thesis. If that thesis be sound, the theory of a deep-lying harmony between man and nature could scarcely stand. The truth probably is that the more civilized races occupy those regions where the advantages to be gotten by work are most obvious to the average intelligence. This leaves us without any light whatever upon the question of an underlying harmony.

Whatever our belief upon that point may be, there is not the slightest doubt that men are sometimes cold and hungry and sick; and that these discomforts would be much more frequent than they now are, if men did not work to prevent them. But work causes fatigue. Obviously the individual cannot be expected to see in this situation any sign of a complete harmony between himself and his material environment. So far as the individual can see and understand, the lack of harmony between himself and nature is a very real one.

Viewed from this standpoint, the whole economic struggle becomes an effort to attain to a harmony which does not naturally exist. As is well known, the characteristic difference between the non-economizing animals, on the one hand, and man, the economizer, on the other, is that in the process of adaptation the animals are passively adapted to their environment, whereas man assumes the active rôle in attempting to adapt his environment

to himself. If the climate is cold, animals must develop fur or blubber; but man builds fires, constructs shelters, and manufactures clothing. If there are enemies to fight against, the animals must develop claws or fangs, horns or hoofs, whereas man makes bows and arrows, or guns and ammunition. The whole evolutionary process, both passive and active, both biological and economic, is a development away from less toward greater adaptation, from less toward greater harmony between the species and its environment.

That phase of the disharmony between man and nature which takes the form of scarcity gives rise also to a disharmony between man and man. Where there is scarcity there will be two men wanting the same thing; and where two men want the same thing there is an antagonism of interests. Where there is an antagonism of interests between man and man there will be questions to be settled, questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice; and these questions could not arise under any other condition. The antagonism of interests is, in other words, what gives rise to a moral problem, and it is, therefore, about the most fundamental fact in sociology and moral philosophy.

This does not overlook the fact that there are many harmonies between man and man, as there are between man and nature. There may be innumerable cases where all human interests harmonize, but these give rise to no problem and therefore we do not need to concern ourselves with them. As already pointed out, there are many cases where man and nature are in complete harmony. There are things, for example, which nature furnishes in sufficient abundance to satisfy all our wants; but these also give rise to no problem. Toward these non-economic goods our habitual attitude is one of indifference or unconcern. Where the relations between man and nature are perfect, why should we concern ourselves about them? But the whole industrial world is bent on improving those relations where they are imperfect. Similarly with the relations between man and man; where they are perfect, that is, where interests are all harmonious, why should we concern ourselves about them? As a matter of fact we do not. But where they are imperfect, where interests are antagonistic and trouble is constantly arising, we are compelled

to concern ourselves whether we want to or not. As a matter of fact, we do concern ourselves in various ways; we work out systems of moral philosophy and theories of justice, after much disputation; we establish tribunals where, in the midst of much wrangling, some of these theories are applied to the settlement of actual conflicts; we talk and argue interminably about the proper adjustment of antagonistic interests of various kinds, all of which, it must be remembered, grow out of the initial fact of scarcity—that there are not as many things as people want.

That underneath all these disharmonies there is a deep underlying harmony of human interests is the profound belief of some. But this belief, like that in a harmony between man and nature, is not susceptible of a positive support. It rests upon philosophical conjecture—and faith. To be sure, it is undoubtedly true that most men, even the strongest, are better off in the long run under a just government, where all their conflicts are accurately and wisely adjudicated, than they would be in a state of anarchy, where every one who was able did what he pleased, and what he could, if he was not able to do what he pleased. This might possibly be construed to imply a harmony of interests, in that all alike, the strong as well as the weak, are interested in maintaining a just government. But the argument is violently paradoxical, because it literally means that interests are so very antagonistic that, in the absence of a government to hold them in check, there would be such a multiplicity of conflicts, wasting the energies of society, that in the end everybody would suffer, even the strongest. This is an excellent argument in favor of the necessity of government, but it is the poorest kind of an argument in favor of the universal harmony of human interests.

Fundamentally, therefore, there are only two practical problems imposed upon us. The one is industrial and the other moral; the one has to do with the improvement of the relations between man and nature, and the other with the improvement of the relations between man and man. But these two primary problems are so inextricably intermingled, and they deal with such infinitely varying factors, that the secondary and tertiary problems are more than we can count.

But whence arises that phase of the conflict with nature out of

which grows the conflict between man and man? Is man in any way responsible for it, or is it due wholly to the harshness or the niggardliness of nature? The fruitfulness of nature varies, of course, in different environments. But in any environment there are two conditions, for both of which man is in a measure responsible, and either of which will result in economic scarcity. One is the indefinite expansion of human wants, and the other is the multiplication of numbers.

The well-known expansive power of human wants, continually running beyond the power of nature to satisfy, has attracted the attention of moralists in all times and places. "When goods increase, they are increased that eat them: and what good is there to the owners thereof, saving the beholding of them with their eyes?" is the point of view of *The Preacher*. It was the same aspect of life, obviously throwing man out of harmony with nature, which gave point to the Stoic's principle of "living according to nature." To live according to nature would necessarily mean, among other things, to keep desires within such limits as nature could supply without too much coercion. Seeing that the best things in life cost nothing, and that the most ephemeral pleasures are the most expensive, there would appear to be much economic wisdom in the Stoic philosophy. But the pious Buddhist, in his quest of Nirvana, overlooking the real point—that the expansion of wants beyond nature's power to satisfy is what throws man inevitably out of harmony with nature and produces soul-killing conflicts—sees in desire itself the source of evil, and seeks release in the eradication of all desire.

Out of the view that the conflict of man with nature is a source of evil grow two widely different practical conclusions as to social conduct. If we assume that nature is beneficent and man at fault, the conclusion follows as a matter of course that desires must be curbed and brought into harmony with nature, which is closely akin to Stoicism, if it be not its very essence. But if, on the contrary, we assume that human nature is sound, then the only practical conclusion is that external nature must be coerced into harmony with man's desires and made to yield more and more for their satisfaction. This is the theory of the modern industrial spirit in its wild pursuit of wealth and luxury.

Even if the wants of the individual never expanded at all, it is quite obvious that an indefinite increase in the number of individuals in any locality would, sooner or later, result in scarcity and bring them into conflict with nature, and therefore into conflict with one another. That human populations are physiologically capable of indefinite increase, if time be allowed, is admitted, and must be admitted by any one who has given the slightest attention to the subject. Among the non-economizing animals and plants, it is not the limits of their procreative power, but the limits of subsistence, which determine their numbers. Neither is it lack of procreative power which limits numbers in the case of man, the economic animal. With him also it is a question of subsistence, but of subsistence according to some standard. Being gifted with economic foresight, he will not multiply beyond the point where he can maintain that standard of life which he considers decent. *But*—and this is to be especially noted—so powerful are his procreative and domestic instincts that he *will* multiply up to the point where it is *difficult* to maintain whatever standard he has. Whether his standard of living be high or low to begin with, the multiplication of numbers will be carried to the point where he is in danger of being forced down to a lower standard. In other words, it will always be hard for us to make as good a living as we think we ought to have. Unsatisfied desires, or economic scarcity, which means the same thing, are therefore inevitable. It is a condition from which there is no possible escape. The cause lies deeper than forms of social organization; it grows out of the relation of man to nature.

These considerations reveal a third form of conflict—perhaps it ought to be called the second—a conflict of interests within the individual himself. If the procreative and domestic instincts are freely gratified, there will inevitably result a scarcity of means of satisfying other desires, however modest those desires may be, through the multiplication of numbers. If an abundance of these things is to be assured, those instincts must be only partially satisfied. Either horn of the dilemma leaves us with unsatisfied desires of one kind or another. We are therefore pulled in two directions, and this also is a condition from which there is no

possible escape. But this is only one illustration of the internal strife which tears the individual. The very fact of scarcity means necessarily that if one desire is satisfied it is at the expense of some other. What I spend for luxuries I cannot spend for necessities; what I spend for clothing I cannot spend for food; and what I spend for one kind of food I cannot spend for some other. This is the situation which calls for economy, since to economize is merely to choose what desires shall be gratified, knowing that certain others must, on that account, remain ungratified. Economy always and everywhere means a threefold conflict; a conflict between man and nature, between man and man, and between the different interests of the same man.

This suggests the twofold nature of the problem of evil. Evil in the broadest sense, merely means disharmony, since any kind of disharmony is a source of pain to somebody. But that form of disharmony which arises between man and nature has, in itself, no moral qualities. It is an evil to be cold or hungry, to have a tree fall upon one, to be devoured by a wild beast or wasted by microbes. But to evils of this kind, unless they are in some way the fault of other men, we never ascribe any moral significance whatever. It is also an evil for one man to rob another, or to cheat him, or in any way to injure him through carelessness or malice, and we do ascribe a moral significance to evils of this kind—to any evil, in fact, which grows out of the relations of man with man. But, as already pointed out, this latter form of evil—in other words, moral evil—grows out of, or results from, the former which may be called non-moral evil. Any true account of the origin of moral evil must therefore begin with the disharmony between man and nature.

Let us imagine a limited number of individuals living in a very favorable environment, where all their wants could be freely and fully gratified, where there was no scarcity nor any need for economy. Under a harmony with nature so nearly perfect as this, there could arise none of those conflicts of interests within the individual, since the gratification of one desire would never be at the expense of some other; nor could there arise any conflict of interests among individuals, since the gratification of one individual's desire would never prevent the gratification of

another's. There being no conflict of interests either within the individual or among different individuals, there could never arise a moral problem. That would be paradise. But suppose that wants should expand, or new wants develop; or suppose that, through the gratification of an elemental impulse, numbers should increase beyond any provision which nature had made. Paradise would be lost. Not only would labor and fatigue be necessary, but an antagonism of interests and a moral problem would arise. Human ingenuity would have to be directed, not only toward the problem of increasing the productivity of the earth, but toward the problem of adjusting conflicting interests. Questions of justice and equity would begin to puzzle men's brains.

It would be difficult to find in this illustration any suggestion of original sin or hereditary taint of any kind. The act which made for increase of numbers, instead of being a sinful one, for which punishment was meted out as a matter of justice, would, on the contrary, be as innocent of moral guilt as any other. But *the inevitable consequence* of it would be the destruction of the pre-existing harmony, giving rise, in turn, to a conflict of human interests. Nor does the illustration suggest or imply any "fall" or change in human nature, but rather a change of conditions under which the same human qualities would produce different social results. Moreover, the illustration does not depend for its validity upon its historical character; that is to say, it is not necessary to show that there ever was a harmony between man and nature so nearly complete as the illustration assumes to begin with. The fundamental basis of conflict is clearly enough revealed by the illustration when it is shown to be inherent in the nature of man and of the material world about him.

This theory of the origin of evil is already embodied in a well-known story, which need not be interpreted as having a historical basis in order to have a profound meaning—more profound, probably, than its most reverent students have seen in it. Once upon a time there was a garden in which lived a man and a woman, all of whose wants were supplied by the spontaneous fruits of the earth. There was no struggle for existence, no antagonism of interests; in short that was paradise. But the gratification of a

certain desire brought increase of numbers, and increase of numbers brought scarcity, and paradise was lost. Thenceforward man was to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. The struggle for existence had set in. Man had to contend against either natural or human rivals for the means of satisfying his wants, and every form of greed and rapacity had a potential existence. When his eyes were opened to these inherent antagonisms, that is, when he became a discernor of good and evil, of advantages and disadvantages, both near and remote, he became an economic being, an adapter of means to ends, a chooser between pleasures and pains. In short, the process of industrial civilization, of social evolution, had made its first faint beginning. The human race was caught in a network of forces from which it was never to extricate itself. It was adrift upon a current which set irresistibly outward—no man knew whither.¹

In this antagonism of interests, growing out of scarcity, the institutions of property, of the family, and of the state, all have their common origin. No one, for example, thinks of claiming property in anything which exists in sufficient abundance for all. But when there is not enough to go around, each unit of the supply becomes a prize for somebody, and there would be a general scramble, did not society itself undertake to determine to whom each unit should belong. Possession, of course, is not property; but when society recognizes one's right to a thing, and undertakes to protect him in that right, that is property. Wherever society is sufficiently organized to recognize these rights and to afford them some measure of protection, there is a state; and there is a family wherever there is a small group within which the ties of blood and kinship are strong enough to overcome any natural rivalry and to create a unity of interests. This unity of economic interests within the group is sufficient to separate it from the rest of the world, or from other similar groups among which the natural rivalry of interests persists. Saying nothing of the barbaric notion that wives and children are themselves property, even in the higher types of society it is the desire to safeguard those to whom one is bound by ties of natural affection, by sharing

¹ Cf. the article by the writer on "The Economic Interpretation of the Fall of Man," in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1900.

the advantages of property with them, which furnishes the basis for the legal definition of the family group.

Closely associated with the right of property—as parts of it in fact—is a group of rights such as that of contract, of transfer, of bequest, and a number of other things with which lawyers occupy themselves. It would be difficult to find any question in the whole science of jurisprudence, or of ethics, or politics, or any of the social sciences for that matter, which does not grow out of the initial fact of economic scarcity and the consequent antagonism of interests among men. This reveals, as nothing else can, the underlying unity of all the social sciences, that is, of all the sciences which have to do with the relations between man and man; and it shows very clearly that the unifying principle is an economic one. Even the so-called gregarious instinct may very probably be the product of the struggle for existence, which, in turn, is the product of scarcity—the advantage of acting in groups being the selective agency in the development of this instinct. But that question, like a great many others, lies beyond the field of positive knowledge. This does not necessarily constitute economics as the “master science,” with the other social sciences subordinate to it; but it does signify that, if there is such a thing as a master science, economics has the first claim to that position among the social sciences. The economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which all other social and moral problems have grown.

Though it lies somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper, it would be interesting, nevertheless, to follow up our conclusion with an examination of the possibilities of escape from the situation which is imposed upon us by economic scarcity. The method of stoicism, or the repression of desires, now going under the name of “the simple life,” and of industrialism or the multiplication of goods, have already been mentioned. Complete escape, by either of these methods, seems to be cut off, in the first place by the refusal of desires, especially the elementary ones, to be repressed, and, in the second place, by the utter impossibility of increasing goods to a point which will provide for every possible increase in population when population is unchecked by economic motives. If economic motives continue to operate as a check upon population, that is in itself an evidence of continued scarcity.

But if they do not operate, and the procreative instincts are given free play, there is absolutely no limit to the increase of population. Any one who has ever been initiated into the mysteries of geometrical progression will not entertain the slightest doubt on this point.

But even under the conditions of economic scarcity there would be no antagonism of interests between man and man if human nature were to undergo a change by which altruism were to replace egoism. If I could develop the capacity to enjoy food upon my neighbor's palate as well as upon my own, as I have already developed the capacity to enjoy it upon the palates of my children, and if my neighbor could develop a like regard for me, obviously there could be no antagonism of interests between us on the subject of food. Let this capacity become universal, and the moral problem would be solved. That would be the Christian's Millennium. Whether this way of escape lies open or not, in other words, whether such a change in human nature is possible or not, is a problem for the psychologist or the religionist. Support for the affirmative of that question comes from a somewhat unexpected quarter, namely from the writings of the late Mr. Herbert Spencer, who must be classed among the premillenarians. The closing words of his *Principles of Sociology*, which are, in fact, the final conclusion of his whole system of Synthetic Philosophy, are as follows: . . . "On the one hand, by continual repression of aggressive instincts and exercise of feelings which prompt ministration to public welfare, and on the other hand by the lapse of restraints, gradually becoming less necessary, there must be produced a kind of man so constituted that while fulfilling his own desires he fulfils also the social needs. . . . Long studies, showing among other things the need for certain qualifications above indicated, but also revealing facts like that just named, have not caused me to recede from the belief expressed nearly fifty years ago that—"The ultimate man will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.'"

This conclusion differs from that of the ordinary premillenarian only in the method by which the end is to be reached. According to Mr. Spencer's argument, it is not to be by evangelization, but by the sterner process of exterminating the unsocial and preserving the social elements in the population, until the whole population is made over into a new type. The execution and imprisonment of criminals, thus preventing them from breeding more of their own kind, undoubtedly work in this direction, but they leave us a long way short of the goal. That we may approach it indefinitely seems reasonable, but that it is ever attainable, either by the method of biological evolution or of evangelization, or by both combined, is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is certainly a long way off. Meanwhile what are we to do?

We may escape from some of the worst features of the situation by working along several lines at the same time. Every improvement in the arts of production, whereby a given quantity of labor is enabled to produce a larger quantity of the means of satisfying wants, tends, of course, in some degree to alleviate scarcity. If this can be supplemented by the doctrine of the simple life, made effective especially in the lives of the wealthier classes, so much the better; for then there will be fewer wants to satisfy. If this result can be still further strengthened by a rising sense of the responsibilities of parenthood, whereby the reckless spawning of population can be checked, especially among those classes who can least afford to spawn, the discrepancy between numbers and provisions will be kept at a minimum. Again, a more widespread spirit of altruism, or even a milder and more enlightened egoism such as that which moves the farmer to take delight in the sleek appearance of his horses, or the English landlord to take pride in the comfortable appearance of his tenants and cotters, would go a long way toward softening the antagonism of interests among men.

In spite of all these methods, however, there will still be antagonistic interests to be adjudicated. The state must therefore continue to administer justice. But every improvement in our conceptions of justice, as well as in the machinery for the administration of justice, whereby a closer approximation to exact justice may be secured, will make for social peace; though the mere

adjudication of conflicting interests will not remove the conflicts themselves nor their cause. That lies deeper than legislatures or courts can probe.

These conclusions sound commonplace enough, and are doubtless disappointing to those who hope for a new earth through some engine of social regeneration. The old world is already pegging away, and has been for a very long time, upon all the plans which have been mentioned in this paper. But after all, the old world is wise—much wiser than any man, though there are some men who think otherwise.

THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE

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The belief in a doctrine of Providence, at least in some sense of the word, is inseparable from theism. Let a man once assume a good God or a righteous universe, and he thereby also assumes that all events must be directed, or at least overruled, for good. Perhaps, however, it is a little easier to declare what one means when he says, "there is a God," than to explain what one means by "the divine Providence." Do we believe in a special Providence, that enters into each particular act or moment, so that, for example, it is literally true that not a sparrow "shall fall to the ground without your Father"? Do we think that the infinite Power carries every individual life in its thought, and even plans, and cares what each man does, suffers, or enjoys? Or do we think of Providence as merely a general guiding agency, like the intelligence that steers a ship in safety without any special responsibility for the conduct or the pleasure of the passengers? Do we think that a man can interfere, by the exercise of his little will, with the working of divine Providence? Or does Providence also enter into and direct the motion of every individual will, as it may be conceived to enter into the motion of the sands on the beach?

In one view it might be as well not to ask any of these questions. It may be held that the idea of a good Providence goes with a very common and helpful religious sentiment. This is trust, or faith. It is expressed in the ancient words, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Or again, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." It matters little, it may be said, whether such trust as this be required to justify and explain itself. It is better to cherish it, though ever so vague, or even without giving any reason for it, than not to have it at all. For without it life would hardly be bearable.

We are challenged, however, at times to ask, and to answer,

what we mean by this marvellous trust in a righteous or beneficent Providence. Some tremendous calamity occurs, like the eruption of Vesuvius or the earthquakes at San Francisco and Valparaiso. In the face of such a vast devastation, the whole world is set to thinking. Is this destruction and slaughter also a part of the divine Providence?

There are indeed minds that are forced early and often to raise this searching question, without waiting for colossal happenings. They are sensitive to the common daily facts of bruises, pain, disease, misfortune, death, crimes, wars. What can Providence mean in a world where such things color all life and characterize history? The faculty of reason in us will not leave us content to hide our heads in the sand like ostriches; we are obliged to ask what kind of a world is it that we live in, orderly or not, rational or not, good or bad, providential or moving at random? It is at least a tenable theory that we have minds and a sense of justice because we share the thought and the compelling righteousness of a good Power. In any case we do well to use our minds and to exercise our sense of justice. There are those of us who cannot help ourselves in this regard; we had rather die than be forbidden to ask the questions that the universe urges upon us.

Moreover, we who are parents, or teachers, or friends, are bound sometimes to define what we mean, or at least what we do not mean, by Providence, in order to set aside certain dreadful notions of God's doings which on occasion our children or our neighbors disclose. Thus, the letter of one of the narrators of the earthquake in California tells of a child who remarked, "Now I know there is a God, for no one else could shake the earth so awful." And the prayer appointed by one of our American bishops to be read in his diocese after the disaster uses the words, "When thou hast made the earth to tremble and the mountains thereof to shake." Here is something very like the old Greek conception of Poseidon, the earth-shaking God. We submit that it needs extremely wise teaching to relieve the minds of children, and grown people too, of the terror of this crude thought.

Again, while it is wonderfully suggestive that in the public comment upon great calamities very little of the old thought of them as a judgment upon men's sins appears, yet we know that this

idea survives and finds occasional utterance. "It was all on account of the terrible wickedness of the city," said a good Roman Catholic maid to her employer after the disaster at San Francisco, hardly conscious of the heavy ruin of the property of her own Church in that city. Here is a fearful load on men's minds, so often as they still think of God as dealing out vengeance and punishment like an angry oriental potentate. Almost better have no God at all, than a God whose Providence we could not respect—less godlike than the best men are. As against such a God of vengeance, we go over to the side of the defiant but noble Prometheus.

Hardly more tolerable is the notion of God's Providence as "sending," as it were arbitrarily, pain, death, and calamity, by way of discipline and chastening. The trouble with this conception is that God is set forth as over against mankind. He disciplines, and their part is to suffer. He does what he pleases, even when he pleases to chasten them for their good. But we do not easily love a God who does as he pleases or acts arbitrarily towards his creatures. Our ethical and spiritual demand is for a conception of a God of whom it may be said, "In all their affliction he was afflicted."

In fact, we believe it would be truer to say that God could not have helped the fact of the sorrow, the blow, the eruption, or the earthquake, than to say this bold and terrible word, "He sent it upon us." This brings us frankly to the question whether there is not a true sense in which we must deny the prevalent thought of the omnipotence of deity, and admit that as he may be conceived to suffer with men in their sorrows, so he may be thought of as being bound, or compelled, or limited (by self-limitation it may be), as men are doubtless bound and limited. We are reminded at once of the great name of John Stuart Mill, as one who was obliged to limit God's omnipotence in order to save his goodness.

There are several modes of philosophy which go to the limitation of the divine power, and lead thus to a changed idea of his Providence. We may try the method of dualism, and, like the Persians, admit a God of mischief as well as a God of righteousness. Even Professor William James appears to suggest diverse powers behind phenomena. But modern science is built upon the

conception of a universe. Every new fact that we observe, or trace to its nexus of relations, carries our minds up to a conviction of an underlying unity. The whirlwind and the storm are related to the sunshine, without which the air could not have been stirred. The earthquake itself is found to be an incident in an orderly process through which the world has become habitable. This idea of a universe, where all things play together, rules intentional mischief or hate out of the whole field of natural happenings.

Meanwhile, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of a universe in which all outward nature, inclusive of blight, disease, and death, is bound together, and to admit at the same time a scheme of dualism or pluralism to account for the untoward events in human history or in the life of the individual. If this is a universe in any sense, it must be a universe throughout, inclusive of human suffering, crime, and unhappiness. In fact, the dualists generally expect eventual harmony and the triumph of good over evil. This is to confess faith in a universe, where good is the ruling principle, and evil only a phase or an incident. The old question therefore recurs, How does evil get into a good universe?

It seems childish to say that matter, with which the guiding and beneficent intelligence of the world has to work, is more or less inchoate and unmalleable in its nature. For where does matter come from? Is it another and independent power which the Almighty has to learn to handle? The truth is that the order, the beauty, and the correlation of the processes of nature are just as conspicuous in the things that hurt and sting us, and wreck our ships and overturn our palaces, as in the things that merely please us. The eye of the house-fly or the skin of the rattlesnake is as great a marvel of creation as the peach tree or the rose bush.

It used to be urged that God governed the world by second causes. It was as if he had set up a hierarchy of powers—gravitation, heat, electricity, and others—and left them, like the inferior gods of the Greek pantheon, to take care of the world while he rested. When anything mischievous happened, we had to lay it not to God, but to the wild or untamed power, as men once blamed Aeolus, or as Aeolus himself blamed his own winds. Everyone of course sees that whatever God's forces do (whatever "forces" may mean), God himself does, and must be accountable

for, so far at least as there is accountability at all. We gain nothing in the clearness of our thought by separating the powers of the world from the ruling intelligence, any more than by separating the realm of matter from the realm of the spirit.

Is it not possible, however, that there may be a general Providence, guiding the processes of nature and the life of conscious creatures toward good, without entering into the details of their processes? This is what Tennyson's lines suggest:

So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life.

But in this view the doctrine of Providence which the religious instinct demands seems almost wholly to evaporate. There is no sense of love in a universe that takes no care for the individual life. What is the use of the type, if the single life is of no account? There is no general welfare in a world whose individuals are sacrificed. For the general good is composed of the good of the units. Either there is no God at all, in our human use of the word and for any practical purpose, or else the Providence that cares for the whole cares also for the parts and for the individuals. But if God cares for us in our enjoyments, and ordains our gains and growth and welfare, how is not God also behind our sorrows, our losses, and our ills?

It has been said that God's Providence, and therefore his power, is limited by man's freedom of will. Mischief enters the world through man's wilful misdoings. This is very like the naïve story in Genesis. The fact is that all that man calls evil in the physical world, including man's own brute ancestry, lies back of Eden and is wrapped up in world conditions with which man had nothing to do. The worst enemies of our happiness are not plague and pestilence, but ignorance, hatred, jealousy, selfishness—all inherited with the animal nature. If these things constitute "original sin," then we did not originate sin, any more than we created our own wills, but sin is simply our misfortune; or—shall we say?—one of the inevitable conditions upon which we are made to be men.

Let us frankly admit that we cannot see how to limit God's power, or his wisdom, without also limiting his goodness as well.

If there is a God in any valid sense, he is not a blunderer. He is not a mere learner as we are; he has not abdicated his responsibility, or left blind forces to act in his stead; he cannot be handicapped for want of adequate power; there is nowhere the sense that his power is giving out. If he cares for the whole, it must be by virtue of caring for all the details and the parts. If he is one, it is because he is also immanent in all things. If he makes the good to appear, it must be because he uses also what we call evil. In short, a divine Providence must be a Providence in particulars. Everything and every life enters into the divine order of a universe.

There is one form of the limitation of the divine Power that we have not considered: Omnipotence, at least if guided by wisdom and goodness, cannot do preposterous and incongruous things; cannot make a square other than a square, or two plus two more than four. It cannot at the same time have a thing and go without it, any more than we can. It cannot create a finite world in time and space, and not use the conditions of finiteness. In other words, we cannot think of God or his universe except in terms of rationality.

Let us venture now, though with becoming modesty, to suggest certain respects in which we men may enter into, and even sympathize with, God's limitations in the working of his Providence. We, who are parents or teachers, admit hardships, pain, and trouble into our children's lives as really as God admits the same factors into the lives of men generally. We sit by with unused power to help them and unused knowledge to direct them, and we let them stumble and fall and suffer, and do not interfere. We put sharp tools into their hands, prevising that they will cut themselves. We could keep them off the ice, or out of perilous sail-boats, or out of games and sports; but we choose to see them go into various ways of danger. The tender mother on occasion sends her boy to die for his country, and often to do business in the wilderness or on the sea. It is the highest form of human love that thus lets its children suffer. It is a lower form of love that tries to exempt them from all pain.

The truth is that life is somehow a study or discipline, and also at the same time an appreciation and enjoyment of values in a great developing hierarchy of "uses," as Swedenborg truly insists.

We might conceivably get for our children ease, comfort, luxury, wealth, exemption from pain. But, without depreciating these things, we know that they are of very low value. Comfort and luxury rarely, if ever, make men any better, or bring anything more than a momentary thrill of happiness. We know that, like an enervating atmosphere, they mostly harm the lives of young people. We also know that out of bumps, bruises, cuts, falls, blunders, humiliation, children learn to walk, to ride, to sail, to wrestle, and above all, to reach the high terms of courage, constancy, loyalty, truth, friendship.

We do not "chasten" our children; we do not arbitrarily trip them up and make them fall; we do not stand over against the child and send humiliation or distress upon him. On the contrary, in the true home, we are with the child in our sympathy; we suffer with his bruises and wounds; we feel his humiliation when he has failed in his lessons or has done wrong. We suffer with him, even though we can foresee how brief his pain will be, and know that he will be better and not worse for it in the end. It is a world of cost. There is no value without the law of cost. God himself cannot have human values without human suffering.

We may catch here a hint or parable of the divine Providence. We cannot think of God as standing away from the world of men and inflicting discipline as a taskmaster. But we conceive of God as in and with all human toil, struggle, and suffering. Life is not our business as men, apart from God, or God's affair apart from men. The enterprise, the values, the cost, the sufferings, are his and ours too. It is a common life. This is the real doctrine of the incarnation. The story of the Christ is only the type of it. It is universal. If God suffered in one man, he suffers wherever men suffer.

Here is the mystery of love; it cannot be at all without cost and pain—not in God or man. Omnipotence could not set at nought a spiritual fact. Here is the mystery of pain. It can be translated into power, into wisdom, into goodness. We see the almost miraculous process daily. God's love is like our love; it contains sorrow as well as joy, and is richer so and more truly love.

All this goes with a different thought of God from what was

once held. God was the Absolute and the Abstract. You got the thought of God by thinking away whatever was most real to you as a man. God could not suffer or sympathize. This was to deny a real God. We are coming reverently to think of God as the one Life in which all real things consist; in which power, beauty, order, justice, love are one; in which therefore sorrow as well as joy is contained. Who was ever hurt, that is, made to be less truly a person, because of sorrow? The divine Life is not less, but more, by reason of this fact. We conceive that sympathy, then, is in the very nature of God. This conception, once entertained, alters forever the problem of the nature of the divine Providence touching human calamity. We see what is meant in the saying that the "whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together." All this is part of the order of a divine universe.

We have already spoken of the risks and ventures of life. Let us be bold enough now to suggest that the element of hazard is essential to life. In other words, life would mean less and be less without it; and omnipotence could not repair the loss if this strand were cast out of the world. We practically say this daily. We would not vote to exclude risks and ventures. Or if we would so agree, it would be in our moods of weakness, fear, and indolence, not in the hour of our health and the mood of our manliness. A part of the daily work of life is to clear away wreckage, to bury the dead, to lay broader foundations, to build straighter road-beds and stancher ships—not to flee from the struggle and cost of existence, but to adjust ourselves more intelligently and hopefully to its ruling conditions. Thus the people of the wrecked city of San Francisco went to work at once to rebuild on the same risky site. They were willing to take their venture, though they might have sought a place safe from earthquakes. We take certain risks every day in our sports with a sense of joyous excitement, as also in the hazards of legitimate trade. We actually should not love life so well in a world where nothing happened, where no ventures challenged our daring, where the Weather Bureau had learned to be perfectly accurate in its forecasts. We are shy of a Bellamy Commonwealth, partly because it looks too prosperous, too comfortable, too safe, too barren of heroism. We say this in perfect

consistency with every attempt to modify brutal hazards, to save life, to assuage suffering, to transfer the field of venture from gross and vile forms of injustice and war to the fair fields of helpful social enterprise. We still believe that man must take brave ventures in some form as long as light and darkness alternate on the earth.

Shall we not be right now in saying that there is a poetic or dramatic element in life? We do not mean in a vulgar or spectacular sense, but rather in that view of the drama in which it has been said that it is the work of tragedy to "purify the soul." To call the development of the world and the process of history dramatic is to call it intellectual, moral, spiritual, significant. We should despise life if we did not surmise that it moved toward some splendid end and was finally to be interpretable into the victory of goodness which Paul calls "the manifestation of the sons of God."

There are two ways of looking at any work of construction. You can see it as a whole, as it lies in the mind of the poet or architect. In this sense you may pronounce it all very good. At our highest moments, in view of the grand procession of noble persons who have walked the earth, we men may even dare to say this of the universe. We see the splendid lines of its integrity; we see light always shining beyond its shadows; we see beauty, goodness, heroism, unity; we see in the noble and generous lives the high fruitage of God's world; we see all things ministering to the grand result; we think of ourselves as belonging, like citizens, to an ideal realm; at our best, we are sure in this large perspective that life is worth whatever it has cost.

The other view of the work of the poet or builder is as one sees only a part at a time, or looks on as the work progresses. We see the bare beginnings of the edifice, with the dust and chaos. We read only a part of the story, wherein there are chapters of pain and disappointment. The poet himself, we are certain, suffered also at these sorrowful points in his story. There are places in the drama where we may wish we had not come to see it, glad as we are afterwards that we stayed through to the victorious close.

Now it is not in omnipotence to have the whole and not to have the parts of which it is made; not to have the contrasts, not to have the heart-rending chapters, not to have the solemn passages, not to

have the seeming defeat of true love, before love had learned its mighty lesson of absolute devotion, to be willing to die that love might live.

So, we conceive, it is not in omnipotence to have man at all in this universe and not to have him first as a child or even as an untutored savage. It is not in God's power to have the type of Christ prevail in this world, and not to pass through terrible chapters where Herods and Caesars oppressed the innocent. Neither is it possible for any of us, even though we may hope that we share at times the thought of the infinite builder and poet, to stand by the wreck and waste and sorrow of some great human tragedy, and not cry out in sympathy, as men of the old times cried, "How long, O Lord, how long!" It is well for us to cry out, but we have a new hope in our cry. God is with us in it. There is no vengeance behind the calamity. Daily we learn to use the powers of nature as if indeed we were God's sons; to be unterrified by them, to rise superior to them; and even, if we must, to give up our little lives under their shock, with unabated confidence that they cannot hurt the indomitable spirit of man.

Men are already learning to a wonderful degree to take almost at the same time these two different views of vast public calamities, conflagrations, earthquake shocks, railroad accidents. On one side we are touched with the sense of a common suffering. We are all made to share it. We call it dreadful. On the other hand, we see it, as perhaps men never could have seen such an event before, with a sense of the wholeness of history. Again and again we find a great population undaunted by their troubles and stirred to a new civic patriotism. We see the civilized world coming to the help of ruined cities or famine-stricken provinces, and pouring in material and treasure to repair the loss, just as the wounded body draws contributions of restoring life from every cell. We see an awakening of sympathy and humanity binding the races of men together. We look forward a little while, and foresee safer and more splendid cities than those which have been destroyed. A little later the signs of the wreck will be covered with beauty. On the vast scale of the life of mankind, nothing has happened more serious than when, in a child's life, he has bruised his finger in a door or cut his foot with an ax. In the case of the great tragedy,

as with the sorrow and hurt of the child, no real or lasting evil has come to the values of the moral and spiritual life. There is no loss of human courage, patience, loyalty, good will. On the contrary, these grand values stand forth in clearer light.

There is a fine thought of Browning in his *Asolando* that may help us now. He traces the course of evolution:

From the first, Power was—I knew!
Life has made clear to me
That, strive but for closer view,
Love were as plain to see.

Let us venture to develop this thought. It is as if an artist were painting a picture. The artist sees it all in his mind's eye before he begins, as the Almighty Creator eternally carries the world in his thought. But look at the artist's beginning. It is a bare surface of pasteboard or canvas; then we see a mere crude sketch and vague lines; then the appearance of daubs and patches of color. Who would not criticize and condemn if this were all?

So with the course of God's world evolving in time. What could there be first except power? How could love show itself in the tremendous processes of a cooling planet? How could love be manifest in the great dull saurian creatures? Yet love is present, waiting and pressing to appear, though everything else must come first. Love is moral harmony: intelligence, art, music, and righteousness must work their way into the picture before love, the harmony, can come to view.

Intelligence now appears on the scene; men come with minds to ask questions and share the wonder of thought. The sense of beauty and the moral sense come to birth. Love presses the more to enter into the world. It takes its risks as it comes into a society only emerging from the animal life; it enters a world of strife and passion. It is the mightiest form of power yet known. But few yet possess intelligence enough to know the power of love when it comes. It has to win its way. The points where it appears seem out of relation with the great masses of the old crude wash that covers the canvas. The men who first know love are sufferers and martyrs, standing out in relief against the brutal world around them. The Christs go to their death. The lovers of liberty are

beheaded. All the more love, always pressing for admittance, wins over the hearts of men, stirs new thoughts in them, rouses their sense of justice, creates fresh and ideal demands. Every martyrdom is at last translated into a prayer, taken up now by the millions, that the world may be changed and redeemed from the ancient struggle of force to the beautiful order of love. Every pain is a mode of urgency, calling for light, intelligence, skill, and goodness. Every prayer or desire of man for the ideal things is the pressure of the love of God, the tireless artist, bringing beauty, welfare, and joy. Nothing is wasted in his work. Love comes as intelligence comes, as fast as men can bear it, as soon as they want it. It comes where power alone and knowledge alone have made men cry out for the harmony and unity that only love adds to life. Men could not have love, men could not understand it, nor pray for it aright, nor value it enough when it comes, if they had not first known the contrast of a world of power without love as yet made evident in it. The brute, selfish, loveless life must come first in the order of growth, that love might conquer at last. The law of contrast is in the nature of the universe, in the mind of God.

We may get some light now on certain alleged facts that men call "special providences." There are those indeed who repel us by their claim to be God's favorites, for whose sole benefit interventions are made, while others must suffer. The trains on which they travel are safeguarded, they tell us; they are providentially kept from taking the steamship doomed to wreck. We refer to another class of happenings. The most intelligent of men will sometimes tell us that everything in their lives seems to them, as they look back, to have been ordered aright. At least everything was usable and assimilable. All the events have fallen into line, and combined to make a unity. Even what seemed untoward things have proved to be good and not evil. It is as if the individual life followed some divine pattern or plan.

What now would you expect? Once grant the idea of an almighty artist or master of life, and it follows that, deep beneath the show of things, lines and patterns must everywhere prevail. God sees them and means them. It follows, again, that whenever any man enters into or shares in a measure the divine intelligence, and especially shares the divine purpose of goodness, in other words,

when a man orders his life with intelligent good-will, he sees somewhat as God sees; the patterns, the beauty, the unity, disclose themselves in small things as in large. The wing of the butterfly is as marvellous as the sight of the Alps. The story of the individual life may be more complete a unity than the bodily organism is. Take, for example, the Life of Gladstone, or Andrew D. White's Autobiography, or Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery* "All things work together for good" in such lives.

It is possible that we might even go further, and catch a clue to certain strange psychic facts. If all life goes by a master plan, who shall say that sensitive minds, Isaiah, for example, or Joan of Arc, taught by love, may not on occasion see below the bare surface of things, or see further than their neighbors, and so detect the ruling lines of destiny? For the world is structural and orderly; coming events do often cast their shadows before. There is a real science of prophecy, whereby the lover of justice or the seeker for truth has glimpses from the mountain top, and sees as if with the eye of God.

All this may seem to be very bold. "Who by searching can find out God?" Let us then put aside every venturesome word. Let us suppose that it is useless to question the divine Providence, or to seek to understand it. There remains a solid and impressive series of facts of experience. There is an attitude or mood in which man is at his strongest and best, in which indeed he is invincible. It is the attitude of trust—we will not say resignation; it is a higher and richer mood; there is hope in it or expectancy of good. Observe that this is exactly the attitude which one would take on the assumption of a divine world and a beneficent God. It is the attitude that corresponds to the ideas which we have been considering. It looks as if the ideas and the attitude ought to go together. But we will suppose now that a man takes this habitual attitude of trust, without seeking to give it any intellectual interpretation more than this vague but splendid faith, namely, that life must be well, here and hereafter, and in all times and places, for him who seeks to do his best and to "follow the glint." This is the substance of practical religion.

Now it is evident that the universe answers to the use of this trust in it. We have the testimony of innumerable witnesses on

this point. The noblest intelligences are one with the host of the humble good. The world certainly behaves like God's world to those who treat it so. No one ever took this attitude and found it to fail. No one ever took it for a day who found that day idle or unhappy. No one having strayed from this way ever came back to it and did not find it more solid than ever under his feet. No one in this attitude was ever discomfited. It looks, therefore, as if we touched here as firm a bit of reality as the world contains. In short, "the witness of the spirit" throughout generations runs with Whittier's lines,

That more and more a Providence
Of love is understood,
Making the springs of time and sense
Sweet with eternal good;

That death seems but a covered way
Which opens into light,
Wherein no blinded child can stray
Beyond the Father's sight.

